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Abstract
Despite changing family compositions, entrenched in family 
law is the antiquated idea that a two-parent household, or its 
approximation vis-à-vis a shared custody arrangement, promotes 
stability and integrity and, thus, is in the best interest of the 
child. Yet, the concept that the two-parent household (or shared 
involvement of both parents in the child’s life if the parents sepa-
rate) promotes stability for the family and is best for the child is a 
dangerous fallacy. When rape or intimate partner violence (IPV) 
is present, or the re-occurrence of violence remains a threat, the 
family unit is far from stable.
This Article explores the legal system’s glorification of the nu-
clear family, its resistance to shifting away from the two-parent 
paradigm, and how this resistance creates a stability paradox and 
perpetuates violence against women and children. The harmful 
impact that the nuclear family paradigm has on families is fur-
ther explored by an examination of the statutory constructs and 
judicial interpretations of termination of parental rights (TPR) 
and custody statutes in cases where a child is conceived as a result 
of rape or exposed to ongoing IPV.
Cases are utilized to examine how courts have interpreted 
parental rights statutes where a child is conceived as a result of 
rape. Additionally, a hypothetical case is discussed to explore ar-
guments that may be advanced in TPR cases where children are 
exposed to ongoing IPV. The Article finds that although there are 
inherent problems in enacting statutes to terminate parental 
rights in cases involving rape or IPV, legislation is also a neces-
sary tool for survivors. Model legislation is proposed for termina-
tion of parental rights in cases where a child is conceived as a re-
sult of a sexual offense or when a child is exposed to ongoing IPV.
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Introduction
Entrenched within the legal system1 is the antiquated assumption 
that a two-parent (often heterosexual) household2 promotes family sta-
bility and integrity, and thus is in the best interest of minor children. 
Enacted statutes codify this concept while judges’ interpretation and ap-
plication of laws reinforce it. In a recent case, for example, a mother’s 
boyfriend was granted in loco parentis standing3 even though he physi-
cally and sexually abused, stalked, and financially exploited the mother.4
The presiding judge highlighted the importance of having two parental 
figures in the child’s life “[e]specially given the fact that the child had 
already lost a father and [the mother’s boyfriend] was stepping in to that 
role, which seems to me to be something very important in a young 
child’s life to have a parental father figure.”5
In the family law context, the two-parent paradigm is most often 
observed in termination of parental rights (TPR) and custody cases. 
Legislators have enacted statutes to terminate parental rights when the 
parent is unfit or engaging in behaviors that place a child at risk of 
harm.6 Parental rights and custody cases come to the attention of the 
1. This Article will focus on family law.
2. The terms “nuclear family” and “two-parent family” are used interchangeably 
throughout this Article.
3. A third party has standing to file an action for custody if the person stands “in loco 
parentis to the child.” 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5324(2) (2018). “The term in loco 
parentis literally means ‘in the place of a parent.’ A person stands in loco parentis with 
respect to a child when he or she ‘assum[es] the obligations incident to the parental 
relationship without going through the formality of a legal adoption.’” A.J.B. v. 
A.G.B., 180 A.3d 1263, 1275 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018) (alteration in original) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Peters v. Costello, 891 A.2d 705, 710 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005)).
4. See Custody Complaint at ¶ 8, Hessler v. Goodrich, No. 2018-1508-CP (Susque-
hanna Cty. Ct. Com. Pl.); Petition to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for Custody and 
Subsequent Court Order Due to Lack of Standing as to Minor Child A.G. at ¶¶ 14, 
17-19, 21, Hessler v. Goodrich, No. 2018-1508-CP (Susquehanna Cty. Ct. Com. 
Pl.) (detailing boyfriend’s abuse); Order, Hessler v. Goodrich, No. 2018-1508-CP
(Susquehanna Cty. Ct. Com. Pl.) (denying defendant mother’s Motion to Dismiss 
for Lack of Standing).
5. Transcript of Jan. 8, 2019 Custody Hearing at 66, Hessler v. Goodrich, No. 2018-
1508-CP (Susquehanna Cty. Ct. Com. Pl.). Though this case involved separated par-
ties, it illustrates the pervasiveness of the notion in the family court system that chil-
dren’s developmental, emotional, and physical well-beings are enhanced when two 
“parents” have custodial rights to the children.
6. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533 (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103
(2009); FLA. STAT. § 39.806 (2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2269 (Supp. 2019); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.090 (West 2014); MINN. STAT. § 260C.301 (2015); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 93-15-119 (2018); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2511 (2010).
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court in different ways. In some states, only state actors such as the At-
torney General’s Office may petition for termination of parental rights 
of one or both biological parents, while in other states, a biological par-
ent or third party may petition to terminate the biological parent’s (or 
parents’) parental rights.7 Grounds for terminating a parent’s rights in-
clude abuse, neglect, abandonment, and substance abuse disorders.8 In 
order to terminate parental rights, the petitioning party must prove the 
grounds for TPR by clear and convincing evidence.9 Most statutes also 
require that the petitioner prove that TPR is in the best interest of the 
child.10 This means that the decision to terminate parents’ rights must 
provide for the child’s emotional and physical well-being and individual 
needs.11 Although legislators enact TPR statutes, judges ultimately de-
7. For states that do not allow private litigants to file for TPR, see, e.g., ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 9-27-341(a)(1)(B) (2015 & Supp. 2019) (stating that termination of parental 
rights is not a remedy available to “private litigants”); S.J.G. v. A.A.G., 970 So. 2d 
1022, 1027 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that “there are no circumstances under 
which one parent may file a petition to terminate the parental rights of another par-
ent”); OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.500 (2019) (stating that a petition to terminate paren-
tal rights may only be “filed by the state or the ward for purpose of freeing the ward 
for adoption”); In re John, 605 A.2d 486, 488-89 (R.I. 1992) (holding there is no 
“private right to terminate parental rights” under 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7
(2003)). For states that do, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533(A) (stating that any 
person who “has a legitimate interest” in the well-being of the child may file for ter-
mination of parental rights); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 93-15-107(1)(a) (stating that “any 
interested person” may file); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-2530(A) (2010) (same); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78A-6-504(1) (LexisNexis 2018) (same); In re Adoption of Liam O., 
138 A.3d 485, 488 (Me. 2016) (“Although the process is unusual, the Legislature has 
given a parent the right to adopt her own child, even when her parenthood is not 
questioned, so that in conjunction with that adoption proceeding, she may seek the 
termination of the other parent’s parental rights.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-
1103(a)(1) (2019) (stating that either parent may file when seeking termination of 
the other parent’s rights); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-310(a)(i) (2019) (same). Some 
states limit standing to certain circumstances. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-
113 (2017 & Supp. 2020) (limiting parental standing to circumstances in which the 
other parent was convicted of certain enumerated crimes whereas other persons such 
as adoptive parents, extended family members caring for the child, and the child’s
guardian ad litem have standing to terminate the biological parent’s rights on more 
expansive grounds such as abuse and neglect).
8. See e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103; FLA.
STAT. § 39.806; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2269; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.090; 
MINN. STAT. § 260C.301; MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-15-119; 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 2511.
9. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 748-49 (1982).
10. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.090; MINN.
STAT. § 260C.301; NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.105 (2018); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2511.
11. Focusing on the “Best Interests” of the Child, FINDLAW (Nov. 26, 2018), 
https://www.findlaw.com/ (click “search legal topics,” then search “focusing on the 
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cide whether a parent’s right will be terminated. Both the state and 
judges, then, determine whether a parent may terminate the parental 
rights of the other biological parent.
Despite these statutory efforts to protect children, judges often fail 
to sever parental rights of abusive fathers because judges rely on a nucle-
ar family paradigm, leaving mothers and children in dangerous situa-
tions. Mothers are more impacted by intimate partner violence (IPV)12
and non-intimate partner rape13 because IPV and rape are gendered 
crimes, affecting women more often than men; thus, these crimes have a 
greater impact on mothers’ rights than fathers’ rights.14 Resistance to 
shifting away from the nuclear family paradigm in IPV or non-intimate 
partner rape cases stems from the compounding factors of judicial neu-
trality,15 the discounting of women’s statements of IPV and rape,16 and 
best interests of the child”) [https://perma.cc/BR75-8W72]; see also 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 2511.
12. Intimate partner violence is when a person engages in a course of coercive and con-
trolling behaviors such as physical and sexual violence, financial exploitation and con-
trol, psychological and emotional abuse, and the use of threats and intimidation. 
Women who have been abused
have been subjected to an ongoing strategy of intimidation, isolation, and 
control that extends to all areas of a woman’s life, including sexuality; 
material necessities; relations with family, children, friends; and work.
Sporadic, even severe, violence makes this strategy of control effective. 
But the unique profile of ‘the battered woman’ arises as much from the 
deprivation of liberty implied by coercion and control as it does from 
violence-induced trauma.
Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to Coer-
cive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 986 (1995).
13. Though rape often occurs in IPV, see LUNDY BANCROFT, JAY G. SILVERMAN &
DANIEL RITCHIE, THE BATTERER AS PARENT: ADDRESSING THE IMPACT OF 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON FAMILY DYNAMICS 4-5 (2d ed. 2012), the terms are used 
separately in this Article for purposes of analyzing how IPV and non-intimate partner 
rape are addressed differently in TPR and custody statutes. The terms rape, sexual vi-
olence, and sexual offenses will be used interchangeably and, for purposes of this Ar-
ticle, will mean rape by a non-intimate partner. The term IPV includes sexual assault 
by an intimate partner. See id. at 5.
14. See id. at 5.
15. Joan S. Meier, Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection: Understanding 
Judicial Resistance and Imagining the Solutions, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L.
671-87 (2003) (discussing how and why the courts resist crediting domestic violence 
claims in custody court).
16. Id. at 666-81; see Deborah Tuerkheimer, Incredible Women: Sexual Violence and the 
Credibility Discount, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3, 14-21 (2017) (discussing the pervasive-
ness of credibility discounting in the legal system’s response to rape).
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gender bias.17 All of these factors preserve (and often heighten) abusive 
fathers’ parental rights. Yet, the notion that two-parent households (or 
shared involvement of separated parents in the children’s lives) promote 
family stability and are best for children is a dangerous fallacy. When 
IPV or rape is present in intact families or re-occurrence of the violence 
remains a threat when parties separate, the family unit is far from sta-
ble.18 Moreover, enacted legislation or judicial decisions that force a 
two-parent household or shared custody arrangements perpetuate family 
violence—both at an individual and systemic level—by restricting 
mothers’ legal options, remedies, and fundamental rights.
The legal system’s entrenched perceptions of what is good for fami-
lies is failing mothers who experience IPV and rape; limited legal protec-
tions for mothers and their children are evidence of that. Consider the 
case of M.E.19 M.E. was adopted by her stepfather, who began raping 
her at the age of four.20 He repeatedly raped her until she was twenty-
three years old, resulting in M.E. conceiving three children from rape.21
M.E. disclosed the rapes to law enforcement when her daughter turned 
four years old, fearing her stepfather would begin raping M.E.’s daugh-
ter.22 Her stepfather was charged with and convicted on multiple counts 
of sexual offenses.23 M.E. sought to terminate the parental rights of her 
stepfather to prevent him from having any parental rights to their chil-
dren.24 Yet, until the August 2019 Pennsylvania Superior Court decision 
17. See discussion infra Part II. Although outside the scope of this Article, the nuclear 
family paradigm also reinforces white dominance given that “the traditional nuclear 
family is not the reality for many in the black community.” Angela Mae Kupenda, 
Angelia L. M. Wallace, Jamie Deon Travis, & Brandon Isaac Dorsey, Aren’t Two 
Parents Better than None: Contractual and Statutory Basics for a “New” African Ameri-
can Coparenting Joint Adoption Model, 9 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 59, 62 
(1999). See also generally MASS. SUP. JUD. CT., GENDER BIAS STUDY OF THE COURT 
SYSTEM IN MASSACHUSETTS, reprinted in 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 745, 831-48 (1990) 
[hereinafter GENDER BIAS STUDY].
18. See discussion infra Part I.B.
19. In re Z.E., Nos. 3577 EDA 2018 & 3624 EDA 2018, 2019 WL 3779711 (Pa. Su-
per. Ct. Aug. 12, 2019). The Barbara J. Hart Justice Center, a project of the Wom-
en’s Resource Center, and the law firm of Drinker, Biddle & Reath represented M.E. 
Id. at *2. The law firm of Jenner & Block and intern Alicia G. Solow-Niederman 
provided research assistance and analysis of the legal arguments for the case. Memo-
randum from Alicia G. Solow-Niederman to Paul M. Smith (July 26, 2016) (on file 
with author). Discussions with Joan Meier, Founder of the Domestic Violence Legal 
Empowerment and Appeals Project, also informed the case.
20. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *1.
21. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *2-3.
22. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *2-3.
23. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *3.
24. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *1.
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in In the Interest of Z.E.,25 M.E. was unable to terminate the parental 
rights of the man who repeatedly raped her.26 Prior to the 2019 deci-
sion, judicial interpretation of Pennsylvania’s TPR statute created an ab-
surd and horrific predicament for M.E: In order to terminate the paren-
tal rights of the man who raped M.E., judges’ interpreted the statute to 
mean that M.E. was required to have someone else adopt her children 
even though she herself was repeatedly raped by an adoptive parent.27
Alternatively, if M.E. did not seek termination of the parental rights of 
her stepfather, she lived in fear that the man who violently raped her 
might seek visitation and contact with their children.28 Under these cir-
cumstances, M.E. was psychologically and physically tethered to her 
rapist.29
This Article explores the impact that the entrenched legal notion 
that two-parent households are in a child’s best interest has on families 
experiencing IPV and sexual violence. It does so by examining the statu-
tory construction and judicial interpretation of TPR and custody stat-
utes in cases where a child is conceived as a result of rape or exposed to 
ongoing IPV. Two cases will be examined to explore Pennsylvania’s 
TPR statute in the contexts of rape and IPV and to demonstrate how 
the analyses of these cases can have broader implications for other states. 
Model legislation for TPR in cases where a child is conceived as a result 
of a sexual offense or when a child is exposed to ongoing IPV will also 
be proposed.
This Article will discuss both IPV and rape by a non-intimate part-
ner. Articles often address one or the other of these types of violence 
against women because there are differences between the two with, at 
times, different legal analyses and outcomes within the family court sys-
25. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *1. H.B. 1984 was passed during the production of 
this Article. See Table B, “Pennsylvania.”
26. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *1-2.
27. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2511 (2010).
28. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *1.
29. Shauna R. Prewitt, Note, Giving Birth to a “Rapist’s Child”: A Discussion and Analysis 
of the Limited Legal Protections Afforded to Women Who Become Mothers Through 
Rape, 98 GEO. L.J. 827, 830-33 (2010). “Many raped women who are forced to share 
custody and visitation privileges with their rapists may never overcome their rapes. By 
being tethered to their rapists, they are continually forced ‘to experience over and 
over the victimization that occurred at the time of the rape.’” Id. at 832-33. Prewitt 
provides a description of prototypes for rape victims and how these prototypes impact 
legislation. Id. at 836-40, 848-54. She also provides a comparative analysis of two 
types of laws that exist for women whose children are conceived as a result of rape. Id.
at 853-60. These laws are for women who elect to place their children up for adop-
tion and women who choose to raise their children. Id.
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tem. In most non-intimate partner rape cases, the only connection be-
tween the child and the person who committed the rape is purely bio-
logical. In these cases, the male committing the rape is nothing more 
than a “violent sperm donor.”30 Conversely, in cases of IPV, there is 
usually an established relationship between the child and the parent who 
is engaging in abusive and controlling behaviors beyond the biological 
relationship. As discussed in Parts III and IV, enacted laws, absence of 
laws, and legal analysis in custody and TPR cases may differ between 
IPV and non-intimate partner rape cases based on the biological par-
ent’s relationship with the child.
Even though these differences exist, there are advantages to ad-
dressing both here because together they provide a richer contextual 
view of TPR and custody laws. Overall, whether a custody or TPR case 
involves IPV or non-intimate partner rape, that case is being litigated 
within the broader legal context. This context glorifies the two-parent 
paradigm, discounts allegations of rape and IPV, and dismisses the ef-
fects of sexual violence and IPV on a mother’s parenting ability and on 
children. As such, a comparison as to how the legal system treats IPV 
and non-intimate partner rape not only explains the existence or absence 
of TPR and custody laws but also the resistance to paradigm shifts that 
threaten the two-parent model and fathers’ rights.
Part I begins with an examination of the legal system’s glorification 
of the nuclear family. Although the legal system and society have begun 
to acknowledge changing family demographics,31 there is resistance to 
enacting laws and issuing judicial decisions that undermine a two-parent 
household paradigm. Even when parents separate, the legal system seeks 
to approximate the nuclear family through shared custody arrange-
ments.32 Part I also documents the “stability paradox.” Laws and judicial 
decisions espouse “permanency” and “stability” as the main reasons for 
privileging the nuclear family or its close approximation.33 In cases 
where IPV and rape are present, however, there is little stability or per-
manency for minor children under this paradigm.
30. Wendy Murphy, Impregnation Rapists, Parental Rights, and the Often Ignored Consti-
tutional Rights of Victims: An Important Case Study from Massachusetts, 15 J. CHILD 
CUSTODY 169, 181-82 (2019).
31. See discussion infra Part I.
32. In this Article, “shared custody arrangement” means an arrangement where the 
mother and the father are awarded equal or close to equal parenting time with the 
minor children.
33. See Rutledge v. Rutledge, 487 So. 2d 218, 219 (Miss. 1986) (citing David Miller, 
Joint Custody, 13 FAM. L.Q. 345, 360 (1979)).
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Part II explores why the nuclear family paradigm persists in cases 
involving IPV and rape. The main factors permitting the glorification of 
the two-parent family to continue are the judicially created notion of 
parental equality,34 the discounting of women’s allegations of rape35 and 
IPV,36 and gender bias37 within the legal system. Tragically, in cases in-
volving IPV and rape, the factors that reinforce this paradigm do so at 
the cost of perpetuating violence against women and children.
Part III illustrates how the nuclear family paradigm and the factors 
reinforcing it have resulted in laws that afford mothers limited ability to 
deny the parentage of the person who raped them or terminate the pa-
rental rights of biological fathers who expose children to ongoing IPV. 
This section also explores the limited rights of mothers to prevent their 
rapist from having custodial visitation with the child who was conceived 
as a result of the sexual offense.
Part IV situates the nuclear family paradigm and the factors rein-
forcing it within the context of several cases challenging the constitu-
tionality of TPR statutes that permit terminating the parental rights of a 
person who committed rape when the child is conceived as a result of 
the sexual assault. One of the cases, In the Interest of Z.E., challenged the 
constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s Adoption Act.38 Arguments made in 
that case, the Superior Court’s decision on appeal, and arguments 
brought forth in other state cases are discussed to provide a broader con-
textual analysis beyond Pennsylvania law. The case of M.P. v. M.P.39 is 
then used to explore arguments that may be advanced to terminate a 
parent’s rights in cases where children are exposed to ongoing IPV.
Part V discusses the disadvantages and advantages of enacting TPR 
statutes specifically to address cases where a child is conceived as a result 
of a sexual offense or a child is exposed to ongoing IPV. Part V argues 
that statutes should be enacted or amended despite the disadvantages to 
states having TPR statutes. Part V also proposes model TPR legislation 
based on existing state laws, prior articles on the topic, and practical ex-
perience.
34. Meier, supra note 15, at 666-81 (discussing how and why the courts resist crediting 
domestic violence claims in custody court).
35. Tuerkheimer, supra note 16, at 3, 14-21 (discussing the pervasiveness of credibility 
discounting in the legal system’s response to rape).
36. Meier, supra note 15, at 681-86.
37. GENDER BIAS STUDY, supra note 17, at 833.
38. 23 PA. CONST. STAT. § 2101 (2020).
39. M.P. v. M.P., 54 A.3d 950 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012). Although this was not a TPR case, 
the case facts are discussed in Part IV to illustrate arguments that could be made to 
terminate a parent’s rights in cases where a child is exposed to IPV.
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I. The Legal System’s Glorification of the 
Two-Parent Household
The legal response to IPV and rape within families has been shaped 
by the entrenched rhetoric that children fare better when both parents 
are involved in their lives and that both parents will act in their best in-
terest. This presupposition results in statutes, or an absence of them, 
and judicial decisions that either glorify nuclear “intact” family struc-
tures40 or, if the parents have separated, extol co-parenting and shared 
custody arrangements.
The legal system’s two-parent paradigm, however, is problematic in 
family law for two reasons. First, it is not reflective of modern family 
compositions in the United States. In 1960, the two-parent household 
was the dominant family form with 73% of all children living in nuclear 
families.41 By 1980, a societal shift away from the nuclear family was 
emerging with the number of children living with two married parents 
in their first marriage decreasing to 61%.42 By 2015, this number had 
decreased significantly to a mere 46% of children.43 Additionally, the 
societal shift away from the two-parent household resulted in a substan-
tial increase in the percentage of woman-headed households.44 In 2018, 
31% of families in the United States were one-parent families, with 
77% being woman-headed households.45 In 2016, 23% of children 
lived with only their mothers, almost triple the 8% that lived with only 
their mother in 1960.46 Thus, a significant number of households, par-
40. See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, Our Scared Institution: The Ideal of Family in 
American Law and Society, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 387, 388-89 (“People live in a wide 
diversity of intimate arrangements . . . but they do so at risk. Historically only the 
nuclear family has been protected and promoted by legal and cultural institutions.”).
41. Parenting in America, PEW RESCH. CTR. (Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.pew
socialtrends.org/2015/12/17/1-the-american-family-today/ [https://perma.cc/69QC-





45. HISTORICAL FAMILIES TABLES, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Table FM-1 (Nov. 2019), 
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/families/families.html 
[https://perma.cc/MZ44-AR8X]. According to Table FM-1, in 2018, there were a
total of 34,452,000 families with children (biological, step, or adopted) under 18 liv-
ing in the United States. Of this number, 23,812,000 were married couples, 
8,156,000 were mother-only, and 2,484,000 were father-only. Id.
46. The Majority of Children Live with Two Parents, Census Bureau Reports, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2016
/cb16-192.html [https://perma.cc/PLK7-74CA].
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ticularly woman-headed households, do not “fit” the two-parent para-
digm. Despite woman-headed families not fitting into the nuclear fami-
ly paradigm, the family court system attempts to recreate the two-parent 
household by favoring parents who co-parent and ordering shared cus-
tody arrangements.47 Many woman-headed one-parent households, par-
ticularly low-income households, however, have experienced IPV or 
rape by the child’s father.48 The approximation of the nuclear family, 
then, increases the risk of ongoing violence to mothers and their chil-
dren.
Second, the glorification of the nuclear family or its approximation 
via a shared custody arrangement perpetuates violence against women 
and children, placing them at risk of harm. Most cases litigated in the 
family court system involve IPV or sexual violence.49 As discussed in 
Part II, however, the legal system discounts women’s accounts of vio-
lence. By discounting the violence, the legal system continues to adhere 
to the two-parent paradigm even when this creates a “stability paradox”:
a situation where the legal system upholds the nuclear family or its ap-
proximation on the grounds that it provides more permanency and sta-
bility for children when, in fact, the paradigm creates more instability in 
family units where violence has occurred. Before Part B further discusses 
the stability paradox and the perpetuation of violence against women 
and children, Part A will explore the glorification of the nuclear family 
in enacted statutes and judicial opinions. Part A will show how pervasive 
the glorification of the two-parent household is throughout family law, 
with the discussion not limited to cases involving IPV and rape.
A. Legislative and Judicial Language Reinforcing the Nuclear Family
The legal system has largely resisted shifting away from framing 
statutes and issuing judicial decisions based on a nuclear family para-
digm. This is the case despite the “ever-changing landscape of the family 
47. Angela Marie Caulley, Equal Isn’t Always Equitable: Reforming the Use of Joint Custody 
Presumptions in Judicial Child Custody Determinations, 27 B.U. PUB. INST. L.J. 403, 
427 (2018).
48. Núria Vergés Bosch, Anna Morero Beltran, Joaquina Erviti Erice, & Elisabet Almeda 
Samaranch, Intimate Partner Violence in Female-Headed One-Parent Households: Gen-
erating Data on Prevalence, Consequences, and Support, 72 WOMEN’S STUD. INT’L F.
95, 97-98 (2019).
49. See BANCROFT ET AL., supra note 13, at 3 (noting that fathers who are abusive “are 
more likely than nonbattering men to seek custody of their children in cases of di-
vorce or separation”).
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unit”50 and the harm this paradigm can cause to children in cases involv-
ing sexual assault or IPV. Pennsylvania’s Adoption Act and how the 
courts have interpreted it are illustrative of the extent to which the two-
parent paradigm permeates the law. Pursuant to the Act, either parent of 
a minor child has standing to file a petition for involuntary termination 
of the parental rights of the other parent.51 One of the enumerated 
grounds for termination is when “the parent is the father of a child con-
ceived as a result of rape or incest.”52
At first glance, the Act appears to provide M.E. and other rape sur-
vivors with the ability to terminate the parental rights of the biological 
parent to her children.53 Prior to the 2019 decision in In the Interest of 
Z.E., however, trial courts had limited the ability of mothers to petition 
for TPR. Courts had held that a parent could only petition to terminate 
the parental rights of the other parent when there was an averment of 
adoption54 and a new parent-child relationship was being established.55
In In re Adoption of M.R.D., for example, the father whose TPR was 
sought failed to perform parental duties, including providing financial 
support for the minor child, for approximately seven years.56 The ma-
ternal grandfather had played a significant role in the child’s life co-
50. In re Z.E., Nos. 3577 EDA 2018 & 3624 EDA 2018, 2019 WL 3779711, at *8 n.26 
(Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 12, 2019).
51. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2512(a) (2010). A petition to terminate parental rights may 
also be filed by an agency, an individual having custody or in loco parentis standing, 
or an attorney or guardian ad litem representing a child who has been adjudicated 
dependent. Id.
52. Id. § 2511(a)(7).
53. Pennsylvania has often been erroneously cited as a state that affords expansive protec-
tions for survivors of rape. In fact, until the decision in In re Z.E., mothers had been 
denied the ability to terminate the parental rights of fathers at the trial court level if a 
contemplated adoption was not averred. In one Pennsylvania county, the clerk’s of-
fice would not even permit a litigant to file a Petition to Involuntarily Terminate the 
Parental Rights because it did not contain a contemplated adoption averment. These 
assertions are based on conversations with family law attorneys practicing in Pennsyl-
vania.
54. The legal term “averment” means a positive statement of fact, particularly in a plead-
ing. Averment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). In Pennsylvania, then, a 
Petition to Involuntarily Terminate the Parental Rights must contain a statement 
that another person intends to adopt the minor child when a parent seeks to termi-
nate the parental rights of the other biological parent. In re Adoption of M.R.D., 145 
A.3d 1117, 1120 (Pa. 2016).
55. Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1120 (“Thus, where ‘no new parent-child relation-
ship is contemplated . . . the involuntary termination of . . . parental rights . . . is not 
permitted under the Adoption Act.’” (quoting In re Male Infant B.E., 377 A.2d 153, 
156 (Pa. 1977))).
56. Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1118.
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parenting with the mother, disciplining the child, attending functions, 
and providing financial support.57 Though the mother’s petition to ter-
minate contained an averment that the maternal grandfather would 
adopt the child, the Superior Court held that her petition failed because 
the mother and the maternal grandfather were not “part of an intact 
family unit.”58 Thus, even in cases where a third party is willing to adopt 
the child and create the approximation of a nuclear family, the court 
still considers the structure unacceptable when an “intact family” is fea-
sible vis-à-vis a custody arrangement between the natural parents. The
court holds this view even when a shared custody arrangement between 
the natural parents is the less stable arrangement for the child.
The reasoning in In re Adoption of M.R.D. demonstrates how in-
grained the belief is that a two-parent household best serves a child’s 
well-being. Noting that the Act requires a parent seeking termination to 
relinquish their own parental rights, the court analyzed two exceptions 
to this requirement.59 First, a parent need not relinquish their own pa-
rental rights when filing to terminate the rights of the other parent in 
second-parent adoption cases—cases where the adopting party is the
spouse of the party seeking termination.60 Second, a court may determine 
that a parent need not relinquish their own parental rights when seeking
to terminate the rights of the other parent if the court determines that it 
is “unnecessary under the particular circumstances of [their case].”61 The 
court found that neither of these requirements was met in In re Adoption 
of M.R.D. because the purpose of the Act, which was to “protect the in-
tegrity and stability of the new family unit,”62 would not be served by 
the maternal grandfather adopting the child. Notice how the court dif-
ferentiates second-parent adoption cases from the facts of In re Adoption
of M.R.D., further reinforcing the nuclear family paradigm:
[I]n second-parent adoption cases in which the relinquish-
ment of the parent’s right’s is not required—i.e. stepparent 
57. Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1118-19.
58. Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1128.
59. Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1120-21.
60. Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1121 (noting that “whenever a parent consents to 
the adoption of his child by his spouse, the parent-child relationship between him 
and his child shall remain whether or not he is one of the petitioners in the adoption 
proceeding” (quoting 23 PA. CONS. STAT § 2903 (2010))).
61. Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1127-28; see also 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2901 (2010) 
(“Unless the court for cause shown determines otherwise, no decree of adoption shall 
be entered unless the natural parent or parents’ rights have been terminated . . . and 
all other legal requirements have been met.”).
62. Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1128.
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adoptions and adoptions by same-sex couples—
relinquishment of the parent’s rights is unnecessary, and in-
deed damaging. In such cases, the parent and the prospective 
adoptive parent are committed partners . . . . Adoption in 
such circumstances allows the prospective adoptive parent to 
create a new parent-child relationship with the legal parent’s 
child and a family unit together with the co-parent to whom 
he or she is committed. Thus, because the legal parent and 
prospective parent in second-parent adoption cases are part of 
the same family unit, the relinquishment requirement un-
dermines, rather than promotes family stability. The same 
cannot be said for the instant case, however, because Mother 
and Grandfather are not similarly part of an intact family 
unit.63
Justice Bear’s concurring opinion not only blatantly states what the 
majority signals but also overtly glorifies two-parent households: “We 
should acknowledge and applaud the wise public policy adopted by our 
legislature in the Adoption Act: the ideal family for children is two par-
ents together in an intact marriage. This may be a traditional notion, 
but it is rooted in the belief that children benefit from permanency.”64
Justice Bear further contends that “even in this modern age where 
non-traditional families may exist, marriage is the best legal proxy of per-
manency for children” and “the law is loath to leave children with only one 
parent, as children derive no benefit from having a parent’s rights termi-
nated, unless a new, committed parent is ready, willing and able to take 
that terminated parent’s place.”65
Cases pre- and post-In re Adoption of M.R.D. also illustrate the ex-
tent to which the legal system upholds the nuclear family paradigm.66 In 
In re Adoption of J.D.S., for instance, the court denied the mother’s peti-
tion to terminate the father’s parental rights when the mother and the 
stepfather, the contemplated adoptive parent, separated and were con-
sidering divorce during the pendency of the appeal.67 Notice again how 
the court glorifies the intact two-parent household: “Because the prima-
ry function of government and law is to preserve and perpetuate society, 
63. Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1128.
64. Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1131 (Bear, J., concurring).
65. Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1132 (Bear, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
66. See, e.g., In re E.M.I., 57 A.3d 1278 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018); In re C.F.G., 194 A.3d 
718 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018) (unpublished table decision); In re I.S.R., 169 A.3d 1181 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2017).
67. In re Adoption of J.D.S., 763 A.2d 867, 871-72 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
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the traditional family structure is given every reasonable presumption in 
its favor. This comprehends an intact and subsisting family including a 
stepparent.”68 Even with an averred adoption by the stepfather, the 
mother’s petition failed because her potential divorce from him did not 
create an intact enough family to overcome the two-parent paradigm.
Judicial decisions relying on language and reasoning that favor the 
two-parent paradigm are present in other jurisdictions as well. Some ex-
amples include: “[T]he child’s best interest will be better served by being 
exposed to a more traditional family environment composed of two par-
ents;”69 awarding custody to the foster family, in part, because they were 
a “more traditional family;”70 awarding primary custody to mother be-
cause, although, “[e]ach parent offers a permanent family unit for the 
child[, t]he mother offers the more traditional family unit;”71 and 
awarding primary custody to the father because “the child would be in a 
stable, traditional, family setting.”72 In all of these cases, the “traditional 
family” was a two-parent household because one of the child’s biological 
parents had remarried, was engaged to be married, or the prospective 
foster parents were married.
Even when judicial opinions recognize the changing demographics 
in family compositions, concurring or dissenting opinions often contain 
language to counter this recognition. Illustrative of this phenomenon is 
the case Clark v. Wade.73 In Clark v. Wade, the maternal grandmother, a 
third party, sought custody of her grandchild over the child’s biological 
father’s objection.74 Pursuant to Georgia law, there is a presumption 
that it is in the best interest of the child to remain in the custody of his 
68. Adoption of J.D.S., 763 A.2d at 871; see also In re Adoption of K.M.W., 718 A.2d 
332, 334 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (noting that when a parent retains her rights, “the 
other party must be the spouse of the parent retaining custodial rights”).
69. Pounders v. Rouse, 582 So.2d 672, 676 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
70. Edwards v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 480 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Ark. Ct. App. 2016).
71. Hanisch v. Osvold, 758 N.W.2d 421, 425 (N.D. 2008) (noting that mother was en-
gaged to be married).
72. S.B. v. L.W, 793 So. 2d 656, 658 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming lower court deci-
sion awarding custody to father because he was married to his wife and thus had a 
stable environment). This decision also highlights how the legal system favors hetero-
sexual family units. The mother was bisexual and the court specifically noted that it 
was disturbed by “mother’s bisexual lifestyle” and that the “morality of” a parent’s
lifestyle was one factor the court could consider. Id. at 661.
73. Clark v. Wade, 544 S.E.2d 99 (Ga. 2001).
74. Clark, 544 S.E.2d at 101. The minor child had resided with the maternal grandpar-
ents since his birth in 1994 with father exercising regular visitation rights. Id. In
1999, father sought custody of his son. Id. The trial court awarded father temporary 
custody. Id.
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or her parents.75 To overcome this presumption, the Clark court—
showing extreme deference to biological parents—determined that a 
third party (in this case, the grandparent) must demonstrate that there 
would be physical or emotional harm to the child if the child’s parents 
were awarded custody (the harm standard).76 If a third party overcomes 
this presumption, “the third party must show that an award of custody 
to him or her will best promote the child’s health, welfare, and happi-
ness” (the best interest of the child standard).77
In a special concurring opinion, Justice Hunstein acknowledged
that, in modern society, it is no longer a reality that all biological par-
ents raise children in nuclear families.78 She, therefore, asserted that less 
deference should be afforded to the natural parents in family law cases 
when a third party seeks custody of the minor child.79 In response, Jus-
tice Sears lamented the decline of the traditional family and sought to 
stem its erosion:
I take issue with the assertion in Justice Hunstein’s special 
concurrence that the changing face of the American family 
justifies the application of a best-interest-of-the-child stand-
ard when a third party seeks to obtain custody of a parent’s 
child. To the contrary, I find that the lamentable decline in 
the traditional family supports the harm standard adopted in 
the majority opinion . . . . [T]he harm standard would stem 
75. Clark, 544 S.E.2d at 101
76. Clark, 544 S.E.2d at 107.
77. Clark, 544 S.E.2d at 107.
78. Clark, 544 S.E.2d at 110 (Hunstein, J., concurring).
79. See Clark, 544 S.E.2d at 110-12 (Hunstein, J., concurring).
Parental autonomy is grounded in the assumption that natural parents 
raise their own children in nuclear families, consisting of a married cou-
ple and their children . . . . The realities of modern living, however, 
demonstrate that the validity of according almost absolute judicial defer-
ence to parental rights has become less compelling as the foundation up-
on which they are premised, the traditional nuclear family, has erod-
ed . . . . More varied and complicated family situations arise as divorces, 
and decisions not to marry, result in single-parent families; as remarriages 
create step-families; as some parents abandon their children; as others 
give them to temporary caretakers; and as still others are judged unfit to 
raise their own children.
Id. (Hunstein, J., concurring) (some omissions in original) (quoting Brooks v. 
Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 778-79 (Ga. 1995) (Benham, J., dissenting)).
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the decline of the nuclear family by fostering the reunifica-
tion of parent and child.80
Enacted statutes also reinforce the concept of the nuclear family. 
Utah provides one such example. Utah’s statutes contain preambles that 
declare that it is the public policy of the legislature to preserve the family 
unit.81 Utah also has a strong preference for placing a child for adoption 
with a “married couple.”82
This glorification of the idea that a two-parent household best pro-
vides stability and permanence for children also impacts laws and judi-
cial decisions regarding parties who separate or divorce. Post-separation 
parents are expected to co-parent and promote frequent and continuing 
contact with the other parent.83 In addition, decisions awarding shared 
80. Clark, 544 S.E.2d at 109 (Sears, J., concurring).
81. E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-11.1 (LexisNexis 2019) (“It is the public policy of the 
state of Utah to strengthen the family life foundation of our society . . . and to take 
reasonable measures to preserve marriages, particularly where minor children are in-
volved.”); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.020 (2020) (“The legislature declares 
that the family unit is a fundamental resource of American life which should be nur-
tured. Toward the continuance of this principle, the legislature declares that the fami-
ly unit should remain intact . . . .”).
82. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-117(4) (2018 & Supp. 2020).
83. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.090(6)(E) (2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403 
(A)(6) (2017); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(VI) (2020); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 23-3203(a)(8) (Supp. 2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.23(j) (2019); MINN.
STAT. § 518.17(a)(11) (2019); MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375.2(2)(4) (2016); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 125C.0035(4)(c) (2018); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 461-A:6(I)(e) 
(2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1(B)(8) (2020); N.D. CENT. CODE. § 14-09-
06.2(1)(e) (2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.137(1)(f) (2019); 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 5238(a)(1) (2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10(2)(c)(ii) (LexisNexis 2019); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665(b)(5) (2019); WIS. STAT. § 767.41(5)(11) (2017-18). 
Though many of these statutes provide an exception for when there is a history of 
past or present IPV, mothers may not be able to sufficiently prove the IPV or judges 
may discount the IPV and then condemn the mother when she does not promote 
frequent contact with the father who has been abusive and controlling. See Meier, su-
pra note 15, at 678-79; Leigh Goodmark, From Property to Personhood: What the Le-
gal System Should Do for Children in Family Violence Cases, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 237, 
257 n.142 (noting that a mother’s “legitimate concern[s] about the batterer’s ability 
to parent can be used as a justification for denying her custody” when she cannot 
prove the IPV). Judges not only frequently inform litigants that they need to co-
parent but also issue orders that attempt to enforce co-parenting. In one county in 
Pennsylvania, for example, I have observed a judge routinely tell parents during any 
proceeding that involves custody that they must learn to co-parent even when there is 
a history of IPV and rape and when there is an active protection order in place. This 
same judge frequently issues custody court orders that contain language that the cus-
todial/visitation times will be by agreement of the parties. In cases involving IPV, this 
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legal and physical custody continue to be the norm because it “approx-
imates . . . an intact nuclear family.”84
Statutes and judicial opinions highlight how pervasive the glorifica-
tion of the traditional family is in the legal system. Part B will address 
how this is problematic in many family cases because it fails to address 
IPV and rape to the detriment of mothers and children. Part B will also 
show how the nuclear family paradigm counter productively creates the 
stability paradox.
B. The Stability Paradox
Though the purported intent of the nuclear family paradigm is to 
provide stability and permanency for children,85 it does the exact oppo-
vague language results in more opportunities for the controlling party continue their 
abuse.
84. Rutledge v. Rutledge, 487 So. 2d 218, 219 (Miss. 1986). Shared custody orders con-
tinue to be the norm despite an abundance of research demonstrating that exposure 
to IPV negatively affects children and that post-separation contact results in on-going 
abuse. See Meier, supra note 15, at 678-80. In fact, a number of states have codified 
shared custody presumptions. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-56a(b) (2019) (stat-
ing a presumption that joint custody is in best interest of child when parents have 
agreed to it); IDAHO CODE § 32-717B(4) (2019) (stating that “absent preponderance 
of evidence to the contrary,” there is a presumption that joint custody is in best inter-
est of the child); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(2) (West 2018) (stating a presump-
tion, rebuttable by preponderance of evidence, that joint custody and equally shared 
parenting time is in best interest of child); MINN. STAT. § 518.17(b)(9) (2019) (stat-
ing a rebuttable presumption that joint custody is in best interest of child when one 
or both parties request it); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24(4) (2018) (stating a pre-
sumption that joint custody is in best interest of child when parents have agreed to 
it); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 461-A:5 (2018) (presuming that joint decision making 
is in the best interest of the child); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1(A) (2020) (stating a 
presumption that joint custody is in the best interest of the child); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(A)(i) (2017 & Supp. 2020) (stating a presumption that joint 
custody is in best interest of child when parents have agreed to it); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 153.131(b) (West 2014) (stating a rebuttable presumption that parents acting 
as joint managing conservators is in the best interest of the child); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 30-3-10(3) (LexisNexis 2019) (stating a rebuttable presumption that joint legal 
custody is in best interest of child); WIS. STAT. § 767.41(2)(am) (2009) (stating a 
presumption that joint legal custody is in best interest of child). Though many of 
these statutes provide an exception to the presumption when there is a history of past 
or present IPV, the abuse is often dismissed or discredited resulting in shared custody 
arrangements. See infra Part I.B.
85. The legal system’s glorification of the two-parent household, which is a proxy for fa-
thers’ involvement in children’s lives, results from concepts of parental equality, soci-
etal discounting of mothers’ accounts of IPV and rape and gender bias. See discussion 
infra Part II.
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site in cases involving IPV or rape. Violence against women and chil-
dren’s exposure to this violence is a global epidemic.86 The 2015 Na-
tional Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey conducted by the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention found that one in five 
women experienced completed or attempted rape during her lifetime.87
It is estimated that there are between 25,000 and 32,000 rape-related 
pregnancies annually in the United States.88 Though it is difficult to de-
termine the number of children conceived from rape, one study found 
that approximately 32% of women who have been raped kept their 
children.89 Another study found that 64% of women raised their chil-
dren conceived from rape.90
When children are conceived as a result of a sexual offense, they are 
often harmed because the rape affects a mother’s ability to parent.91
Forced interaction between a mother and the person who raped her is 
likely to impede her recovery process.92 “Most raped women suffer from 
symptoms of one of the various forms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disor-
der (PTSD), and nearly one-third of all raped women develop rape-
related post-traumatic stress disorder (RR-PTSD).”93 In order to recov-
er, women who experience PTSD “must alleviate stress, which may ‘in-
volve avoid[ing] any thoughts, feelings, or cues which could bring up 
the catastrophic and most traumatizing elements of the rape.’”94 Women 
86. The 2012 National Task Force on Children Exposed to Violence found that “of the 
76 million children currently residing in the United States, an estimated 46 million 
can expect to have their lives touched by violence, crime, abuse, and psychological 
trauma this year.” REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S NATIONAL TASK FORCE 
ON CHILDREN EXPOSED TO VIOLENCE 3 (2012), https://www.justice.gov
/defendingchildhood/cev-rpt-full.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9A8-NVCS]. Exposure to 
domestic violence was one of the forms of violence highlighted in the report. See, e.g.,
id. at 32.
87. SHARON G. SMITH, XINJIAN ZHANG, KATHLEEN C. BASILE, MELISSA T. MERRICK,
JING WANG, MARCIE-JO KRESNOW, & JIERU CHEN, NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER 
AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2015 DATA BRIEF 1 (2018), https://www.cdc.gov
/violenceprevention/pdf/2015data-brief508.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4AL-RPYH].
88. Rape Survivor Child Custody Act, H.R. 1257, 114th Cong. § 2(2) (2015); see also
Prewitt, supra note 29, at 828 (“[B]ased on a 1990 study estimating that 683,000 
women over the age of eighteen were raped in that year, conceivably 32,000 rape-
related pregnancies occur annually.”).
89. H.R. 1257, supra note 88, §2(4); see also Prewitt, supra note 29, at 829 (“One study 
found that 50% of women who became pregnant by rape underwent abortions, 5.9% 
placed their infants for adoptions, and 32.3% of raped women kept their infants.”).
90. H.R. 1257, supra note 88, § 2(5).
91. Id. § 2(11).
92. Id. § 2(10).
93. Prewitt, supra note 29, at 833-34.
94. Id. at 834.
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who are continuously forced into contact with their rapist in custody 
matters, however, cannot escape the triggers of their trauma:
[W]omen who choose to raise their rape-conceived children, 
then, may be put in a Catch-22 if their rapists assert custody 
and visitation privileges. To effectively parent their children, 
these raped women must adequately overcome their victimi-
zation; however, in order to do that, these women must be 
able to escape from the “triggers” that make healing from 
their victimization impossible. Unfortunately, escaping from 
these triggers may range from difficult to impossible because, 
through the exercise of parental rights, most rapists are able 
to interact frequently with their rape-conceived children and, 
as a result, their victims.95
IPV is just as prevalent as sexual violence against women. One in 
four women in the United States has “experienced contact sexual vio-
lence, physical violence, and/or stalking by an intimate partner and re-
ported an IPV-related impact during their lifetime.”96 Studies estimate 
that over three million children are exposed to IPV each year.97 Exam-
ples of how children are exposed to IPV include directly observing vio-
95. Id. at 834-35. Indirect contact with the rapist, such as the rapist giving the child gifts 
that are brought back to the mother’s house or telephone contact with the child in 
which the mother overhears the rapist, can also be triggers for the victim. See id. at 
832; see also H.R. 1257, supra note 88, § 2(12). (“Rapists may use the threat of pur-
suing custody or parental rights to coerce survivors into not prosecuting rape, or oth-
erwise harass, intimidate, or manipulate them.”) In many cases, however, the person 
who committed the rape often does not even want custody of the child but will exer-
cise custody or visitation privileges to exert control over the victim, resulting “‘in the 
child . . . becoming a pawn in the predator’s power game.’” Prewitt, supra, at 835.
96. SMITH ET AL., supra note 87, at 7. “Contact sexual violence” is defined as “a com-
bined measure that includes rape, being made to penetrate someone else, sexual coer-
cion, and/or unwanted sexual contact.” Id. “Intimate partner violence-related impact 
includes experiencing any of the following: being fearful, concerned for safety, injury, 
need for medical care, needed help from law enforcement, missed at least one day of 
work, missed at least one day of school.” Id. Note that IPV is the leading cause of in-
jury for women, even more common than car accidents, muggings, and rapes com-
bined and that an estimated 41 percent of murdered women are killed by their inti-
mate partner. Nancy Ver Steegh, The Silent Victims: Children and Domestic Violence,
26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 775, 778, 779 (2000).
97. Amy Haddix, Unseen Victims: Acknowledging the Effects of Domestic Violence Through 
Statutory Termination of Parental Rights, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 757, 760 (1996). Haddix 
argues that evidence of a parent committing IPV in the presence of minor children 
should be admissible in TPR proceedings to demonstrate the parent’s unfitness. See 
id.
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lence; hearing their mother screaming for help or crying; observing the 
aftermath of the violence such as their mother’s injuries, torn clothing, 
or broken or damaged items; or hearing their father degrade, belittle, or 
threaten their mother.98 Exposure to IPV can continue post-separation 
as children are used as pawns in the abusive parent’s fight for control.99
Survivors of IPV also experience PTSD. Again, PTSD has a direct 
impact on children because mothers’ ability to effectively parent is hin-
dered by repeated and forced contact with fathers who have been (and 
often continue to be) abusive and controlling.100 Unlike in cases where a 
mother is raped by a non-intimate partner, however, IPV has additional 
negative and harmful effects on children because the abusive partner is 
part of the family unit prior to the parties separating.101 Post-separation, 
children’s exposure to IPV continues because fathers frequently dispar-
age the mother in the presence of the minor children, physically and 
mentally abuse her in front of the minor children, interrogate the chil-
dren about their mother, use the children to investigate and stalk her, 
and generally use the children as pawns.102 Thus, in cases involving IPV, 
98. Ver Steegh, supra note 96, at 784; see also Leslie D. Johnson, Comment, Caught in 
the Crossfire: Examining Legislative and Judicial Response to the Forgotten Victims of 
Domestic Violence, 22 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 271, 273-74 (1998) (noting that many 
children hear or see the physical abuse and observe the aftermath of the physically 
abuse such as bruising and broken bones).
99. For example, one commentator has observed that “survivors are at increased risk for 
physical violence when they take steps to leave abusers” and that “the risk of violence, 
including sexual assault, is highest immediately following separation and when vic-
tims attempt permanent separation through legal or other action.” Deborah Goelman 
& Darren Mitchell, Protecting Victims of Domestic Violence Under the UCCJEA, 61
JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 1, 2-3 (2010). Goelman and Mitchell further note:
In addition to the risks of separation violence, perpetrators often pursue 
protracted custody or visitation litigation as a means of controlling their 
former partners. Batterers may manipulate custody proceedings to obtain 
information about their former victims, to continue monitoring them, or 
to create opportunities for contact in order to perpetrate additional vio-
lence. Many batterers repeatedly file for modification of custody orders to 
harass or punish victims for leaving.
Id. at 3.
100. Peter G. Jaffe & Claire V. Crooks, Understanding Women’s Experiences Parenting in 
the Context of Domestic Violence: Implications for Community and Court-Related Ser-
vices Providers, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ONLINE RESOURCES (Feb. 2005), 
http://safeandtogetherinstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/parentingindv-
11.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7GV-VE5K].
101. See generally BANCROFT ET AL., supra note 13, at 33-107 (describing typical parenting 
characteristics of parents who engage in IPV and how these parenting characteristics 
affect the family unit).
102. See id. at 136.
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children are continuously exposed to violence resulting in various short-
and long-term harms to them.103 Children exposed to IPV often develop 
PTSD resulting in “above-average risk for self-destructive behavior, such 
as suicide, alcohol and drug abuse, and sexual promiscuity.”104 They also 
have higher levels of learning difficulties, anxiety, hyperactivity, and be-
havior problems.105 Moreover, children exposed to IPV are “twice as 
likely to have juvenile court involvement and three times as likely to be 
in juvenile court for a violent offense.”106 Further, approximately half of 
children living in households where their mothers experience ongoing 
abuse by their father are also physically assaulted by their fathers.107
The effects are ongoing: “Negative emotional effects from exposure 
to domestic violence can persist into adulthood, leading to higher rates 
of emotional distress and lower rates of successful social connec-
tion . . . and to higher rates of depressive symptoms.”108 Female children 
exposed to IPV are more likely to become victims of violence; male 
children exposed to IPV are more likely to become violent towards a 
partner.109 Studies have also found that exposure to intimate partner vio-
lence results in alterations in children’s brain structures.110
103. See generally id. at 42-54 (providing an overview how exposure to IPV effects chil-
dren).
104. Johnson, supra note 98, at 274-75. “Children from violent homes are more likely to 
run away, use drugs and alcohol, attempt suicide, and exhibit assaultive behavior.”
Ver Steegh, supra note 96, at 786.
105. BANCROFT ET AL., supra note 13, at 44. Children exposed to IPV are more frequently 
absent from school and more often suspended from school for behavioral problems. 
Id.
106. Id. at 45.
107. Ver Steegh, supra note 96, at 779.
108. BANCROFT ET AL., supra note 13, at 45.
109. Johnson, supra note 98, at 275.
110. See, e.g., Areti Tsavoussis, Stanislaw P.A. Stawicki, Nicoleta Stoicea & Thomas J. Pa-
padimos, Child-Witnessed Domestic Violence and Adverse Effects on Brain Development: 
A Call for Societal Self-Examination and Awareness, 2 FRONTIERS PUB. HEALTH 1, 4
(2014).
The impact on the community at large is of importance and concern; the 
effects on child witnesses of DV extend beyond the families and children. 
These children have impaired learning skills, poor school performance, 
poor life developmental skills, and lose their ability to self-regulate. As 
these children age, they will have different existential memories and re-
spond in a different manner than they would have otherwise. Conse-
quently, society may have difficulty preserving individual safety through 
an inability to decrease violence, while at the same time it has to support 
unproductive or underproductive members of society. Cumulatively, 
these findings support the presence of neuro-biological-developmental al-
terations in children witnessing DV, their ensuing PTSD, and the im-
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Paradoxically, then, the enacted laws, or their absence, and judicial 
decisions that extol the nuclear family or its approximation often un-
dermine the purported state interests in stability and permanency for 
the child. Whether the two-parent household is “intact” or approximat-
ed via a forced shared custody arrangement, family stability is under-
mined and children are harmed by ongoing IPV, fear of contact with 
the rapist, and/or triggers that reinforce trauma. The current legal para-
digm forces the mother into an impossible position where leaving her 
violent partner does little to protect her or her children by requiring 
continued harmful contact through shared custody arrangements.111
Similarly, in cases where a child is conceived as a result of rape, the ina-
bility to deny parentage or terminate the parental rights of the person 
who committed the rape results in harmful and absurd situations where 
the man who committed a violent crime—and had no intention to have 
a child—may attempt to, and in some cases actually does, gain custodial 
rights.112 These court-imposed custodial arrangements result in less sta-
bility for the family because children are harmed when continued con-
tact between the parties negatively impacts a mother’s ability to parent 
and affords opportunities for a father to continue his abuse.
II. Perpetuating the Nuclear Family or Its Approximation
When the overarching standard in family court is the best interest 
of the child, how can the system continue to glorify the nuclear family 
while blatantly ignoring research demonstrating that violence against 
mothers harms children? On the one hand, it is hardly surprising that 
there has not been a paradigm shift. Despite changing family composi-
pression that cumulative childhood trauma (and not adulthood trauma) 
may predict the overall symptom complexity in adults.
Id. (citations omitted).
111. I do not suggest that all custody court cases result in shared custody arrangements or 
that every court discounts the impact that exposure to IPV has on children. However, 
courts often discount IPV and rape, hold that fathers should be involved in children’s
lives, and hold that a shared custody arrangement is in the child’s best interest. See
BARRY GOLDSTEIN & ELIZABETH LIU, REPRESENTING THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
SURVIVOR 16-18 (2d ed. 2019); Joan Meier, #Childrentoo in Family Court: The Cul-
ture of Denial 19 (G.W. L. Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Paper No. 2020-24, 2020) 
[hereinafter Meier, #Childrentoo] https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3589328 [perma.cc/UL5R-N5YW]. Alternatively, if fathers are not afforded 
shared custody, fathers who engage in abusive and controlling behaviors often obtain 
significant unsupervised custodial time. Id.
112. See infra Parts III-IV.
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tions and increased public awareness about violence against women, so-
cietal attitudes towards families and violence remain largely unchanged 
when it comes to parenting: “According to a 2010 Pew Report, 69% of 
Americans say single mothers without male partners to help raise their 
children are bad for society and 61% agree that a child needs a mother 
and father to grow up happily.”113 The passage of time has done little to 
change the view that both parents need to be involved in children’s lives 
for children to succeed.114 A 2015 Pew Research Center survey found 
comparable results to the 2010 report: “[T]wo-thirds of adults said that 
more single women raising children on their own was bad for society, 
and 48% said the same about unmarried couples raising children.”115
Like the rest of society, the legal realm has steadfastly resisted a 
paradigm shift, despite documented harm to children. Perpetuating the 
two-parent household or its approximation in the family court system 
are three independent but interrelated factors: concepts of parental 
equality,116 discounting of violence against women,117 and gender bias.118
All three of these factors together provide justification for the system 
disregarding violence against mothers and the harm this violence has on 
children: If, from the onset of a case, women litigants are viewed as less 
credible than male litigants and allegations of IPV and sexual assault are 
presumed false or unimportant, then the legal system’s default premise 
that both mother and father are fit and on equal footing when entering 
113. See Sara Shoener, Op-Ed, Two-Parent Households Can Be Lethal, N.Y. TIMES
(June 21, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/22/opinion/sunday/domestic-
violence-and-two-parent-households.html [https://perma.cc/W4FB-TG8M] (“Wom-
en experiencing domestic abuse are told by our culture that being a good mother 
means marrying the father of her children and supporting a relationship between 
them.”).
Mental health professionals, law enforcement officials, judges and mem-
bers of the clergy often showed greater concern for the maintenance of a
two-parent family than for the safety of the mother and her children. 
Women who left abusive men were frequently perceived at best as moth-
ers who had not successfully kept their children out of harm’s way and at 
worst as liars who were alienating children from their fathers.
Id.
114. I do not suggest that shared custody is never in a child’s best interest. Rather, when 
IPV or rape has occurred, shared custody is usually not in the best interest of the 
child for reasons mentioned throughout this Article.
115. GRETCHEN LIVINGSTON, PEW RSCH. CTR., THE CHANGING PROFILE OF 
UNMARRIED PARENTS 4 (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2018/04
/25/the-changing-profile-of-unmarried-parents/ [https://perma.cc/E92U-NR9C].
116. See Meier, supra note 15, at 676-78.
117. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 16, 3-6.
118. See GENDER BIAS STUDY, supra note 17, at 834-47.
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court need not be challenged.119 This in turn enables the legal system to 
approximate the two-parent household through laws and judicial deci-
sions that resist terminating the parental rights of fathers whose violent 
conduct has shown they are unfit and to award shared custody arrange-
ments.
A. Factors Perpetuating the Two-Parent Paradigm
It is presumed that parents enter the family court system as 
equals,120 thus, shared custody arrangements are in children’s best inter-
ests. Statutory presumptions reinforce the notion of parental equality, 
including the presumption that custody not be awarded to a particular 
parent every time (i.e., preferring mothers over fathers)121 and presump-
tions in favor of shared custody.122 Although both presumptions are fa-
cially gender neutral and appear to treat parents similarly, in practice 
they favor fathers and the approximate nuclear family in cases involving 
IPV and rape. A father who has exposed (and continues to expose) a 
child to his ongoing abuse has already demonstrated a degree of parental 
unfitness that should cause the court to question its assumption of 
equality. Similarly unfit is the person who has committed rape against 
the biological mother where the child was conceived as a result of his 
criminal conduct. As such, any statutory or judicial presumptions of pa-
119. See Meier, supra note 15, at 676-80, 682-84.
120. See id. at 675-76.
121. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 61.13(c)(1) (2019) (“There is no presumption for or against 
the father or mother of the child”); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-3 (2018) (“In all cases in 
which the custody of any child is at issue between the parents, there shall be no pri-
ma-facie right to the custody of the child in the father or mother. There shall be no 
presumption in favor of any particular form of custody, legal or physical, nor in favor 
of either parent.”); IND. CODE § 31-17-2-8 (2018) (“In determining the best inter-
ests of the child, there is no presumption favoring either parent.”); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 23-3204 (2019) (“[T]here shall be no presumption that it is in the best interests of 
any infant or young child to give custody or residency to the mother.”); 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 5327(a) (2018) (“In any action regarding the custody of the child between 
the parents of the child, there shall be no presumption that custody should be award-
ed to a particular parent.”).
122. See In re Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d 1117, 1128 (Pa. 2016) (providing examples 
of codified shared custody presumptions). For a discussion of the dangers of joint 
custody presumptions in custody cases involving domestic violence, see GABRIELLE 
DAVIS, KRISTINE LIZDAS, SANDRA TIBBETTS MURPHY, & JENNA YAUCH, THE 
DANGERS OF PRESUMPTIVE JOINT PHYSICAL CUSTODY (2010), https://www.bwjp.org
/assets/dangers-presumptive-joint-physical-custody.pdf [https://perma.cc/4RCU-
MK42]; see also generally Judith G. Greenberg, Domestic Violence and the Danger of 
Joint Custody Presumptions, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 403 (2005).
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rental equality obfuscate violence against mothers and the effect it has 
on children.
Overcoming statutory presumptions of parental equality is arduous 
for mothers experiencing violence because the court is “obligated to ad-
judicate cases from a stance of judicial neutrality.”123 Adjudicating cus-
tody cases from a judicial neutrality stance means that the court views 
“both parties as starting with equal rights to custody”124 when they enter 
the courtroom. In cases involving allegations of IPV or rape, however, 
parents begin on unequal footing.125 The presence of these allegations 
frames the parties as “innocent victim v. evil perpetrator”126 before tes-
timony is even heard; thus:
Courts may resist such allegations because to accept them can 
have the effect of replacing the exercise of the court’s uncon-
strained discretion under the ‘best interest of the child’ test 
with an implicit presumption of one party’s unfitness (effec-
tively erasing judicial discretion). Courts are reluctant to cede 
their discretion and judgement in this manner.127
Theoretically, concepts of parental equality should not even arise in 
cases involving non-intimate partner rape because the only connection 
between the child and person committing the rape is biological.128 Thus, 
there are no grounds to presume that the “parents” are equals or for
judges to engage in a best interest of the child analysis because the per-
son who committed the rape never developed a relationship with the 
child.129 Parentage, then, is nonexistent.130 Statutes and judicial deci-
sions, however, create parental rights for the person who committed the 
sexual offense.131
The full extent to which parental equality and judicial neutrality af-
fect parental rights and custody-arrangement outcomes in cases involv-
ing non-intimate partner rape is difficult to assess. News coverage of 
cases and judicial decisions reported in legal reporters, however, signal 
123. Meier, supra note 15, at 676.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. (“This makes such allegations appear almost unfair, tilting the scales before the 
court hears and shifts all the evidence.”).
127. Id. at 676-77.
128. See Murphy, supra note 30, at 181-82. For further discussion, see infra Parts III-IV.
129. Murphy, supra note 30, at 181-82.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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that notions of parental equality and judicial neutrality do affect judicial 
decisions even when the only connection between the child and the per-
son who committed the rape is biological.132 This result is hardly sur-
prising given the legal system’s adherence to the two-parent paradigm.
On the other hand, research suggests that the parental-equality and 
judicial-neutrality frameworks do impact outcomes in custody cases in-
volving IPV. Wisconsin enacted a statute that created a rebuttable pre-
sumption that granting joint or sole custody to an abusive parent is not 
in the child’s best interest when the parent has engaged in a pattern of 
IPV or there has been a serious incident of abuse.133 Despite this statuto-
ry presumption, research found that 50% of cases where one parent had 
been convicted of IPV against the other parent resulted in court orders 
awarding joint legal custody even though there was a documented history 
of IPV evidenced by criminal convictions for felony or misdemeanor bat-
tery.134 Court orders for joint legal custody increased to 62% when the 
parent who was abusive was not incarcerated.135 Notwithstanding evi-
132. Id.; see, e.g., Alabama Court Forces Rape Survivor to Allow Rapist to Have Visitation 
With Children, KNOE NEWS 8 (June 12, 2019), https://www.knoe.com/content
/news/Alabama-court-forces-rape-survivor-to-allow-rapist-to-have-visitation-with-
children-511195642.html [https://perma.cc/8QHH-HWEL]; Tim Stelloh, Michigan 
Judge Gives Convicted Rapist Parental Rights for Victims Sons, NBC NEWS (Oct. 9, 
2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/michigan-judge-gives-convicted-
rapist-parental-rights-victim-s-son-n809196 [https://perma.cc/QCJ7-MGSU].
133. WIS. STAT. § 767.41(2)(d) (2009); Teresa E. Meuer, Tony Gibart, & Adrienne 
Roach, Domestic Abuse: Little Impact on Child Custody and Placement, 91 WIS. LAW.
16, 16 (2018).
134. Meuer et al., supra note 133, at 18-19.
135. Id. at 19. Researchers also found that even though there was a history of IPV between 
the parties, it was frequently not noted in the family court file. Id. at 20. This suggests 
that the legal system and legal professionals were discounting the abuse and dismiss-
ing its relevance in making custody determinations.
First, only 27.4 percent of all cases include a reference to domestic abuse. 
In 15 cases, documentation was inaccessible or missing. Therefore, data 
on the references to domestic violence in those cases is incomplete. While 
our file reviewers did not have access to sealed documents, nor could they 
access many transcripts, the lack of written references to domestic abuse 
appears significant. Institutions, especially courts, “are organized and co-
ordinated, for the most part, by means of standardized texts or standard-
ized protocols for producing texts.” If acts of domestic abuse within a 
family are not routinely noted in family law case files, it suggests that 
Wisconsin family law case processing does not systematically account for 
abuse.
Second, even when a [guardian ad litem] or parties’ lawyers are involved, 
written references to domestic abuse are absent in more than one-half of 
cases. When the victim had a lawyer or a [guardian ad litem] was ap-
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dence of parental unfitness based on a documented history of violence 
and a presumption against shared custody, courts still adhered to the 
nuclear family paradigm because of the power of the parental equality 
presumption.
By analyzing cases through a parental-equality and judicial-
neutrality framework, the legal system reinforces the two-parent para-
digm. Unfortunately, this framework and paradigm perpetuate violence 
against women and risk to children because fathers’ rights are not only 
preserved but even heightened in cases involving IPV or rape, where the 
fathers have demonstrated parental unfitness. Paradoxically, the legal 
system creates more instability and harm for children by fallaciously 
viewing parents as “equals” even in light of evidence to the contrary.
B. Discounting of IPV and Rape
The legal system’s blatant discounting of IPV and sexual assault 
further strengthens the nuclear family paradigm and parental-equality 
framework. If the family court system discounts the violence outright or 
believes it impacts the mother but not the child, then it can continue to 
view parents as equals136 and justify results that approximate a two-
parent household. In addition to the legal system discounting the vio-
lence outright, women’s testimony on IPV and rape—and the effects on 
children—is frequently disbelieved in family court and in society. This 
doubt stems primarily from three differing false narratives: Women fab-
ricate violence to obtain custody of their children; women who do not 
resemble the prototypical IPV or rape victim are lying; and even if alle-
gations of IPV or rape are credible, there is no consequence or harm to 
the child.
pointed, 39 percent and 42 percent of cases referenced domestic violence. 
Formal domestic abuse findings were much less frequent. Domestic abuse 
findings were made in only 17 percent (23) of cases with a [guardian ad 
litem]. In over 60 percent of cases in which the victim had representa-
tion, the lawyer did not reference domestic violence. These statistics sug-
gest that legal professionals tend to see histories of domestic abuse as ir-
relevant, unimportant, or unnecessary for courts to make decisions.
Id. at 20-21 (citations omitted).
136. Meier, supra note 15, at 680-81.
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1. Fabricating Abuse to Gain Custody
Despite increased public awareness regarding IPV and rape,137 a
commonly held societal assumption that allegations of IPV and rape are 
false permeates the family court system.138 Compounding the effects of 
this assumption is the added belief that mothers make up these false al-
legations of abuse as a means to gain custody.
Violence against women, however, is far more likely to be underre-
ported than falsely reported. Research has frequently relied on police re-
ports to study the prevalence of false reporting in cases involving sexual 
assault.139 The problem with this approach is that such studies often fail 
to account for how law enforcement officials frequently believe that al-
legations of rape are false from the outset of the investigation:
“[I]nvestigators start from the proposition that the complainant is lying 
137. Media attention continues to raise discussions and public awareness about IPV and 
rape, as seen with the Brett Kavanaugh Senate confirmation hearings. See Sherly Gay 
Stolberg, & Nicholas Fandos, Brett Kavanaugh and Christine Blasey Duel With Tears 
and Fury, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/27/us
/politics/brett-kavanaugh-confirmation-hearings.html [https://perma.cc/C49T-
46VD]; see also Domenico Montanaro, Poll: More Believe Ford than Kavanaugh, a
Cultural Shift from 1991, NPR (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/03
/654054108/poll-more-believe-ford-than-kavanaugh-a-cultural-shift-from-1991 
[https://perma.cc/ZBp7-VM4P]. Even with increased public attention, however, the 
public still questions women’s credibility, as evidenced by the varying reactions to 
Dr. Christine Blasey Ford’s testimony, including President Donald Trump’s mocking 
of her and her testimony. Id.; see also Allie Malloy, Kate Sullivan, & Jeff Zeleny, 
Trump Mocks Christine Blasey Ford’s Testimony, Tells People to ‘Think of Your Son,’
CNN (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/02/politics/trump-mocks-
christine-blasey-ford-kavanaugh-supreme-court/index.html [https://perma.cc/ALQ3-
N8RJ]; Mary Grace Hebert, Media Narratives of Sexual Violence of Sexual Violence 
During the Ford and Kavanaugh Testimonies, NAT’L COMMC’N ASSOC. (Jan. 2, 2020), 
https://www.natcom.org/communication-currents/media-narratives-sexual-violence-
during-ford-and-kavanaugh-testimonies [https://perma.cc/TES6-J32V]. Discounting 
women’s allegations of sexual violence occurs globally as well. See, e.g., Li Yuan, In
China, a Viral Video Sets Off a Challenge to Rape Culture, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/05/business/china-richard-liu-rape-video-
metoo.html [https://perma.cc/Z6MD-UESR]. In China, the release of a heavily edit-
ed video discrediting a woman who accused a Chinese businessman of raping her 
went viral. The video, titled “Proof of a Gold Digger Trap?” used subtitles to blame 
the woman and suggested that she could not have been raped because she “showed 
the man the elevator,” she “pushed the floor button voluntarily,” and she “gestured 
an invitation.” Id. Missing from the edited video was what happened after the woman 
and the businessman exited the elevator. Id.
138. Meier, supra note 15, at 682-85; see Tuerkhiemer, supra note 16, at 3.
139. Tuerkheimer, supra note 16, at 17.
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and act to confirm this belief.”140 Acting to confirm their presupposition 
that rape allegations are not credible, police “promptly disregard[ ], 
[and] short-circuit[ ] sexual assault investigations well before the oppor-
tunity to gather available corroborative evidence is exhausted.”141 Thus 
law enforcement’s preconceived belief that rape allegations are not true 
from the start of the investigation results in inflated numbers of false re-
ports as cases are deemed false before being fully investigated.142
Researchers have treated victims’ recantations of sexual assault as 
evidence that they lied, which has also inflated the number of false re-
ports.143 But victims may recant truthful allegations of rape for myriad 
reasons including fear of retaliation, belief that law enforcement will not 
act, or embarrassment.144 Thus, “[s]ince many factors may cause a truth-
ful complainant to recant her allegation, a failure to independently as-
sess the underlying accusations tends to result in findings of false report-
ing rates that are misleadingly high.”145 “Independent evaluations of 
[rape] reports deemed unfounded by the police,” however, provide more 
accurate assessments of the rate of false reporting.146 Studies utilizing this 
method—which involves “researchers review[ing] the complete police 
file”—found that false reporting rates were significantly lower than be-
lieved by law enforcement and society.147
The rate of false reporting in cases involving IPV is similarly lower 
than societal assumptions suggest. Indeed, “the rate of false reports in 
140. Id. at 33.
141. Id. at 11.
142. Id. at 17.
143. Id. at 17.
144. HEATHER HUHTANEN, ATT’Y GEN.’S SEXUAL ASSAULT TASK FORCE, FALSE 
ALLEGATIONS, CASE UNFOUNDING AND VICTIM RECANTATIONS IN THE CONTEXT 
OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 1-3 (2008), https://www.evawintl.org/Library/DocumentLibrary
Handler.ashx?id=618 [https://perma.cc/C549-29YY].
145. Tuerkheimer, supra note 16, at 17.
146. Id. at 18-20.
147. Id. at 19-20 n.96. Studies found that the rate of false reporting was between 4.5% 
and 6.8%. Others argue that the rate of false reporting is anywhere from 2% to 10%.
E.g. Cameron Kimble & Inimai Chettiar, Sexual Assault Remains Dramatically Unre-
ported, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org
/blog/sexual-assault-remains-dramatically-underreported [https://perma.cc/DZJ4-
NYJ8]. As an example of the disparity between actual rates of false reporting and per-
ceived reporting rates, one study found that “more than half of the detectives inter-
viewed believed that 40 to 80 percent of sexual assaults complaint were false.” Tuerk-
heimer, supra note 16, at 16.
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custody disputes is no greater than for any other crimes.”148 The legal 
system, however, consistently discredits IPV because it assumes that 
mothers fabricate claims of abuse at a high rate.149
Speaking the truth about violence, then, can backfire in the family 
legal system to the detriment of the child. When a mother discloses IPV 
or rape to the court in an effort to show that a father is unfit and that 
exposure to him through custody arrangements will be harmful to the 
child, she risks the court assuming that she fabricated the abuse based 
on these inaccurate assumptions about false reporting. In turn, this can 
(and often does150) result in the court viewing her as a vindictive and, 
therefore, unfit parent. This results in unfit fathers gaining even more or 
significant custodial time with the children.151
2. The Reinforcement of Unbelievable Mothers: Victim Prototypes
Measuring women against prototypes of victims based on societal 
stereotypes also heightens fathers’ rights and the two-parent paradigm.152
Prototypes help people “process[] information, draw[] conclusions, 
and . . . make[] sense of the world.”153 By defining both what is typical 
and atypical, prototypes “set the standard by which others are 
148. Cynthia Grover Hastings, Letting Down Their Guard: What Guardians Ad Litem 
Should Know About Domestic Violence and Custody Disputes, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD 
L.J. 283, 306 n.151 (2004).
149. Meier, supra note 15, at 684-85.
150. See April M. Zeoli Echo A. Rivera, Cris M. Sullivan & Sheryl Kubiak, Post-
Separation Abuse of Women and Their Children: Boundary-Setting and Family Court 
Utilization Among Victimized Mothers, 28(6) J. FAM. VIOLENCE 547, 547-50 (2013). 
(“When women make allegations of IPV or express concerns that fathers will harm 
children, the court often views them as obstructing the court process and the father’s
right to have a relationship with their children”); see also Meier, #Childrentoo, supra 
note 111, at 1-2. I have also witnessed this firsthand.
151. I am not suggesting that mothers should not inform the court of the IPV. In fact, it is 
imperative that litigants provide the court with the full contextual history of the vio-
lence. I raise this point to illustrate the barriers that mothers encounter in the court 
system and the absurdity that results when the court discredits mothers’ allegations of 
IPV and rape.
152. See Prewitt, supra note 29 (providing a description of prototypes for rape victims and 
the rights of fathers).
153. Id. at 837(quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categori-
cally Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1125 (2004)).
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judged.”154 Victim prototypes are problematic because they fail to ac-
count for the full range of victim experiences and they are not “statisti-
cally or descriptively accurate.”155 When a victim does not “fit” the pro-
totype she is not believed to be credible.
In cases involving rape, the prevailing cultural script is that of the 
stranger-rape prototype—“a black stranger attacking a white woman in 
public using overwhelming force.”156 Statistics reveal that in contrast to 
this stereotype, most rapes are actually committed by a known assailant 
of the same race as the victim and the victim does not sustain physical 
injuries from the rape.157 As such, this prototype actually describes the 
atypical rape case.158 Yet:
Because it depicts what societal rhetoric argues ought to con-
stitute “real rape” instead of what typically and statistically 
constitutes the majority of nonconsensual sex experiences, 
the [stranger-]rape prototype . . . “distorts decisions about 
whether specific instances belong in the [rape] category” in a 
biased way. Moreover, it conveys that nonconsensual sexual 
experiences differing from the stranger-rape prototype consti-
tute harm that is not merely different but that ought to be 
treated as less “real,” less “substantial,” and less “worthy of le-
gal redress.”159
154. Id. (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Un-
derstanding of Bias: On Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 
787 (2001)).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 838.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Chamallas, supra note 154, at 779-80).
Where less force is used or no other physical injury is inflicted, where 
threats are inarticulate, where the two know each other, where the setting 
is not an alley but a bedroom, where the initial contact was not a kidnap-
ping but a date, where the woman says no but does not fight, the under-
standing is different. In such cases, the law as reflected in the opinions of 
the courts, the interpretations, if not the words, of the statutes, and the 
decisions of those within the criminal justice system, often tell us that no 
crime has taken place . . . .
Id. at 839 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J.
1087, 1092 (1986)).
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When rape results in pregnancy, a pregnant-raped-woman prototype
emerges. 160 This prototype depicts
the typical or prototypical raped woman as someone who 
views her unborn child as an extension of her rapist and as 
perpetuating the violence against her from within; whose 
healing from the rape is so intertwined with her ability to 
prevent the pregnancy or birth of her rape-conceived child 
that, even if she self-identifies as strongly pro-life, she sup-
ports measures intended to terminate her pregnancy; and 
whose hatred toward her unborn child is so natural that ex-
traordinary measures are needed.161
The pregnant-raped-woman prototype, similar to the stranger-rape proto-
type, describes how pregnant rape victims ought to behave: She must 
abort her baby because her baby symbolizes the person who raped her.162
Where a victim behaves differently, i.e., choosing to keep and love the 
child, her allegations of rape and conception as a result of rape are less 
believable.163 Acting inconsistently with the pregnant-raped-woman pro-
totype results in society “labeling . . . these women as ‘impostor rape vic-
tims’—that is, women who are likely falsifying their rape allegations and 
the facts about the conceptions of their children.”164
Cultural prototypes concerning rape are no less persistent in the 
law. A family court judge recently questioned whether a rape had oc-
curred because the woman had not been held at gunpoint and attacked 
by strangers.165 Similarly, numerous legislators have opined that certain 
rapes that do not fit this narrative are illegitimate or unbelievable: Mis-
souri Representative Todd Akin suggested that a woman cannot get 
pregnant from a “legitimate rape;”166 Missouri Representative Barry 
160. Id. at 840.
161. Id. at 848.
162. Id. at 851.
163. Id. at 858.
164. Id.
165. Luis Ferré-Sadurní, Teenager Accused of Rape Deserves Leniency Because He’s from a 
‘Good Family,’ Judge Says, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com
/2019/07/02/nyregion/judge-james-troiano-rape.html?searchResultPosition=3 
[https://perma.cc/FRQ4-E5YM].
166. Charlotte Alter, Todd Akin Still Doesn’t Get What’s Wrong with Saying ‘Legitimate 
Rape,’ TIME (July 17, 2014, 4:07 PM), https://time.com/3001785/todd-akin-
legitimate-rape-msnbc-child-of-rape/ [https://perma.cc/7MWJ-BNH7].
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Hovis used the phrase “consensual rape” during a debate;167 Wisconsin 
State Assembly member Roger Rivard stated that “some girls rape easi-
ly;”168 and Pennsylvania Senate candidate Tom Smith commented that 
his daughter’s out-of-wedlock conception, which resulted from consen-
sual sex, was the same as conception as a result of rape.169
Reliance on the stranger-rape and pregnant-raped-woman prototypes
permits the legal system to dismiss women’s allegations of rape and 
therefore justifies granting persons who committed sexual assault par-
enting rights when children are conceived as a result of the criminal of-
fense. If rape does not occur according to the cultural script, the legal 
system can conclude that parenting rights should exist and that termi-
nating parental rights should not occur or only occur in limited con-
texts.
Similar to cases involving rape, a prevailing cultural script emerges 
for cases of IPV. In IPV cases, the prototype is that of the helpless-
woman—a cowering badly bruised woman who is in denial about the 
violence she experiences and never reacts to it.170 Physical violence, how-
ever, is only one tactic that men who engage in abusive behaviors use to 
control their partners,171 and physical abuse may or may not result in 
observable injury.172 Moreover, women usually do react to violence in 
167. Orion Donovan-Smith, A GOP Lawmaker Used the Phrase ‘Consensual Rape’ During 




168. Molly Reilly, Roger Rivard, Wisconsin Legislator, Criticized Over ‘Some Girls Rape Easy’
Remark, HUFFPOST (Oct. 11, 2012, 10:22 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry
/roger-rivard-rape_n_1956491 [https://perma.cc/6SSU-A3BU].
169. Gregory J. Krieg, Pa. Senate Candidate Backs Off Unplanned Pregnancy-Rape Compar-
ison, ABC NEWS (Aug. 27, 2012), https://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/08
/pa-senate-candidate-backs-off-unplanned-pregnancy-rape-comparison/ [https://
perma.cc/6E6W-LGEU].
170. SHERRY HAMBY, BATTERED WOMEN’S PROTECTIVE STRATEGIES: STRONGER THAN 
YOU KNOW 1-2 (2014).
171. Men who engage in coercive behaviors employ a range of tactics to control their 
partner including physical, sexual, psychological, and economic abuse; threats; intim-
idation; sleep deprivation; and isolation. See Stark, supra note 12, at 986.
172. The racialized cultural script that has emerged for a black woman is that of an “un-
controllable, promiscuous black woman who is capable of sustaining greater physical 
abuse than her white counterpart and is herself capable of violence.” Erika Sussman 
& Sara Wee, Accounting for Survivor’s Economic Security: An Atlas for Direct Service 
Providers, CTR. FOR SURVIVOR AGENCY & JUSTICE 43 (2016), https://csaj.org
/document-library/CSAJ_Atlas_Mapbook_1_FINAL_TO_POST.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6QR5-PSFD] (citing Zanita E. Fenton, Domestic Violence in Black 
and White: Racialized Gender Stereotypes in Gender Violence, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER &
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some manner at some point in time.173 When a woman does not have 
physical injuries or she reacts to the violence, countering the prevailing 
cultural script, the legal system can conclude that the IPV must not have 
occurred, so TPR is inappropriate and a shared custody arrangement is 
in the best interest of the child.
A judge’s ruling in a protection order case exemplifies how the 
helpless-woman prototype impacts legal outcomes. Although the judge 
granted an order of protection against the abusive individual, the order 
of protection was only for six months because the woman did not have 
any broken bones or bruises and had once thrown a toy out of frustra-
tion in response to the abuse.174 Here the woman did not conform to 
the helpless-woman prototype—she did not have observable injuries and 
she reacted to the abuse. The fact that she did not fit the prevailing soci-
etal view of how a victim of IPV ought to appear and behave resulted in 
the judge determining that her case ought to be treated as less worthy of 
significant legal redress.
The helpless-woman prototype, like the stranger-rape and pregnant-
raped-woman prototypes, provides grounds for states to resist terminating 
the parental rights of fathers who continually expose children to IPV 
and to award these fathers significant custodial time. By relying on this 
prototype, the legal system constantly discounts the violence and treats 
any violence or behavior that does not fit into the helpless-women proto-
type as less real or less substantial. The legal system can then reasonably 
conclude that there is no harm to the child. As a result of this discount-
ing, courts place both parents on equal footing when they enter custody 
court, even though the father has already shown he is unfit, and award 
custody arrangements that approximate the nuclear family despite the 
risk of harm to children.
L. 54 (1998)). This racialized gender stereotype provides even more grounds for the 
legal system to discount IPV against a black woman as the legal system treats the vio-
lence against her as inconsequential because she can “sustain” it and/or she herself is 
“violent” so she “deserves” it. See id. (noting that black women experiencing IPV are 
frequently subjected to dual arrests and prosecution as a result of the IPV).
173. Suzanne C. Swan & David L. Snow, The Development of a Theory of Women’s Use of 
Violence in Intimate Relationships, 12 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1026, 1027 
(2006).
174. I observed this case in open court; as far as I am aware there is no written opinion 
from the case.
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3. Judicial Failure to Recognize Harm to Children
Even when the legal system acknowledges IPV and rape, judicial 
decisions still afford little weight to that violence in deciding family law 
matters. Judges choose to disregard the effect violence has on children 
by suggesting that there is no harm to the child if the child was not the 
direct object of the abuse and that the child is safe if the parents have 
separated. Courts credit the abuse against mothers but refuse to recog-
nize how exposure to that violence harms children and affects mothers’
ability to parent. In turn, this allows courts to continue to justify pre-
sumptions of parental equality, resulting in custody awards that approx-
imate the nuclear family, resistance to terminating the parental rights of 
men who are violent, and adherence to the two-parent paradigm. Thus, 
this deliberate judicial failure to recognize the harm to children justifies 
creating less stable family units, perpetuating violence.
Courts excuse the violence when the child is not the direct object 
of the abuse and when the parents have separated for myriad reasons. 
Courts measure women against prototypes of victims based on stereo-
types and view the violence as less legitimate whenever a mother behaves 
differently than the prototype, resulting in the conclusion that the vio-
lence was minimal and did not affect the children.175 Courts further 
hold mothers “responsible for whatever harm her children suffer from”
the parent who is abusive because she remained in the abusive relation-
ship, “‘putting up with’ the abuse.”176 Courts then conclude that the 
mother and her children are not deserving of protection from the of-
fending parent because the “mother has already ‘tolerated’ or ‘subjected’
the child to the . . . abuse.”177
A case litigated in Pennsylvania illustrates how a court can credit an 
account of violence while failing to structure a custody award that ac-
counts for this violence. The woman fled from the relationship after en-
during years of physical, emotional, and financial abuse, including her 
boyfriend strangling her and slamming her head on the floor.178 After 
she fled, her boyfriend exploited the court system to further control and 
abuse her by filing and obtaining a temporary protection order against 
175. See supra Part II.A.
176. Meier, supra note 15, at 701 n.150.
177. Id.
178. Guardian Ad Litem’s Memorandum to the Court at 1, McCartney v. Moore, No. 
2018-FC-40225 (Lackawanna Cty. Ct. Com. Pl.).
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her,179 which provided that she was not allowed any contact with their 
daughter. At the time, their daughter was still breastfeeding and had 
never been separated from her mother. The judge appointed a guardian 
ad litem (GAL) in the case. In her report and recommendation to the 
court, the GAL reported that the father was very abusive and controlling 
and that he had a history of abusing prior girlfriends and family mem-
bers. The GAL, however, still recommended a shared custody arrange-
ment. Her recommendation was based on two illogical and disturbing 
conclusions: 1) It would be confusing for the child to be taken from her 
father because she had been in his care due to the temporary protection 
order, even though the father had falsely filed the temporary protection 
order, and 2) the mother having sole custody would put the mother and 
the child more at risk because the father would become angry if he lost 
custody.
Presumably, other unstated factors that contributed to this recom-
mendation were that the child was safe because she was not a direct ob-
ject of the abuse and the parents were separated. Though the judge 
acknowledged that the father had engaged in litigation abuse and was 
also physically abusive, he agreed with the GAL and ordered shared cus-
tody. Here the GAL and court credited the violence as it occurred to the 
mother, but still awarded equal parenting.
In cases of non-intimate partner rape in which a child is conceived 
as a result of the sexual offense, the court may be even more likely to 
disregard the effects of that violence on a child—even when it acknowl-
edges that violence—when determining parental rights and custodial 
time. A court may easily conclude that there is no risk of harm to the 
child if the person who committed the sexual offense is awarded paren-
tal rights and custodial time because the assault occurred before the 
child was born. Courts justify this conclusion because the child was not 
directly physically or sexually abused, the mother and the person who 
committed the rape are separated, and the child was not exposed to the 
violence. A problem with this conclusion, however, is that custody ar-
rangements that expose a mother to the person who violated her may 
negatively affect the mother’s parenting, which in turns impacts the 
179. See Temporary Order at 1, McCartney v. Moore, No. 2018-FC-40225 (Lackawanna 
Cty. Ct. Com. Pl.). In Pennsylvania, a temporary order of protection is granted or 
denied at an ex parte proceeding, which is a legal hearing without both parties being 
present. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6107 (2018). A person seeking a protection order 
completes a petition, files it with the court, and affirms that all statements contained 
in the petition are true. The court will grant a temporary protection order without 
hearing from the party the petition is filed against until the hearing date, which is 
scheduled within ten days.
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child. Thus, the child is still harmed by the violence, even though they 
are not directly exposed to it.180 Additionally, the person who commit-
ted the rape may use custody as a means to further threaten, intimidate, 
and abuse the biological mother, which affects the child.181 Despite these 
documented issues, courts frequently fail to analyze how violence, and 
the continuous exposure to a person who is or was violent, impacts par-
enting and harms children. Courts often erroneously conclude that the 
mother has poor parenting skills rather than recognizing that her par-
enting abilities are affected by repeated exposure to the person who vio-
lated her.182
Decisions crediting the violence as to the mother but discounting 
its effect on the children permit judges to place both parents on equal 
footing: If the violence is viewed as impacting only the mother, then 
both parties can equally parent the child. From this viewpoint, the court 
preserves the notion of parental equality. This, in turn, upholds the nu-
clear family paradigm as the legal system concludes that parents are 
equally fit to care for the child. This mindset has remained steadfast de-
spite research to the contrary.
C. Gender Bias
Gender bias further impacts judicial decisions in family law cases to 
the detriment of mothers and children. Despite the popular misconcep-
tion that mothers are favored in custody cases, research has found that 
mothers are “often measured against the standard of ideal motherhood, 
while fathers are measured against a different and lower standard,”183 re-
sulting in “courts consistently [holding] mothers to higher standards of 
proof than fathers.”184 Mothers are also “evaluated on their actual histo-
180. See supra Part I.B.
181. H.B. 1257, supra note 88.
182. See BANCROFT ET AL., supra note 13, at 84-89.
183. GENDER BIAS STUDY, supra note 17, at 833 (“The courts, as in the rest of society, 
expect far more from women as caretakers than as men. Any shortcomings the wom-
an has, whether directly relating to her parenting or not, are closely scrutinized. 
Whereas, if a father does anything by way of caring for his children, this is an indica-
tion of his devotion and commitment.” (quotation marks omitted) (quoting testimo-
ny of Sheera Strick of Greater Boston Legal Services)); id. at 832 (“A woman’s history 
of motherhood is subject to intense scrutiny. A father’s history of fatherhood is only 
examined from the time of the petition.” (quotation marks omitted) (quoting an un-
named Boston attorney)).
184. Meier, supra note 15, at 687 (citing CARRIE CUTHBERT, KIM SLOTE, MONICA 
GHOSH DRIGGERS, CYNTHIA J. MESH, LUNDY BANCROFT & JAY SILVERMAN,
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ry of performance as parents and fathers evaluated on the basis of their 
expressions of their emotions and their stated intentions for the fu-
ture.”185 When fathers actively seek custody, they obtain primary or 
shared custody over 70% of the time.186
In addition to being held to a higher parenting standard, “credibil-
ity accorded [women] litigants is less than that accorded to [men as] liti-
gants in domestic violence cases.”187 This unfair credibility burden re-
sults in mothers having to offer more evidence than fathers in 
hearings.188 This burden makes it more difficult for mothers to prove the 
IPV and its impact on children because IPV is often not witnessed by 
others or reported to the police.
Mothers are also judged harshly for remaining in an abusive rela-
tionship and “failing to protect” their children.189 One judge in Pennsyl-
vania, for instance, consistently remarks that a mother cannot possibly 
be concerned for the safety of her children if she leaves them in the care 
of their father, who she is alleging is abusive.190 This remark simultane-
ously discounts the mother’s allegations of IPV and blames her for fail-
ing to protect her children, even though there are myriad reasons she 
left the children in the father’s care. Reasons that a mother may leave 
children in the care of a father who is abusive include lack of housing, 
lack of financial resources to care for the children, and threats from the 
BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT: A HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT ON DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE AND CHILD CUSTODY IN THE MASSACHUSETTS FAMILY COURTS (2002)).
185. BANCROFT ET AL., supra note 13, at 148.
186. GENDER BIAS STUDY, supra note 17, at 748.
187. Meier, supra note 15, at 687 (citing Karen Czapanskiy, Domestic Violence, the Family, 
and the Lawyering Process: Lessons from Studies on Gender Bias in the Courts, 27 FAM.
L.Q. 247, 255-58 (1993)).
188. Id. at 688. (“[I]n rape and domestic violence cases, a female comes to court in Geor-
gia bearing a credibility burden, a burden based on a stereotypic view of gender that 
does not affect males in the same way. The effect of undue skepticism frequently 
places female litigants in a position where they must offer more evidence than do 
male litigants.”) (citing Czapanskiy, supra note 187, at 255-58).
189. BANCROFT ET AL., supra note 13, at 149. Many states have “failure to protect” stat-
utes in their Child Protective Services Codes, see, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-
710(2)(b) (2019); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6303(b.1) (2018)) or Criminal Codes. See, 
e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3623 (2018); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-221(a) 
(2013); MINN. STAT. § 609.378(b)(1)(2018). These statutes are counterproductive in 
cases involving IPV because it is often political and societal structures that impede a 
woman’s ability to remain free from violence because she does not have the resources 
to leave the abusive household. See generally Sussman, supra note 172, at 4, 34. These 
can be compounded by broader systemic issues as livable wages and lack of affordable 
housing. Id. at 14, 17, 34.
190. This comes from personal knowledge, as I have practiced in front of this judge fre-
quently.
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father.191 Once parents separate, however, a “societal reversal tends to 
take place” around mothers protecting their children: Courts “become 
suspicious of a mother’s motives for attempting to protect her children 
and may attribute children’s symptoms [i.e., fear of father] to the moth-
er’s alleged anxiety, overprotectiveness, or vindictiveness against the al-
leged abuser.”192
Mothers are further scrutinized when they have acted as the prima-
ry caretaker for minor children.193 Theoretically, state statutes and court 
decisions recognize that, when determining the best interests of the 
child, consideration should be given “to the parent who has been the 
primary caretaker and psychological parent.”194 In practice, however, the 
opposite occurs:
[I]t appears that as soon as physical custody is contested, any 
weight given to a history of primary caretaking disappears. 
Mothers who have been primary caretakers throughout the 
child’s life are subjected to differential and stricter scrutiny, 
and they may lose custody if the role of primary caretaker has 
been assumed, however briefly and for whatever reason, by 
someone else.195
Presumptions about parental equality, credibility discounting, and gen-
der bias all operate to justify decisions within the legal system that up-
hold violent fathers’ rights via the two-parent paradigm or its approxi-
mation. When women litigants are viewed as less credible and IPV is 
discounted, judges can and do see both parents as fit, and thus capable 
of substantial custodial time with the child. As seen, however, when IPV 
or rape is present, both parents are not fit nor are they on equal footing 
when they enter the courtroom. Strict adherence to this paradigm is det-
rimental to children due to the resulting heightening of fathers’ parental 
rights and creation of unstable family units.
Enacted statutes and judicial decisions relating to TPR and custody 
decisions in cases involving IPV or rape continue to afford mothers and 
children limited protections against violence. Limited protections exist 
because most statutes allow judicial discretion in determining whether 
parental rights should be terminated or what custody arrangement is 
191. See, e.g., Why Do Victims Stay?, NATIONAL COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE, https://ncadv.org/why-do-victims-stay [https://perma.cc/7G53-94ZF].
192. BANCROFT ET AL., supra note 13, at 149.
193. GENDER BIAS STUDY, supra note 17, at 748.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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best for the child. As seen, however, judges view both parents as fit from 
the start of the case and engage in credibility discounting and gender bi-
as, resulting in decisions that are not in the best interest of the children. 
Adherence to these invidious assumptions perpetuates the erroneous be-
lief that the two-parent paradigm or its approximation is the best family 
structure for children.
Unfortunately, limited protections vis-à-vis laws and judicial deci-
sions result in a perpetuation of violence. The next section provides an 
overview of existing TPR and custody statutes and a discussion of how 
these statutes continue to perpetuate violence against mothers and chil-
dren. The custody statutes are limited to situations where the child is 
conceived as a result of rape.
III. In 2020, There’s Still Limited Protection
Inscribed in our legal system is “the maxim that a wrongdoer shall 
not profit from his wrong.”196 In practice, this maxim is codified though 
legal principles that prevent individuals who have committed offenses 
from benefiting from their transgressions such as the right to confiscate 
proceeds of a crime197 and the right to deny spousal support to a spouse 
who has engaged in conduct harmful to the innocent spouse.198 For 
TPR and custody in cases where a child is conceived as a result of rape 
or IPV is involved, however, the legal system has overwhelmingly—and 
blatantly—disregarded this maxim. This is so despite the violent nature 
of the behavior and the ongoing impact of the IPV and/or rape on both 
mothers and children. A biological link to a child alone does not grant a 
constitutional right to parentage; a parent only has a constitutionally 
protected right to custody and control of a child when they have an es-
tablished relationship with the child.199 Yet many states have enacted 
laws that “create[] [parental] rights for rapists that did not previously ex-
196. Peña v. Mattox, 84 F.3d 894, 900 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Prewitt, supra note 29, at 
835-36 n.56.
197. See e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981 (2018).
198. See e.g., S.M.C. v. W.P.C., 44 A.3d 1181, 1185 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (“A long rec-
ognized exception to the obligation to pay spousal support exists where the recipient 
spouse conducts him or herself in a manner that would constitute grounds for a fault-
based divorce.”). Examples of grounds for fault-based divorce include adultery, willful 
abandonment for a period of one or more years, “cruel and barbarous” treatment to 
the innocent spouse, and the imposition of a sentence to imprisonment for two or 
more years. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3301(a) (2010).
199. Peña, 84 F.3d at 899-900.
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ist.”200 The creation of such statutorily created rights has limited protec-
tions for mothers seeking to terminate the rights of their attackers or to 
deny or limit their custodial time. Additionally, most states have failed 
to even codify exposure to IPV as grounds for TPR,201 while judicial de-
cisions in custody cases disregard the violence.202 As discussed, this re-
sistance to denying parentage or to enacting TPR or custody statutes 
that afford protections for mothers and children stems from the en-
trenched two-parent paradigm and the presumptions that reinforce it.
The enactment of state statutes denying parentage or permitting 
TPR when a child is conceived as a result of rape has frequently in-
volved long, arduous battles. In Maryland, for example, a bill permitting 
the termination of a rapist’s parental rights was not enacted until 2018 
despite being introduced in legislative sessions since 2007.203 Prior at-
tempts to pass the bill had been stalled on more than one occasion by 
all-male subcommittees.204 In Pennsylvania, a bill to permit TPR when a 
200. Murphy, supra note 30, at 172. Murphy astutely contends that convicted rapists do 
not have parental rights because biology alone does not create parentage:
The idea that a convicted rapist has parental rights over the product of 
his crime assumes that parentage is biological. However, as the United 
States Supreme Court noted many years ago in a discussion regarding 
parentage, “[T]he mere existence of a biological link does not merit con-
stitutional protection” (Lehr v. Robertson) . . . More recently, courts 
have held that biology, while relevant, does not create parental rights. 
(A.R. v. C.R.; R.R. v. M.H., 1998). In fact, biology alone does not estab-
lish even minimal due process rights to notice and a hearing in family 
court to determine whether parentage exists as a matter of law for the 
sperm donor or man participating in assistive reproductive technologies. 
(In the Matter of J.S.V., 1998).
If a biological sperm donor “father” who is not a rapist has no parental 
rights in a surrogacy case, or when a court is considering placing his bio-
logical offspring up for adoption, then surely a convicted rapist has no 
better rights over a child born from his crime. Simply put, a rapist should 
be seen as a violent sperm donor, nothing more, because a biological 
connection to a child caused by rape is as legally distant from nature of 
fatherhood as a man can get.
Id. at 181-82.
201. See Haddix, supra note 97, at 760-61.
202. See supra Part II.
203. Eric Cox, Maryland Poised to Let Rape Victims Terminate Parental Rights of Their As-
sailants, BALTIMORE SUN (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news
/maryland/politics/bs-md-parental-rights-rapists-20180130-story.html. (quoting 
Democrat Kathleen Dumias as saying, “It’s been such a long, hard fought battle.”).
204. Kelly Weill, All-Male Panel Fails to End Maryland Law that Forces Women to Share 
Custody with Their Rapist, DAILY BEAST (May 5, 2017, 2:30 PM), 
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child is conceived as a result of a sexual offense without the requirement 
of a contemplated adoption205 was finally enacted into law in October of 
2020 after being stalled in subcommittees for several years, despite legis-
lators seemingly being appalled that the right did not already exist.206
Even where states have enacted TPR statutes addressing rape, the 
legal protections those statutes afford to mothers are still rather limited 
in practice. To date, thirty-three states permit TPR or denial of parent-
age when a child is conceived as a result of a sexual offense.207 Eleven of 
those states only permit termination when the other parent is convicted
of a sexual offense.208 A conviction requirement renders the statute moot 
https://www.thedailybeast.com/all-male-panel-fails-to-end-maryland-law-that-forces-
women-to-share-custody-with-their-rapists [https://perma.cc/6UCZ-4LDF].
But while the bill passed both Maryland’s House and Senate, the bill’s
text varied between the two legislative bodies. On Monday, the last day 
of legislative session, a five-person negotiating group was set to decide on 
the bill’s final text, the Baltimore Sun reported. Instead, the five-man 
group let the bill fall by the wayside, running out the legislative session’s
clock without finalizing the bill’s text.
Id.
205. Though I agree with Murphy, supra note 30, that biology alone does not create par-
entage and TPR statutes are problematic because they create this right, several reasons 
existed for seeking to change Pennsylvania’s TPR statute. First, prior to the 2019 Su-
perior Court decision in In re Z.E., Pennsylvania permitted TPR when a child was 
conceived as a result in rape or incest but only in cases where there was a contemplat-
ed adoption. See discussion supra Part I. Second, when laws and judicial opinions are 
continuously granting rights to men who rape, discounting violence against women, 
and disregarding the notion that biology alone does not equate parentage for the rea-
sons discussed in Part II, statutes that afford TPR at least provide mothers the ability 
to seek termination. Lastly, in cases involving intimate partner rape or incest, the rap-
ist may have established some type of relationship with the child beyond a biological 
connection. See Peña v. Mattox, 84 F.3d 894, 899-901 (7th Cir. 1996). As such, the 
rapist would arguably be able to establish due process rights to notice and a hearing 
and that he has a fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of the child. Id.
206. H.B. 1984, 2019 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2020).
207. See Tables A, B, and D.
208. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2271(a)(12) (Supp. 2019); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292.02(4)
(2019); NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.105(1)(b)(8) (2018); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-
C:5-a (Supp. 2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1111(a)(11) (2019); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 27-20-44(1)(e) (2016); OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.510(1) (2019); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 63-7-2570(11) (2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-113(g)(10) (2017 & Supp. 
2020); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-309(a)(ix) (2019). See Table A for a condensed 
summary of relevant statutory language and notes for these statutes. A more detailed 
version of Table A may be found at jclewisesq.wordpress.com (select the Resource 
Tab and then The Stability Paradox, Table A). Other resources providing lists of state 
TPR statutes include Parental Rights and Sexual Assault, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES, https://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/parental-rights-
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for most survivors. “Rape is the most underreported violent crime” and 
few cases are prosecuted, resulting in minimal convictions.209 “Research-
ers estimate that of 100 forcible rapes that are committed, approximate-
ly five to twenty will be reported, 0.4 to 5.4 will be prosecuted, and 0.2 
to 5.2 will result in a conviction.”210 Additionally, these states are silent 
as to whether the conviction may be for a crime in “which the underly-
ing basis was sexual assault.”211 Under these statutes, it is unclear wheth-
er TPR could occur in cases where a woman was sexually assaulted but 
the person who raped her was convicted of a different crime. Since 
many cases are pled to lessor offenses, this means that even where a con-
viction occurs a woman may still not have the option to seek TPR in 
states where a conviction is required if the offender was not ultimately 
convicted of sexual assault.
Furthermore, many TPR statutes affirmatively permit judicial dis-
cretion in determining whether to terminate parental rights by provid-
ing that the judge “may” terminate parental rights and/or the judge 
must make a finding that termination is in the best interest of the 
child.212 Since these statutes allow judicial discretion in deciding wheth-
er to terminate a parent’s rights, all TPR outcomes are based on a 
judge’s determination of what the judge thinks is best for the child. As 
discussed in Part II, however, judges often disregard violence in making 
their best interest of the child determinations because they are influ-
enced by the parental equality framework, credibility discounting, and 
gender bias.213 Presumptions about these factors, in turn, uphold the 
glorified nuclear family paradigm. Most mothers, then, will have no re-
course to terminate their offenders’ parental rights in these states.
and-sexual-assault.aspx [https://perma.cc/BP2K-YF8Q] and Termination of Parental 
Rights, RAINN, https://apps.rainn.org/state-laws/landing-page/ [https://perma.cc
/T5ZC-P3W6]. Although Alabama law states that TPR shall occur if a parent has 
been convicted of rape in the 1st degree, sodomy in the 1st degree, or incest, it was not 
included in Table A or as one of the eleven states because the statute is not specific to 
terminating parental rights when the child was conceived as a result of a sexual of-
fense. ALA. CODE § 12-15-319(b) (2012).
209. Moriah Silver, Legal Options for Rape Survivors to Terminate Parental Rights, 48 FAM.
L.Q. 515, 518-19 (2014).
210. Id. at 519.
211. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-105.5(3) (2020). Colorado is the only state that provides 
the statutory language that the conviction may be a crime in which the underlying 
basis was sexual assault. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-105.7 (2020). Significantly, 
Colorado also permits TPR using a clear and convincing standard. Id. § 11(a).
212. See Table A.
213. See supra Part II.
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Eighteen states permit TPR when the court finds by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the perpetrator committed a sexual offense and 
the child was conceived as a result of the sexual offense.214 A majority of 
the statutes in these states, however, also provide for judicial discretion 
by providing that the judge “may” terminate parental rights and the per-
son seeking termination must prove that it is in the best interest of the 
child.215 As discussed above and in Part II, judicial discretion is prob-
lematic because judges commence cases with the notion that both par-
ents are equally fit parents due to gender bias and discounting vio-
lence.216 In Alabama, for instance, a woman’s uncle began raping her 
when she was approximately twelve years old, resulting in several chil-
dren being conceived.217 Despite these horrific facts, the court awarded 
her uncle visitation and informed her that she would be incarcerated if 
she denied him visitation with her children.218 In Pennsylvania, a court 
awarded parental rights and custody of a child to the person who com-
mitted rape even though he was “on trial for his fifth Megan’s Law vio-
lation [conviction of a sex crime against a child and subsequent failure 
to notify law enforcement of changes of his address and employment as 
required by law] and living in the basement of someone’s home.”219 This 
214. ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.180 (c)(2) (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-105.7 (2020);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-112(j)(3)(G) (2019); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1004
(2014); FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(m) (2020); HAW. REV. STATE. § 571-61(5) (2018);
IDAHO CODE § 16-2005 (b)(2)(A) (2019); IND. CODE § 31-35-3.5-7(a)(1) (2018);
IOWA CODE § 232.116(1)(p) (2014); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1402(a)(2)(ii) 
(LexisNexis 2019); ME. STAT. tit. 22 § 4055(1-B) (2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 722.1445(2) (2019); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-15-119(1)(b) (2018); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 211.447(11) (Supp. 2019); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2511(a)(7) (2010); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 161.007(a) (West 2014); WIS. STAT. § 48.415(9) (2018). See Table B 
for a condensed summary of relevant statutory language and notes for these statutes. 
A more detailed version of Table B may be found at jclewisesq.wordpress.com (select 
the Resource Tab and then The Stability Paradox, Table B). Other resources provid-
ing lists of state TPR statutes include Parental Rights and Sexual Assault, NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, https://www.ncsl.org/research/human-
services/parental-rights-and-sexual-assault.aspx [https://perma.cc/BP2K-YF8Q] and 
Termination of Parental Rights, RAINN, https://apps.rainn.org/state-laws/landing-
page/ [https://perma.cc/T5ZC-P3W6].
215. See Table B.
216. See supra Part II.
217. Alabama Court Forces Rape Survivor to Allow Rapist to Have Visitation with Children,




219. Kara Bitar, Note, The Parental Rights of Rapists, 19 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 275, 
294 (2012).
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decision resulted in the minor child regressing to the point that he was 
wearing diapers again at age five.220 Judicial discretion in these matters, 
then, has often resulted in more harm to the child.221
Some states have enacted additional requirements for termination 
even when a clear and convincing standard is met. Indiana requires that 
the petition for TPR be filed within 180 days after the birth of a child 
when the victim of rape seeking TPR is eighteen years or older.222 This 
is a burdensome and arbitrary time restriction when a mother is recover-
ing from both rape and childbirth, as well as parenting a newborn. Mis-
sissippi highlights that the court may exercise its discretion not to ter-
minate parental rights if the child’s safety and welfare are not 
endangered and termination is not in the best interest of the child based 
on four enumerated factors:
(a) The Department of Child Protection Services has docu-
mented compelling and extraordinary reasons why termi-
nating the parent’s parental rights would not be in the 
child’s best interests;
(b) There is a likelihood that continuing reasonable efforts for 
achieving reunification will be successful;
(c) Terminating the parent’s parental rights would inappropri-
ately relieve the parent of the parent’s financial or support 
obligations to the child; or
(d) The child is being cared for by the other parent, or a rela-
tive, guardian, or custodian, in a residence not occupied by 
the abusive or neglectful parent and terminating the par-
220. Id.
221. See also Bartasavich v. Mitchell, 471 A.2d 833, 834-38 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (hold-
ing that a father’s parental rights should not be terminated even when he had mur-
dered the child’s mother, stabbed himself with a fork, was incarcerated for the crime, 
and the child had had no contact with the father from ages four to twelve because do-
ing so caused her distress).
222. IND. CODE § 31-35-3.5-4 (2018) (“[A] parent who . . . is at least eighteen (18) years 
of age at the time the act of rape occurred; may not file a petition for termination of 
the parent-child relationship under this chapter more than one hundred eighty (180) 
days after the birth of the child.”). When a parent is under 18 at the time of the rape, 
she has two years after turning 18 to file. Id.
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ent’s parental rights would not expedite the process for ob-
taining a satisfactory permanency outcome.223
Factors (c) and (d) provide the courts with even more reasons to forgo 
terminating the parental rights of the father. A judge may be less in-
clined to terminate the parental rights of the person who committed the 
rape in cases where the person is capable of paying support, the mother 
is on public assistance, and/or the judge believes biological parents 
should not be relieved from paying support. A judge might also not 
terminate the parental rights of the person who committed the sexual 
assault if the child is currently residing in a safe home. In Oklahoma, 
though one ground for terminating the parental rights of fathers is that 
a child was conceived as a result of rape, only the district attorney or at-
torney for the child may file a petition or motion to terminate a parent’s 
rights.224 In Louisiana, the TPR statute is found in the subchapter title 
“Judicial Certification of Children for Adoption” of the Children’s 
Code suggesting that there must be a contemplated adoption in order to 
terminate parental rights.225 These statutory restrictions mean that, in 
many cases, the mother of a child conceived as a result of rape may not 
initiate a termination proceeding against the person who raped her or 
may only do so in the limited context where adoption of her child by 
another person is contemplated.226
Fifteen states restrict the legal custody and/or physical custody 
rights of the person who committed rape when a child was conceived as 
a result of a sexual offense, but have failed to enact legislation permitting 
TPR of the person who committed the sexual assault.227 The restrictions 
223. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-15-123 (2018).
224. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A, § 1-4-901(A) (2011).
225. See LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1015 (2014); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1004 
(2014); see also State ex. rel. C.E.K., 234 So. 3d 1059, 1066 (La. Ct. App. 2017)
(emphasizing that the stated of purpose of art. 1004 is to provide for TPR to allow 
adoption of the child).
226. See supra Part I.A.
227. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-416 (2017); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-121 (2015); CAL.
FAM. CODE § 3030(b) (West 2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 724A(e) (2009); 750 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 46/622 (2018); KY. REV. STAT ANN. § 403.322(2) (LexisNexis 
2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209C, § 3 (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4.1 (West 
2013); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1-c)(b) (McKinney 2010); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3109.504(A) (Lexis Nexis 2015); 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16 (2003); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4A-20 (2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-414 (LexisNexis 
2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.1 (2019); W.VA. CODE § 48-9-209a(a) (2014). See
Table C for a condensed summary of relevant statutory language and notes for these 
statutes. The Stability Paradox: Table C, https://jclewisesq.com/2020/03/14/tsp-
table-c/ [https://perma.cc/R3TQ-WGBP]. Other resources providing lists of state 
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on custody and visitation afford little protection to mothers because a 
majority of the states require that the person be convicted of the sexual 
offense in order for the statute to apply.228 Additionally, several of these 
states permit judicial discretion in determining whether custody and vis-
itation should be awarded.229 Similar to the TPR statutes, affirmatively 
permitting judicial discretion in determining custody in rape cases often 
results in judges disregarding the violence and the impact it has on 
mothers and children.230 Judges view the person who committed the 
rape as fit because they either believe that the rape did not occur, or al-
ternatively, they believe that the rape occurred but it does not affect the 
child. Judges, then, can and do award custodial time to the person who 
committed the rape, perpetuating the glorification of the two-parent 
paradigm.231
Of the fifteen states that restrict custodial time when conception is 
due to a sexual offense, thirteen indicate that a convicted person shall not 
be permitted custody of or visitation with the child at all.232 If legislators 
have deemed that a person convicted of rape is unfit to have any custo-
dial or visitation rights, then it should follow that the other parent has 
the right to deny parentage or terminate the parental rights of that per-
son. Yet, most states with these custody restrictions have not enacted 
statutes denying parentage or permitting TPR.233
TPR statutes include Parental Rights and Sexual Assault, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES, https://perma.cc/6Z5H-5BTC and Termination of Parental 
Rights, RAINN, https://perma.cc/T6SN-DM42.
228. Out of the states that afford restrictions on parental rights of individuals who commit 
sexual assault through custody statutes alone, only two use a clear and convincing 
standard: 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 46/622; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4A-20; see also 
infra Table C.
229. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209C, § 3; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4.1; N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 240(1-c)(a); 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16(d)(4); W.VA. CODE § 48-9-209a(a);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4A-20; VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 15, § 665(f) (2019); see also
infra Table C.
230. See supra Part II.
231. Some of these states’ statutes explicitly state that the restrictions on a father’s custodi-
al rights are not applicable when the mother (or legal guardian) consents to the visita-
tion. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46(a)(17)(c) (2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209C, 
§ 3(a); 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-16(d)(4); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125C.210(1) 
(2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-414(1)(a). Most of these statutes, however, still 
provide that visitation will only be granted if it is in the best interest of the child, 
suggesting that legislators do not believe that a fit parent—more specifically a woman
parent—can make sound decisions regarding her children. Id.
232. See Table C.
233. Id.
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One further point demonstrates the degree to which the legal sys-
tem has resisted terminating parental rights in cases of sexual violence 
against women. In cases in which the only connection between the child 
and the person who committed the sexual offense is biological, there is 
not a constitutionally protected right to parentage.234 As such, courts 
and states should deny parentage to the rapist. Yet, only four states have 
codified the right to do so.235
TPR statutes look similarly bleak for mothers seeking legal reme-
dies in order to protect their children in cases involving exposure to 
IPV.236 TPR statutes are typically codified within adoption codes and/or 
juvenile (usually dependency) codes. States vary on whether one biolog-
ical parent even has standing to initiate a TPR proceeding against the 
other.237 Many state statutes include abuse or neglect as an enumerated 
ground for TPR, with some defining abuse as including emotional or 
psychological injury or exposing minor children to an unsafe environ-
ment.238 To date, however, few states have actually statutorily defined 
234. See Murphy, supra note 30, at 181; see also Peña v. Mattox, 84 F.3d 894, 900 (7th 
Cir. 1996) (noting that the “mere fact of fatherhood . . . that is not cemented . . . by 
association with the child” does not create a constitutionally created interest).
235. See Table D. A more detailed version of Table D may be found at 
jclewisesq.wordpress.com. The Stability Paradox: Table D, https://jclewisesq.com
/2020/03/14/tsp-table-d/ [https://perma.cc/3WHU-P7DW]. In all four states the 
burden of proof is the clear and convincing standard.
236. See Haddix, supra note 97, at 761.
237. See supra note 6.
238. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533(B)(2) (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-
105(3.1)(a)(IV) (2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103(a)(5) (2009); FLA. STAT.
§ 39.806(1)(f) (2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2269(b) (Supp. 2019); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 625.090(1)(a)(1) (West 2014); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.020(26) (West
2014); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1015(4) (2014); MINN. STAT. § 260C.301(b)(2) 
(2015); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 93-15-119(1)(a)(i), 93-15-121(f) (2018); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 128.105(1)(b)(5) (2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1111(a) (2019); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7B-101(1)(e) (2019); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A, § 1-1-105(2) (2011 & Supp. 
2020); OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.504(1)(a) (2019); 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-
7(a)(2)(ii) (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 63-7-2570,  63-7-20(6)(a)(i) (2010); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-26.1(4) (2016); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-113 (2017 & 
Supp. 2020); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (West 2014); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 16.1-228(1) (2016); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-202(a)(ii)(A) (2019); see also gener-
ally State ex rel. M.R.S., No. 20020608-CA, 2003 WL 21294878 (Utah Ct. App. 
Apr. 24, 2003); In re Stephen Tyler R., 584 S.E.2d 581 (W. Va. 2003). Examples of 
the definition of abuse including emotional injury or exposing minor children to un-
safe environments are: “Risk of serious physical, mental, or emotional injury to the 
child if the child were returned to, or remains in, the home of his or her parent or 
parents,” NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.105(1)(b)(5) (2018), and “harm or threatened 
harm to the health, safety, or welfare of the child,” which includes mental or emo-
tional injury. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A § 1-1-105(2) (2011 & Supp. 2020); see also The 
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abuse as including exposure to IPV.239 Even where states have included 
language permitting TPR on the basis of exposure to IPV, the statutory 
definition of IPV is narrow compared to how IPV is experienced and 
observed by children.240
Despite most states’ failure to codify exposure to IPV as a ground 
for TPR, courts have recognized that exposure to IPV is harmful to 
children and, as such, can be grounds for TPR. A Kansas court, for ex-
ample, held that children exposed to IPV were emotionally abused.241
Similarly, Texas courts have held that exposure to domestic violence 
supports a finding of TPR due to abuse even when the abuse is “not di-
rected at the child[]” because IPV “undermines the safety of the home 
environment.”242 West Virginia courts have also highlighted that acts of 
physical and emotional abuse due to IPV are relevant to TPR proceed-
ings because children who witness IPV “may suffer deep and lasting 
emotional harm.”243
Stability Paradox: Table E, https://jclewisesq.com/2020/03/14/tsp-table-e/ 
[https://perma.cc/X3X4-VW58].
239. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-2(2)(E) (2020) (“The commission of an act of family vio-
lence as defined in Code Section 19-13-1 in the presence of the child. An act includes a 
single act, multiple acts, or a continuing course of conduct. As used in this subpara-
graph, the term ‘presence’ means physically present or able to see or hear.”) (emphasis 
added). It is unclear whether this statutory definition would encompass a child seeing 
the aftermath of the violence, such as bruising to mother, but the child not having 
been physically “present” during the violent act. Id.; ALASKA STAT.
§ 47.10.011(8)(B)(ii)-(iii) (2018) (including conduct by a parent which places child 
at substantial risk of mental injury as a result of “exposure to conduct by a household 
member . . . that is a crime [or attempted crime] under AS § 11.41.100-11.41.220, 
11.41.230(a)(1) or (2), or 11.41.410-432 . . . or repeated exposure to . . . crime[s] 
under AS § 11.41.230(a)(3) or AS § 11.41.250-11.41.270.”) (emphasis added).
240. The definition of IPV in both of these states does not include emotional abuse. GA.
CODE § 19-13-1 (2018); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.011(8)(B)(ii)-(iii). Many children, 
however, observe fathers’ emotional abuse of mothers. See ALISON CUNNINGHAM &
LINDA BAKER, LITTLE EYES, LITTLE EARS: HOW VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SHAPES 
CHILDREN AS THEY GROW (2007), https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/phac-
aspc/migration/phac-aspc/sfv-avf/sources/fem/fem-2007-lele-pypo/pdf/fem-2007-
lele-pypo-eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/9569-WAJ2].
241. In re A.H., 334 P.3d 339, 343 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014) (also noting that “‘[i]f the trial 
court observes abuse of one child, the judge should not be forced to refrain from tak-
ing action until the next child suffers injury.’ Young bodies cannot withstand many 
savage blows; young psyches, even fewer.” (citations omitted) (quoting In re A.B., 
746 P.2d 96, 97 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987)).
242. In re A.M.Y., No. 04-15-00352-CV, 2015 WL 6163212, at *4 (Tex. App. Oct. 21, 
2015); see also Haddix, supra note 97, at 769-70 (citing various Texas cases where 
TPR of a parent was upheld when child was exposed to IPV).
243. In re Stephen Tyler R, 584 S.E.2d 581, 593 (W. Va. 2003) (quoting W. VA. CODE
§ 48-27-101(a)(2) (2015)); see also In re Carlita B., 408 S.E.2d 365, 368 (W. Va. 
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In sum, most states have afforded limited protection and remedies 
for mothers experiencing violence by failing to enact protective statutes 
or enacting statutes that are ineffective. Many enacted statutes require 
that the person who committed rape be convicted of the crime in order 
for the court to terminate that person’s parental rights or restrict custo-
dial time. In most rape cases, however, the rapist is not convicted of the 
crime. Also, most statutes permit judicial discretion in deciding whether 
to terminate parents’ rights or restrict custodial time. Judges, however, 
frequently discount violence, the impact that exposure to violence has 
on children, and the effect that IPV and rape have on a mother’s ability 
to parent. This results in judges ordering custody arrangements that ap-
proximate the two-parent household, creating more instability in the 
family because of the IPV or rape.
IV. Continued Resistance to a Paradigm Shift
In deciding whether to terminate parents’ rights, a court must bal-
ance parents’ fundamental right to parent their children with the State’s
parens patriae interest in protecting the welfare of children.244 Courts are 
reluctant to terminate parental rights because TPR results in a disrup-
tion of the nuclear family paradigm. As a result, language in court opin-
ions expresses extreme disdain for terminating parents’ rights. TPR is 
seen as “tantamount to imposition of a civil death penalty.”245 Courts 
also say of TPR that “few forms of state action are both so severe and so 
irreversible;”246 that it is “punishment more severe than many criminal 
1991) (“Prior acts of violence, physical abuse, or emotional abuse . . . are relevant in a 
termination of parental rights proceeding.”); Nancy Viola R. v. Randolph W., 356
S.E.2d 464, 468 (W. Va. 1987) (“[S]pousal abuse is a factor to be considered in de-
termining parental fitness for child custody.” (citation omitted)); Collins v. Col-
lins, 297 S.E.2d 901, 902 (W. Va. 1982) (per curiam) (finding that the child’s moth-
er who had committed acts of domestic violence was unfit custodian for child); In re
Wiltse, No. 318374/318375, 2014 WL 1515777, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 
2014) (“Moreover, it is likely the minor children would be harmed if returned to re-
spondents’ care because of the domestic violence and unstable living environment. 
Testimony during the termination hearing supported the conclusion that even if no 
violence was directed at the children, the children could be ‘traumatized’ if exposed 
to domestic violence.”) (citations omitted).
244. Katherine E. Wendt, Comment, How States Reward Rape: An Agenda to Protect the 
Rape-Conceived Child Through the Termination of Parental Rights, 2013 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 1763, 1775 (2013).
245. Drury v. Lang, 776 P.2d 843, 845 (Nev. 1989).
246. N.J. Div. of Youth Family Servs. v. P.P., 852 A.2d 1093, 1099 (N.J. 2004) (quoting 
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982)).
362 michigan  jo urn al  o f  g ender & la w [Vol. 27:311
sanctions;”247 that “[n]o civil action carries with it graver consequences 
than a petition to sever family ties irretrievably and forever;”248 and that 
termination is a “drastic step that once taken cannot be withdrawn.”249
Although courts are reluctant to terminate parents’ rights, courts 
still acknowledge that parental rights are not absolute250 and that a 
child’s interest should prevail over that of an unfit parent.251 Courts also 
say of children’s rights that “when the interest of the child and the pa-
rental rights conflict, the interest of the child shall prevail;”252 “it is also 
essential that emotional and physical interests of the child not be sacri-
ficed merely to preserve” the parent-child relationship;253 “[q]uite be-
yond and more important than the rights and privileges of the parents is 
the welfare of these children and their prospects of becoming well-
adjusted, self-sustaining individuals;”254 and “parental rights will not be 
enforced to the detriment or destruction of the health and well-being of 
the child.”255 This language suggests that, in cases involving IPV and 
rape, the child’s interest should prevail over that of the offending parent 
because harm results when the court does not account for IPV and 
rape.256
In actuality, however, parents’ rights frequently prevail over chil-
dren’s well-being in cases involving non-intimate partner rape and IPV. 
The legal system affords limited legal protections to mothers who expe-
rience IPV or non-intimate partner rape in the TPR and custody con-
text, which results in a denial of children’s right to proper parenting, 
247. Matter of Adoption of K.A.S., 499 N.W.2d 558, 563 (N.D. 1993) (quoting Joel E. 
Smith, Annotation, Right of Indigent Parent to Appoint Counsel in Proceeding for In-
voluntary Termination of Parental Rights, 80 A.L.R.3d 1141, 1145 (1977), superseded 
by 92 A.L.R.5th 379 (originally published in 2001)).
248. In re M.J.B, 140 S.W.3d 643, 653 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).
249. Ex Parte T.V., 971 So. 2d 1, 9 (Ala. 2007).
250. See, e.g., In re M.D.C, 39 So. 3d 1117, 1128 (Ala. 2009); N.J. Div. of Youth Family 
Servs., 852 A.2d at 1099; In re Grace H., 335 P.3d 746, 756 (N.M. 2014); In re Jus-
tice A. F., No. W2011-02520-COA-R3-PT, 2012 WL 4340709, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. Sept. 24, 2012).
251. Wendt, supra note 244, at 1775.
252. Charleston Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. King, 631 S.E.2d 239, 244 (S.C. 2006).
253. In re C.H., 89 S.W. 3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002).
254. Utah v. Dade, 376 P.2d 948, 949 (Utah 1962).
255. Torres v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., No. CA12-150, 2012 WL 2406614, at *4 
(Ark. Ct. App. 2012); see also In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 388 (Pa. 2004) (“A par-
ent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his or her child is con-
verted, upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child’s right to have 
proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent, healthy safe 
environment.” (quoting In re B.L.L, 787 A.2d 1007, 1013 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001))).
256. See supra Part I.B.
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emotional and physical well-being, and stability. By emphasizing paren-
tal rights over the rights of the child, the legal system maintains the 
structure of the nuclear family or its approximation. Judicial decisions 
justify adhering to the two-parent paradigm even though it contradicts 
the parens patriae interest by disregarding violence against mothers and 
the impact this violence has on children. Judges are able to view the par-
ent who is abusive as being a fit parent when, at the same time, they dis-
credit violence against mothers and the impact that exposure to violence 
has on children and mothers’ ability to parent. The parent’s rights, then, 
prevail over those of the child, preserving the two-parent household or 
its approximation.
A paradigm shift in the legal system is difficult because the nuclear 
family paradigm is rooted in societal attitudes about family, women, 
IPV, and rape. The following section will demonstrate how rooted the 
two-parent paradigm is in the legal system, even in some cases where the 
court decision shifts slightly from the paradigm. Current Pennsylvania 
law regarding TPR and the case of M.E., a case involving rape, will be 
discussed. The facts from the case of M.P. will then be used as a hypo-
thetical TPR case to illustrate how arguments can be applied to cases in-
volving ongoing exposure to IPV.
A. The Relationship Matters: Mere Biological Link 
Versus Established Relationship
The constitutional analysis in TPR cases differs depending on what 
type of relationship exists between the child and the person who com-
mitted the rape or IPV. Where the only connection between the two is 
biological, there is no constitutionally protected right to parentage.257
Conversely, where there is an established relationship between the par-
ent and child, a fundamental liberty interest in the custody and control 
of the child is at stake.258 In cases of non-intimate partner rape there is 
usually only a biological connection between the person who committed 
the crime and the child,259 unless the state has created a connection by 
ordering visitation, custodial rights, or by requiring the offender to pay 
child support.260
257. Murphy, supra note 30, at 181.
258. See Peña v. Mattox, 84 F.3d 894, 899-900 (7th Cir. 1996).
259. See Murphy, supra note 30, at 181-82.
260. Peña, 84 F.3d at 900 (highlighting two cases where male statutory rapists were grant-
ed parenting rights when they had been required to pay support); see also id. at 172.
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An analysis of whether a person has a constitutional right to the
care, custody, and control of their biological child matters because it can 
change the outcome of TPR cases. A person who has committed rape or 
IPV has this constitutional right when he has an established relationship 
with his biological child.261 He therefore has the due process right to a 
hearing where the grounds for terminating parental rights must be 
proved by clear and convincing evidence.262 Absent clear and convincing 
evidence showing that the parent is unfit, the court may not terminate a 
parent’s rights.263 Courts are reluctant to terminate parental rights, espe-
cially in cases involving rape and IPV.264 Thus, it is much more difficult 
for mothers to terminate the parental rights of the person who commit-
ted IPV or rape if that person has an established relationship with the 
biological child.
Conversely, a person who has committed rape or IPV does not 
have a constitutional right in the care, custody, or control of his biologi-
cal child if he has not established a relationship with his biological 
child.265 He therefore does not have “even minimal due process rights to 
notice and hearing in family court to determine whether parentage ex-
ists.”266 Theoretically, then, mothers should not even need to argue for a 
termination of parental rights of the person who committed the rape or 
IPV, as parental rights never existed.
Actions by the State or the parties can also create parental rights in 
cases where none previously existed.267 For example, statutes that permit 
the termination of parental rights of a person who committed rape in 
cases where the child is conceived as a result of the sexual offense create 
parental rights because they assume that there are parental rights to ter-
minate.268 Similarly, courts may establish parental rights when ordering 
custody or visitation rights or when requiring the payment of support.269
261. See Peña, 84 F.3d at 899-900.
262. Santoksy v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 751, 770 (1982).
263. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 751, 770.
264. See supra Parts I-II.
265. See Murphy, supra note 30, at 181.
266. Id.
267. See id. at 184, 189 n.3.
268. Id. at 170.
269. See Peña v. Mattox, 84 F.3d 894, 901 (7th Cir. 1996). Based on the language in Pe-
ña, it can be inferred that mothers may unintentionally create parenting rights for the 
person who committed rape against them if they file for child support against the of-
fender. Id. at 901.
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B. TPR When There is Only a Biological Connection to the Child
Consider cases that have addressed the constitutionality of termi-
nating the parental rights of a person who commits a sexual offense re-
sulting in conception. In Peña v. Mattox, a child was conceived as a re-
sult of statutory rape and placed for adoption without the consent or 
knowledge of the person who committed the rape.270 The person who 
committed the sexual offense sought parental rights, asserting his rights 
were protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.271 Reasoning that 
“[i]t is not the brute biological fact of parentage, but the existence of an 
actual or potential relationship that society recognizes as worthy of re-
spect and protection, that activates the constitutional claim,” the Peña 
court held that the person who committed the rape did not have a con-
stitutionally protected interest in his biological child.272 The court fur-
ther found that even though it was not the person’s fault that he did not
have a relationship with the child because he had not known about the 
pregnancy or adoption, he still did not have a protected right because of 
his criminal conduct.273
Notably, however, the Peña court did suggest that in some circum-
stances someone who commits a sexual offense may have constitutional-
ly protected parental rights, i.e., when there is an established relation-
ship with the child:
The maxim that a wrongdoer shall not profit from his wrong 
is deeply inscribed in the Anglo-American legal tradition. It 
sometimes clashes with, and is sometimes even overridden 
by, competing principles. Where the wrong is of a technical, 
trivial character and the cost of righting it would be great, the 
maxim yields, as in cases in which a father who has estab-
lished an enduring relationship with his child seeks constitu-
tional protection for the relationship in the face of an argu-
ment that as a fornicator he should have no rights.274
270. Peña, 84 F.3d at 895-96.
271. Peña, 84 F.3d at 897-98.
272. Peña, 84 F.3d at 899.
273. Peña, 84 F.3d at 900 (“[N]o court has gone so far as to hold that the mere fact of fa-
therhood, consequent upon a criminal act that our society does take seriously and 
that is not cemented (whoever’s fault that is) by association with the child, creates an 
interest that the Constitution protects in the name of liberty.”).
274. Peña, 84 F.3d at 900 (citation omitted).
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The Peña court further reasoned that individuals who commit sexual of-
fenses “have an argument that parental duties imply correlative parental 
rights” if child support is sought from them.275 Mothers seeking support, 
then, can unintentionally establish parental rights for the rapist.
After Peña, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals also signaled that a
fundamental liberty interest may not be at stake when the only relation-
ship between the offender and the child is biological.276 In State v. Otis,
a father appealed the termination of his parental rights by challenging 
the constitutionality of a Wisconsin statute that permits termination of 
parental rights when a child is conceived as a result of a sexual assault.277
The State contended that the statute was constitutional because “biolog-
ical connection alone does not create a fundamental liberty interest” and 
the father did not have a substantial relationship with his child.278
Though the court analyzed the case as though the father had a funda-
mental liberty interest in the custody of the child, the court noted that 
the statute was constitutional even if it were analyzed as if a fundamen-
tal liberty interest was not at stake.279 This suggests that the court may 
well have agreed with the State’s contention that a fundamental liberty 
interest was not at stake because there was no connection between the 
father and child.
In both Peña and Otis, the two-parent paradigm arguably factored 
into the courts’ determination that the State had constitutional grounds 
to terminate the parental rights of the offenders. In Peña, for example, 
the minor child was living in a two-parent household with individuals 
who sought to adopt him prior to the person who committed the rape 
seeking to establish his parental rights.280 The court specifically noted 
that the person who committed the rape could not block the adoption 
in order to create a relationship with the child.281 Here, allowing the of-
fender to have parental rights would have disrupted the existing tradi-
tional two-parent family, regardless of the fact that it was created by 
adoption.282
275. Peña, 84 F.3d at 901.
276. State v. Otis G. (In re Termination of Parental Rights to Davonta S.), 2008 WI App 
135, ¶ 9, 314 Wis. 2d 283, 758 N.W.2d 927 (Wis. 2008).
277. Otis G., 2008 WI App 135U, ¶¶ 3-5. Wisconsin permits TPR when a child is con-
ceived as a result of a sexual assault when there is a “conviction or other evidence 
produced at a fact-finding hearing.” WIS. STAT. § 48.415(9)(a) (2018).
278. Otis G., 2008 WI App 135U, ¶ 9.
279. See Otis G., 2008 WI App 135U, ¶ 10.
280. Peña, 84 F.3d at 900-01.
281. Peña, 84 F.3d at 901.
282. Though the facts in Otis G. do not indicate whether or not the child was going to be 
adopted, there is a strong likelihood that the State was seeking TPR for adoption 
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Though the Peña and Otis courts’ apparent reliance on the two-
parent paradigm resulted in just outcomes—the TPR of the person who 
committed the rape—more often than not, the glorification of the nu-
clear family perpetuates violence against women. But what results in 
cases where the child has had a relationship with the person who com-
mitted the rape?
C. TPR of Offending Parent When a Relationship Exists
In In the Interest of Z.E., M.E.’s stepfather repeatedly raped her 
from the time she was four years old until she was twenty-three years 
old, resulting in three children conceived from rape.283 M.E. wanted to 
terminate her stepfather’s parental rights to the children because, even 
though he was convicted on multiple charges, incarcerated, and did not 
have contact with M.E. or her children, she feared that he might try to 
contact her and their children in the future.284 Unlike in Peña, however, 
M.E.’s stepfather had a relationship with the children: M.E., her stepfa-
ther, and the children resided together as a family for approximately 
four years prior to M.E. and her children leaving her stepfather.285
At the time that M.E. wanted to terminate her stepfather’s parental 
rights to their children, Pennsylvania’s Adoption Act which contains the 
state’s TPR statute, had been interpreted to require the parent who 
sought to terminate the parental rights of the other parent to have a 
partner who would adopt the child and form a new parent-child rela-
tionship.286 M.E. did not want to have a partner adopt her children for 
two reasons.287 First, M.E. believed that she should not be required to 
have a partner adopt her children in order to terminate the parental 
rights of her stepfather.288 As a single parent, she had created a stable, 
purposes given the ages of the mother and the offender and the fact that the State ini-
tiated the proceedings.
283. In re Z.E., Nos. 3577 EDA 2018 & 3624 EDA 2018, 2019 WL 3779711 (Pa. Su-
per. Ct. Aug. 12, 2019).
284. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *4-5.
285. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 6-7, In re Z.E., No. 3577 EDA 2018, 2019 WL 
3779711 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 12, 2019). Though the minor children had not had 
any contact with the stepfather for a long time prior to the TPR proceeding and one 
of the children did not even remember the stepfather, M.E. did not try to argue that 
stepfather did not have any parenting rights under the theory that there was not an 
existing relationship between the stepfather and the children. Id.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 16-26.
287. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 6, 14, In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711.
288. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 14, In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711.
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happy environment for her children where they were thriving and free 
from harm.289 M.E. felt that single parents like her should not be forced 
into establishing two-parent households to terminate the parental rights 
of men who committed rape.290 Second, M.E. did not want a partner to 
adopt her children because the person who had adopted her—her step-
father—had raped her.291
M.E. challenged the constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s TPR stat-
ute.292 When a person challenges the constitutionality of a statute, the 
court reviews whether the governmental act (e.g., the statute) is law-
ful.293 Statutes that affect an individual’s fundamental rights, such as the 
right to the care, custody, and control, of a child, are reviewed using a 
strict scrutiny analysis.294 Under this review, the statute is upheld if it 
serves a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to 
serve that interest.295 M.E. contended that Act was unconstitutional be-
cause it did not serve a compelling state interest nor was it narrowly tai-
lored.296
One purported purpose of the Act was “to dispense with the need 
for parental consent to an adoption.”297 This might have served a com-
pelling governmental interest in effectuating adoptions where a parent is 
deemed unfit. Courts, however, had conflated this with establishing a 
parent-child relationship with two parents in an intact marriage to pro-
tect the stability of the new family unit.298 This conflation was shown in 
the case of In re Adoption M.R.D. where the TPR petition was denied 
289. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 8, 17-18, In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711.
290. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 17-19, In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711.
291. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 6, In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711.
292. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 8-9, In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711.
293. Judicial Review, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/judicial_review
[https://perma.cc/C8GK-7CFP].
294. Schmehl v. Wegelin, 927 A.2d 183, 185-86 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 2007).
295. Schmehl, 927 A.2d at 185-86.
296. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 15-19, In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711.
297. See, e.g., In re Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d 1117, 1120 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016) (The 
“adoption requirement is consistent with the rationale behind permitting the invol-
untary termination of a parent’s rights, which we have explained is ‘to dispense with 
the need for parental consent to an adoption when, by choice or neglect, a parent has 
failed to meet the continuing needs of the child.’” (quoting In re B.E., 377A.2d 153, 
155 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977))).
298. See In re Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d 1117, 1127-28; see also In re Adoption of 
J.D.S., 763 A.2d 867, 871 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (“Termination of the natural par-
ent’s rights prior to adoption and allowance of stepparent adoption is for the purpose 
of protecting the integrity and stability of the new family unit. Because the primary 
function of government and law is to preserve and perpetuate society, the traditional 
family structure is given every reasonable presumption in its favor.”).
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when the mother sought to have the minor child’s grandparent be the 
adoptive parent.299 M.E. argued that establishing a two-parent house-
hold to provide stability for the family unit was not a compelling (or 
even legitimate) state interest.300 M.E. noted that, in today’s society, 
nontraditional families abound with 35% of children living in single 
parent households.301 M.E. also argued that research studying children 
who had not experienced early trauma “found no significant difference 
in negative behaviors of children raised by dual parents or single par-
ents.”302 Two-parent households, then, do not inherently provide more 
stability for children than a single-parent household.
Additionally, M.E. argued that a two-parent household did not 
guarantee stability for a child.303 For example, exposure to IPV has nu-
merous adverse impacts on children.304 In households experiencing IPV, 
the home environment or its approximate vis-à-vis shared custody ar-
rangement is harmful to mothers and children.305 The state’s purpose 
“of creating a ‘stable, new family unit’ which preserves the nuclear fami-
ly is flawed” in cases where there is IPV or rape “as the two-parent 
household provides no such stability.”306
The State’s stated objective was providing more stability to chil-
dren, but by suggesting that a fit parent who was already providing a 
safe, stable environment needed to have someone adopt her children in 
order to terminate her attacker’s parental rights, the State undermined 
this objective.307 Paradoxically, the legal system’s glorification of the 
two-parent paradigm was creating more instability and harm for M.E.’s 
family unit by suggesting that her stepfather could attempt future con-
299. See, e.g., In re Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d 1117 at 1120; see also supra Part I.
300. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 17, In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711. In addition, a 
two-parent household does not guarantee stability for a child. As discussed supra in 
Part I, exposure to IPV has numerous adverse impacts on children. In households ex-
periencing IPV, the home environment is volatile. The state’s purpose of creating a 
“stable, new family unit” is fundamentally flawed as a two-parent household may 
provide no such stability.
301. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 15-20, In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711.
302. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 17, In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711 (quoting Domi-
nic Schmuck, Single Parenting: Fewer Negative Effects on Children’s Behaviors than 
Claimed, 118 MOD. PSYCHOL. STUD. 117, 120 (2013)).
303. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 18-19, In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711.
304. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 18-19, In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711; see also supra 
Part I.
305. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 18-19, In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711; see also supra
Part I.
306. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 19, In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711; see also supra Part 
I.
307. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 15-19, In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711.
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tact with her and her children even though his connection as a “parent”
was derived from his criminal acts of raping M.E.308
Noting that the Act required a contemplated adoption, the trial 
court denied M.E.’s petition even though it determined that grounds 
for termination existed and that it would be in the best interest of the 
minor children to terminate the parental rights of the father.309 The trial 
court found that M.E. had not met her burden of establishing that the 
statute violated the Constitution because the governmental purpose of 
“effect[ing] a new family unit” was a “rational basis for the requirement 
of adoption.”310 Although a fundamental right was at issue, the judge’s 
language suggests that he reviewed the legitimacy of the Act under a ra-
tional basis test.311 Under a rational basis test, a law is upheld if it is ra-
tionally related to a legitimate government purpose.312 This is a much 
less stringent burden for the state to meet in proving a law is constitu-
tional than application of strict scrutiny requires.313
Though the court provided no further analysis in this decision, one 
has to wonder whether the judge was influenced by the nuclear family 
paradigm. The court emphasized that M.E. proved that grounds to ter-
minate her stepfather’s parental rights existed, that her stepfather com-
mitted “despicable crimes of abuse” against her, and that M.E. “set forth 
well-reasoned arguments to sever all connections with an abusive indi-
vidual.”314 Yet, the trial court still denied M.E.’s petition to terminate 
her stepfather’s parental rights because there was not a contemplated 
adoption.315 Unlike the positive outcome in Peña and Otis, the trial 
court’s adherence to the two-parent paradigm here resulted in M.E. not 
being able to terminate the parental rights of her stepfather. The differ-
ent outcome in these cases may well have resulted because in Peña and 
Otis the offending parents had no prior relationship with the children at 
issue. In M.E.’s case, however, the parties had lived together as a family 
308. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 18, In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711. In Pennsylvania, 
the stated purpose of the adoption requirement was further contradicted by the stat-
ute itself. Under the statute, an unmarried person may adopt as a single person when 
adopting through an agency. Id. at 19.
309. Opinion and Order at 6, In re Z.E., No. 64 O.C.A. 2018 (C.P. Monroe Cty. 2018)
(“[D]espite the despicable crimes of abuse by Father against Mother, and the facts of 
this case, we are unable to grant Mother’s petition at this time.”)
310. Opinion and Order at 6, In re Z.E., No. 64 O.C.A. 2018 (C.P. Monroe Cty. 2018).
311. Opinion and Order at 6, In re Z.E., No. 64 O.C.A. 2018 (C.P. Monroe Cty. 2018).
312. Rational Basis Test, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/rational
_basis_test [https://perma.cc/CY9S-38ZT].
313. Id.
314. Opinion and Order at 6, In re Z.E., No. 64 O.C.A. 2018 (C.P. Monroe Cty. 2018).
315. Opinion and Order at 6, In re Z.E., No. 64 O.C.A. 2018 (C.P. Monroe Cty. 2018).
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unit for a period of time prior to M.E. and her children safely separating 
from her stepfather.316
On appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania circumvented the 
constitutional arguments raised by M.E. Instead, the court sua sponte re-
lied on a statutory section found in the Act to reverse the trial court.317
Under Section 2901 of the Act, the court can determine that all of the 
legal requirements of the Act, such as averring a contemplated adoption, 
need not be met for “cause shown.”318 The court noted:
Applying [the] . . . contemplated adoption requirement to 
the unique facts of this case creates an absurd result where 
Mother, a capable and fit single parent who has been the 
tragic victim of rape committed at Father’s hand for decades, 
cannot remain Children’s legal Mother and seek termination 
of Father’s, her rapist’s, parental right.319
The court held that M.E. had shown cause as to why she should be re-
lieved of the contemplated adoption requirement.320 In distinguishing 
M.E.’s case from prior decisions where the court had determined that 
“cause shown” was not established, the court highlighted two factors.321
First, there was no need to create a new parent-child relationship be-
cause M.E. was a fit parent.322 Second, M.E. was not attempting to 
“subvert the adoption process in seeking” TPR of the father.323 Rather 
M.E. was “looking to sever Father’s parental rights . . . in an effort to 
put an end to the cycle of abuse, and to provide Children with a chance 
to grow up in a loving, supportive and caring home with no fear of re-
prisal from Father.”324
The court rejected the two-parent paradigm as it applied to M.E.’s 
specific case. It did not, however, shift away from the paradigm at a 
broader constitutional level. In fact, the court expressly “limit[ed] the 
holding of this case to its facts so that ‘[t]he exercise of such discretion 
316. In re Z.E., Nos. 3577 EDA 2018 & 3624 EDA 2018, 2019 WL 3779711, at *1 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. Aug. 12, 2019).
317. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *1.
318. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2901 (2010).
319. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *6.
320. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *6.
321. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *7.
322. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *7.
323. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *7.
324. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *7.
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does not open the door’ to terminat[ion of] parental rights ‘when adop-
tion is not contemplated.’”325
At the same time, the court repeatedly signaled that the legal sys-
tem should shift away from the nuclear family paradigm. The court not-
ed the law should be changed because an absurd result occurs when the 
State requires a fit parent to have a contemplated adoption in order to 
terminate the parental rights of the man who raped her.326 The opinion 
also highlighted that “societal norms regarding what constitutes a family 
are constantly evolving” and that M.E., a single parent, was capable of 
raising her children in a supportive, caring home.327 All of these state-
ments signal that a paradigm shift should occur to recognize that two-
parent households or its approximation are not always the more stable 
family units—particularly where sexual violence has occurred—because 
it is harmful to both mothers and children.
State statutes requiring a conviction to terminate parental rights in 
cases where a child is conceived as a result of the sexual offense could al-
so be challenged using the analysis in Peña and Otis. As signaled in Peña
and Otis, a fundamental liberty interest is not at stake when there is no 
relationship between the offending parent and the child other than biol-
ogy.328 A person who committed rape does not even have a constitution-
ally protected right to parent if he does not have a relationship with the 
child.329 Any statute that creates this right could be challenged as uncon-
stitutional from the onset. The advantage to this argument is that it 
eliminates judicial discretion: Since parentage is denied from the onset, 
judges would not have the opportunity to determine whether TPR is in 
the best interest of the child. This would prevent judges from upholding 
the two-parent paradigm and denying TPR of the offending parents.
The dicta in In the Interest of Z.E. could be used to challenge state 
statutes requiring a conviction to terminate parental rights in cases 
where a child is conceived as a result of the sexual offense—whether 
there is a relationship between the offending child or not. For most 
states, the stated purpose of TPR statutes is to protect the child from an 
325. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *8 (quoting In re Adoption of R.B.F., 569 Pa. 269, 
280 (Super. Ct. 2002)).
326. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *6 (“It is doubtful that the legislature would have 
intended such a result where a fit parent seeks to ensure his or her family’s safety and 
prevent them ‘from further exposure to a sexually violent predator.’”).
327. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *8.
328. Peña v. Mattox, 84 F.3d 894, 899-901 (7th Cir. 1996); see State v. Otis G. (In re
Termination of Parental Rights to Davonta S.), 2008 WI App 135, ¶ 10, 314 Wis.
2d 283, 758 N.W.2d 927 (Wis. 2008).
329. See Peña, 84 F.3d at 899-901.
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unfit parent (i.e., from harm, such as abuse and neglect) and promote 
permanency and stability for the child.330 A conviction requirement ren-
ders the state’s purported objective of protecting children from harm 
and providing stability and permanency in the family unit moot because 
few mothers will be able to access the legal protections afforded by the
TPR statute.
Continued contact with an offending parent has harmful effects on 
mothers and children.331 Legislatures have recognized this harm. In Col-
orado, the preamble to the statute permitting TPR when a child is con-
ceived as a result of a sexual offense notes that the purpose of the statute 
is to “protect the victim of the sexual assault and to the protect the 
child . . . by . . . preventing future contact between the parties.”332 The 
United States House of Representatives has noted that continued con-
tact with a rapist can have “traumatic psychological effects on the survi-
vor” which can “severely negatively impact her ability to raise a healthy 
child.”333 Despite legislatures recognizing that contact between a mother 
and the person who raped her creates instability in the family unit and 
harm to the child, the conviction requirement persists in many states.334
Paradoxically, this requirement contravenes the stated purposes of pro-
moting permanency for children and protecting them from an unfit 
parent because most offenders are not convicted of rape.335 In In the In-
terest of Z.E., the court noted that the adoption requirement created an 
“absurd result” because the mother, “a capable and fit single parent who 
had been the tragic victim of rape,” could not terminate the parental 
rights of the person who raped her.336 The conviction requirement cre-
ates a similar absurd result: Most fit mothers who have experienced sex-
ual assault will not be able to terminate the parental rights of the person 
who raped them because of low conviction rates in sexual assault cases.
Notably, state statutes do not require a conviction to terminate a 
parent’s right for most other grounds permitting TPR, such as abuse, 
neglect, substance abuse dependency, and abandonment.337 Why, then, 
330. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-100.2 (2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2201 
(Supp. 2019); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-201 (2019).
331. See supra Part I.B.
332. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-105.5(1) (2020).
333. Rape Survivor Child Custody Act, H.R. 1257, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015).
334. See supra Part III.
335. See supra Part III.
336. In re Z.E., Nos. 3577 EDA 2018 & 3624 EDA 2018, 2019 WL 3779711, at *6 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. Aug. 12, 2019).
337. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.011 (2018); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-112(j) (2019);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292.02 (2019); NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.105(b) (2018); N.H.
REV. STAT. § 170-C:5 (Supp. 2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1111(a) (2019); N.D.
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do many states require a conviction for rape as a prerequisite to termi-
nating the parental rights of the person who committed the rape when a 
child is conceived as a result of the sexual offense? A conviction re-
quirement is further evidence of how the legal system disbelieves women 
and discounts allegations of rape.
D. TPR When There is Exposure to IPV
In cases involving IPV, a fundamental liberty interest will usually 
be at stake because the father is likely to have an established relationship 
with the child. The State, however, has a compelling government inter-
est—protecting a child from the psychological and physical harm—in 
the TPR of a parent who exposes a child to his ongoing abusive and 
controlling behavior.338 The absence of statutes permitting TPR on the 
basis of children’s exposure to IPV—even though a number of statutes 
recognize that emotional and psychological abuse injures children—
further reflects societal belief that permitting TPR in these circumstanc-
es will cause the family unit to disintegrate.
Although the holding in In the Interest of Z.E. was limited to the 
facts of that case, the Superior Court’s reasoning can be used to support 
the termination of a father’s rights in cases where a relationship exists 
between the father and the child and the child was or is exposed to IPV. 
In M.P. v. M.P., though M.P. never sought to terminate the parental 
rights of her husband, the facts in her case are useful to demonstrate 
how one could argue for terminating the parental rights of a partner 
who is abusive.339 M.P. fled the marital residence due to IPV;340 M.P.’s 
husband engaged in a pattern of physical, psychological, and emotional 
abuse including controlling her finances and threatening her.341 Exam-
ples of the IPV include when M.P.’s husband kicked her in the back 
CENT. CODE § 27-20-44(1) (2016); S.C. CODE. ANN. § 63-7-2570 (2010); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 14-2-309 (2019).
338. See supra Part I.B; see also In re A.H., 334 P.3d 339, 343 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014); In re
A.M.Y., No. 04-15-00352-CV, 2015 WL 6163212, at *4 (Tex. App. Oct. 21, 2015);
In re Stephen Tyler R., 584 S.E.2d 581, 593 (W. Va. 2003); Nancy Viola R. v. Ran-
dolph W., 356 S.E.2d 464, 468 (W. Va. 1987); Collins v. Collins, 297 S.E.2d 901, 
902 (W. Va. 1982); In re Wiltse, No. 318374/318375, 2014 WL 1515777, at *3 
(Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2014).
339. M.P. v. M.P., 54 A.3d 950, 951 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012). The Barbara J. Hart Justice 
Center (a project of the Women’s Resource Center) represented M.P. on numerous 
family matters. M.P. provided consent for her case to be shared.
340. M.P., 54 A.3d at 951.
341. Interview with M.P., client, in Scranton, Pa. (2011).
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and threw her against a counter while she was holding their daughter.342
He also threatened to beat her when she insisted they go to the doctor 
because the baby was sick, threatened that she would never see their 
daughter again if she left him, and controlled her access to money to the 
point where she was not even allowed to purchase her own clothing.343
After M.P. left her husband, he had no contact with their daughter by 
his own choice and he did not pay any child support.344
The right to terminate parental rights based solely on ongoing ex-
posure to IPV does not exist under Pennsylvania law.345 Hypothetically 
M.P. could have sought to terminate his rights under two enumerated 
grounds in the statute:
1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least 
six months immediately preceding the filing of the peti-
tion either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing 
parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform 
parental duties.
2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or 
refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without es-
sential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for 
his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and 
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 
will not be remedied by the parent.346
Pennsylvania law, however, required that M.P. also show that either she 
had someone who will adopt her daughter, creating a new family unit, 
or that the legal requirement of adoption need not be met based on the 
facts of her case.347
Under the decision in In the Interest of Z.E., M.P. could argue that 
the facts of her case are such that the legal requirement that a contem-
plated adoption be averred are not necessary. M.P. suffered extreme 
abuse by her husband and since 2011 she has been the sole financial 
342. Id.
343. Id.; see also Petition for Protection from Abuse at 8, Piguave v. Price, No. 2009-FC-
40747 (Lackawanna Cty. Ct. Com. Pl. June 22, 2009).
344. Interview with M.P., client, in Scranton, Pa. (2011); see also Guardian Ad Litem Re-
port & Recommendation at 1, Piguave v. Price, No. 2009-FC-40747 (Lackawanna 
Cty. Ct. Com. Pl. Aug. 30, 2011); M.P., 54 A.3d at 951-52.
345. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2511(a) (2010).
346. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2511(a)(1)-(2) (2010).
347. See supra Part I.A for a detailed analysis of the relevant Pennsylvania laws.
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provider for her daughter and had primary physical and sole legal custo-
dy.348 Further, the father has not seen or contacted their child since 
2011.349 In In the Interest of Z.E., the Superior Court noted these same 
facts: That M.E. had been the sole financial provider, had primary cus-
tody and legal custody of the children, had suffered abuse by father, and 
that the father had had no contact with the children.350
In addition, M.P., like M.E., is a fit parent who has met her 
daughter’s needs, demonstrating that there is no need to establish a new 
parent-child relationship. M.P. would not be acting to “subvert” the 
adoption process as she is not seeking to terminate the parental rights of 
the father for being “ineffective or merely negligent.”351 Rather, she seeks 
to terminate the parental rights of the father “in an effort to end a cycle 
of abuse” and to provide her daughter “with a chance to grow up in a 
loving, supportive and caring home with no reprisal from [the] 
[f]ather.”352 The requirement of a contemplated adoption would once 
again be counterproductive to the State’s objective of family stability.
In sum, M.P. has the same arguments advanced by M.E. M.P. 
need not have a contemplated adoption in order to terminate the paren-
tal rights of her daughter’s father because she is a fit parent and the fa-
ther is not. M.P., like M.E., would also be seeking to end a cycle of vio-
lence to prevent future harm to her daughter. In addition, M.P. has the 
same constitutional arguments that M.E. raised. States do not have a 
compelling reason for requiring contemplated adoptions when a fit par-
ent seeks to terminate the parental rights of the other parent who is un-
fit. Conversely, States do have a compelling reason to terminate the 
rights of a parent who exposes a minor child to his ongoing physical, 
psychological, sexual, and/or financial abuse because extensive research 
has demonstrated the harmful impact exposure to IPV has on children.
Although the case of In the Interest of Z.E. is limited to Pennsylva-
nia, the Superior Court’s opinion and the mother’s brief provide persua-
sive arguments for the legal system to move away from the nuclear fami-
ly paradigm. In In the Interest of Z.E., the court recognized the stability 
paradox that results when the court adheres to the traditional family (or 
348. Interview with M.P., client, in Scranton, Pa. (2011); see also Stipulated Order at 1, 
Piguave v. Price, No. 2009-FC-40747 ((Lackawanna Cty. Ct. Com. Pl. Oct. 31, 
2011); Stipulated Order at 1, Piguave v. Price, N0.2009-FC-40747 (Lackawanna 
Cty. Ct. Com. Pl. Dec. 7, 2011).
349. Interview with M.P., client, in Scranton, Pa. (2011).
350. In re Z.E., No. 3577 EDA 2018 & 3624 EDA 2018, 2019 WL 3779711, at *2, *7
(Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 12, 2019).
351. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *7.
352. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *7.
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its approximation) when it noted that there is no need to create a new 
parent-child relationship because the mother was a fit parent and stepfa-
ther was not. The language used for the mother and for the stepfather in 
the opinion also simultaneously framed the case, addressing the notion 
of parental equality. Within the opinion, the mother is referred to as the 
“fit parent” whereas the stepfather is the “rapist.”353 In other words, the 
stepfather, by nature of his criminal conduct of violence towards the 
mother, is unfit.
The court, then, did not need to adhere to the judicial notions of 
parental equality because the mother and the stepfather are not on equal 
footing. Rather, the stepfather’s egregious and criminal conduct made 
him an unfit parent. Finally, the court not only credited the violence 
against the mother, but also the harmful impact that future exposure to 
the stepfather could have on both the mother and the children. Here, 
the court dismantled the presumptions of parental equality, discounting 
violence against mothers, and gender bias, thereby signaling a limited 
(due to the narrow holding of the case) paradigm shift away from the 
two-parent household. Until the legal system shifts fully from the two-
parent paradigm and addresses the factors that perpetuate it and vio-
lence against women, an absence of TPR statutes could result in courts 
continuing to award custodial time and visitation to persons who com-
mit sexual offenses and/or IPV. The next section discusses the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of enacting TPR statutes directed at cases 
involving rape or IPV and provides model legislation.
V. Model Legislation
The goal of enacting statutes permitting TPR and/or restricting vis-
itation in cases where a child was conceived as a result of a sexual offense 
should be to afford protections for mothers and children. But when 
lawmakers start with the presumption that parental rights exist, the stat-
utes they enact can have the harmful consequence of making it more 
difficult to terminate the parental rights or restrict visitation of violent 
offenders or abusive partners.354 Statutes that begin with the presump-
tion that a person who has committed the sexual offense has parenting 
rights have the effect of putting the mother and the person who com-
mitted the rape on equal footing when they enter the courtroom.355
353. See In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *6-7.
354. See generally Murphy, supra note 30.
355. Id. at 182-83.
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Thus, the notion that parental rights already exist provides a legal ad-
vantage to the person who committed the violent offense.
In the absence of TPR statutes, courts award custodial rights to 
men who have committed rape. This has often meant long, arduous le-
gal battles for mothers. TPR statutes, then, became a necessary tool in 
efforts to prevent men who committed rape from obtaining parenting 
rights even though many provide inadequate protection for mothers be-
cause the statutes either require a criminal conviction or permit judicial 
discretion in determining whether the parental rights will be terminat-
ed.356 And because TPR statutes themselves reinforce the faulty notion 
that a parent-child relationship exists in cases when it does not—
specifically where a child is conceived as a result of a sexual offense—
continuing to propose legislation and/or seeking amendments to exist-
ing statutes is admittedly risky. Numerous statutes, however, have al-
ready been enacted and a lack of statutes continues to result in courts 
awarding custody to the offending person without remedies for moth-
ers.357 Amending existing statutes or enacting statutes in states that have 
not done so, then, can improve protections for mothers and their chil-
dren.
This section provides recommendations for model legislation on 
TPR for cases involving rape and IPV. Relevant portions of existing 
state statutes, prior proposed ideas expressed in articles,358 and ideas 
based on practical experience are used to formulate more comprehensive 
legislation. The model legislation denies parental rights from the onset if 
the person who committed the rape or IPV does not have an established 
relationship with the child. This legislation lessens presumptions of pa-
rental equality and combats the discounting of violence against women 
356. See supra Part III.
357. See, e.g., Amanda Woods, Convicted Rapist Gets Joint Custody of Victim’s Child, N.Y.
POST (Oct. 9, 2017), https://nypost.com/2017/10/09/convicted-rapist-gets-joint-
custody-of-victims-child/ [https://perma.cc/X4MT-YKKR]; Alabama Court Forces 
Rape Survivor to Allow Rapists to Have Visitation with Children, KNOE 8 NEWS (June 
12, 2019), https://www.knoe.com/content/news/Alabama-court-forces-rape-survivor-
to-allow-rapist-to-have-visitation-with-children-511195642.html [https://perma.cc
/JF4Y-NYH6]; Lynn Smith, Some States Are Giving Rapists Custody of Children, and 
That Needs to Stop, PARENTS (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.parents.com/parenting
/better-parenting/some-states-are-giving-rapists-custody-of-children-and-that-needs-
to-stop/ [https://perma.cc/24PF-BWED].
358. See, e.g., Bitar, supra note 219; Haddix, supra note 97; Natalie Hoch, The Real Ameri-
can Horror Story: Overcoming the Hurdles to Terminate a Rapist’s Parental Rights, 51
VAL. U.L. REV. 783 (2017); Johnson, supra note 98; Rachael Kessler, Due Process and 
Legislation Designed to Restrict the Rights of Rapist Fathers, 10 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y
199, 221-28 (2015); Prewitt, supra note 29; Silver, supra note 209; Wendt, supra
note 244.
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and gender by limiting judicial discretion and not requiring a conviction 
in order to terminate parental rights. The proposed legislation seeks to 
dismantle the two-parent paradigm by addressing these presumptions.
The model legislation involves three sections. States should enact 
all three sections in order to most effectively prevent instability in the 
family unit. Section A addresses cases where the person who committed 
rape or IPV does not have an established relationship with the child. 
Here, the person who committed the rape or IPV is prohibited from 
even establishing parentage. In other words, the person is prohibited 
from even claiming they are legally the child’s parent. Section B ad-
dresses cases where the person committed rape, the child was conceived 
as a result of the sexual offense, and there is a relationship between the 
offender and the child. Section C addresses cases where a person has ex-
posed a child to ongoing IPV and there is an established relationship be-
tween the offending parent and the child.
A. Denial of Parentage
In cases where a relationship with the child has not formed, the of-
fender should be precluded from even establishing parentage. Georgia, 
Michigan, Vermont, and Washington have enacted statutes that prohib-
it parentage from being established or maintained in cases where a child 
is conceived as a result of rape.359 All four states require proof by a clear 
and convincing standard that the person committed a sexual assault 
which resulted in conception of the child.360 States should enact statutes 
similar to these.361
The Georgia, Michigan, Vermont, and Washington statutes deny-
ing parentage only address cases involving rape.362 In most cases involv-
ing IPV, the offending parent will have an established relationship with 
the child. There may be some limited cases involving IPV where the of-
fending parent does not have an established relationship with the minor 
child. States, therefore, should expand the language in these statutes to 
include IPV.
Statutes that deny parentage when the offending parent has not es-
tablished a relationship with the child help prevent the creation of par-
enting rights when none should exist. They also permit less judicial dis-
359. See Table D.
360. See Table D.
361. See Table D.
362. See Table D.
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cretion. Judges need not place the parents on equal footing when they 
enter the courtroom because judges are only determining whether the 
child was conceived as a result of rape. Unfortunately, judicial discount-
ing of allegations of rape and IPV as well as judicial gender bias may still 
occur when there is not a conviction for the rape, even when one is not 
required, because judges are still assessing whether the mother’s allega-
tions are credible. Overall, however, denial of parentage statutes provide 
judges with less discretion by limiting the issue before the judge. Addi-
tionally, the statutes dismantle the two-parent paradigm by expressly 
stating that parentage can be denied and, thus, affirming that a single-
parent household provides stability for a child.
B. TPR in Cases Involving Rape and Established Relationship with 
the Child
The following model legislation is proposed for cases where the of-
fender committed rape, the child was conceived as a result of the sexual 
offense, and the offender has an established relationship with the child:
(a) The court shall terminate the parental rights upon a find-
ing of one or more of the following:
1) The person was convicted, or pled guilty or nolo conten-
dere, to a sexual offense against the petitioner or was con-
victed, or pled guilty or nolo contendere, to an offense in 
which the underlying factual basis was a sexual offense 
against the petitioner, in this state or another state, terri-
tory, possession, or jurisdiction, and a child was con-
ceived as the result of the sexual offense.
Termination of the parental relationship must also be in 
the best interest of the child. There is a rebuttable pre-
sumption that terminating the parental rights of the par-
ent who committed the act of sexual violence is in the 
best interest of the child. The court shall not presume 
that having only one remaining parent is contrary to the 
best interest of the child; or
2) The court finds by clear and convincing evidence, after 
trial, that
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i) The alleged perpetrator committed a sexual offense;363
ii) The child was conceived as a result of that sexual offense; 
and
iii) Termination is in the best interest of the child. There is a 
rebuttable presumption that terminating the parental 
rights of the parent who committed the act of sexual vio-
lence is in the best interest of the child. The court shall 
not presume that having only one remaining parent is 
contrary to the best interest of the child.
(b) Other considerations:
1) In determining whether the termination of parental rights 
is in the best interest of the child, the court shall presume 
that continued contact with the person who committed 
the sexual offense has psychological effects on the victim 
negatively impacting her ability to raise the child.364
2) The parent who is the victim of a sexual offense may file a 
petition for termination of parental rights. The victim of 
the sexual offense may file the petition without an aver-
ment that there is an adoption, need not relinquish her 
parental rights, and need not have a prospective adoptive 
second parent for the child.
3) A petition for termination of parental rights under this 
section may be filed at any time.
4) Terminating the parental rights of a parent does not re-
lieve that parent of his or her support obligation. The 
parent whose parental rights are not being terminated has 
the right to waive said support. No state agency may re-
363. The statute could specifically define sexual offense by enumerating crimes that consti-
tute any offense where a child could be conceived as a result of the conduct. For in-
stance, in Pennsylvania, the statute could read: For purposes of this section “sexual 
offense” has the same meaning as in 18 Pennsylvania Statute Sections 3121-3126, or 
Section 4302 or pursuant to comparable law of another state, territory, possession, or 
jurisdiction or where the offense occurred. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3121, 3122.1, 
3123, 3124.1, 3124.2, 3124.3, 3125-26, 4302 (2015).
364. See Rape Survivor Child Custody Act, H.R. 1257, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015).
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quire the parent whose rights are not being terminated to 
seek support as a condition of receiving public benefits.
Numerous existing statutes are inadequate because they fail to pro-
vide that a guilty plea or nolo contendere plea would provide grounds 
for TPR,365 often leaving mothers without legal protection because in 
the majority of situations few convictions result from sexual assault alle-
gations.366 Most statutes also fail to state that a conviction, guilty plea, 
or nolo contendere plea to an offense in which the underlying basis was 
a sexual offense permits TPR.367 Given that many prosecuted cases result 
in pleas to lessor offenses,368 inclusion of this language (and language 
that a conviction, guilty plea, or nolo contendere plea in this state or 
other states) broadens the applicability of the statute in cases where a 
child was conceived as a result of a sexual offense. Most importantly, 
this proposed statute provides that TPR can occur in cases where there 
is a conviction for a sexual offense or where clear and convincing evi-
dence demonstrates that a child was conceived as a result of a sexual of-
fense. It is imperative that states permit the ability to terminate the pa-
rental rights of a parent who is a sexual offender absent a conviction 
because few convictions occur in sexual assault cases.369 Statutory lan-
guage that explicitly permits TPR in cases of conviction for rape or an 
underlying offense, or where clear and convincing evidence show that a
child was conceived as a result of a sexual offense improves access to le-
gal recourse for mothers.
Notably, the model statute states that the court “shall” rather than
“may” terminate parental rights to prevent judicial discretion, which is 
often used to further the two-parent paradigm regardless of the effect on 
families. Some judicial discretion remains in the proposed statute be-
cause the court must still determine that terminating parental rights is in 
the best interest of the child. A rebuttable presumption that terminating 
the rights of the parent who committed a sexual offense is in the best in-
terest of the child is included in the model legislation to limit judicial 
discretion in the best interest of the child determination. Any form of 
judicial discretion is not ideal given courts’ resistance to shift from the 
365. See supra Part III.
366. See supra Part III.
367. See supra Part III.
368. Erica Goode, Stronger Hand for Judges in the ‘Bazaar’ of Plea Deals, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
22, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/us/stronger-hand-for-judges-after-
rulings-on-plea-deals.html [https://perma.cc/56QN-659W] (“97 percent of federal 
cases and 94 percent of state cases end in plea bargains”).
369. See supra Part III.
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nuclear family paradigm and to afford weight and credibility to accounts 
of rape. The best interest of the child analysis, however, is included here 
for two reasons. First, the proposed legislation might be unconstitution-
al without the best interest of the child analysis because the fundamental 
right to the custody of one’s child is at stake. Second, legislators may be 
reluctant to enact statutes without inclusion of a best interest determina-
tion because states have generally included this analysis in both custody 
and TPR determinations.370 Though not ideal, the rebuttable presump-
tion at least provides mothers with better protection (and arguments 
should she have to appeal the case) than a best interest analysis absent a 
statutory presumption.
The model legislation also includes language that the court must 
presume that contact with the person who committed the rape will neg-
atively impact the mother’s ability to parent. In determining the best in-
terest of the child, courts frequently fail to consider or understand how 
trauma impacts parenting. Rather, courts tend to focus on whether the 
child was directly physically or emotionally harmed by the offending 
parent when engaging in best interest of the child analysis.371 However, 
continued interaction with the person who committed the rape may re-
traumatize the mother, impacting her ability to parent through no fault 
of her own. This, in turn, does impact the child.372 Including this lan-
guage helps prevent courts from discounting the effect of violence on 
families and limits courts’ ability to revert to the two-parent paradigm.
The proposed statute also expressly allows the victim to file a peti-
tion without having to contemplate adoption. This provision emphasiz-
es that mothers in this position still have standing to file. The provision 
stating that the petition may be filed at any time was added to counter 
state statutes that restrict the time period for when a petition may be 
filed. A woman undergoing the trauma of rape recovery and birth of a 
child should have the time and control to file a petition when she so de-
sires instead of her being restricted to arbitrary filing deadlines that serve 
no purpose.373
370. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.19b(5) (2013); MINN. STAT. § 260C.301 
Subd. 7 (2015); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A § 1-4-904(A)(2) (2011); 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 2511(b) (2010); KY. REV. STAT. § 625.090(1)(C) (West 2014).
371. See BARRY GOLDSTEIN & ELIZABETH LIU, REPRESENTING THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
SURVIVOR, 5-8 (Civ. Res. Inst., 2d ed. 2019). Courts also penalize mothers who do 
not present well in court due to the trauma and/or have taken measures to protect 
themselves and their children from repeated interactions and exposure to the person 
who raped them. Meier, supra note 15, at 690-93.
372. See supra Part I.B.
373. See supra Part III.
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Finally, the statute includes a provision that TPR does not relieve 
the parent whose rights are being terminated of his obligation to pay 
child support. This provision was added because rape and IPV has a sig-
nificant negative short- and long-term financial impact on survivors.374
Recognizing that any support payments would be a constant reminder 
of the person who committed the rape or IPV, the model legislation 
provides that the victim may waive support if she so chooses. To prevent 
the legal system from forcing a rape survivor to have constant contact 
with the person who raped her in order to acquire necessary benefits for 
family stability, the statute also prevents agencies from forcing a victim 
to file for support as a condition of receiving public benefits.
C. TPR in IPV Cases
In cases where children are exposed to ongoing IPV, the following 
legislation is proposed:
(a) The court shall terminate parental rights when: The 
court finds by clear and convincing evidence, after trial, 
the repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or 
refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 
essential parental care, control, or subsistence necessary 
for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions 
and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal 
cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
1) “Continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal” in-
cludes exposing the minor child(ren) to a history of on-
going domestic violence which includes physical and sex-
ual violence, intimidation, threats, psychological
/emotional abuse, financial abuse, using the minor child 
374. See Sara J. Shoener & Erika A. Sussman, Economic Ripple Effect of IPV: Building 
Partnerships for Systemic Change, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REP., 83, 83-84 (Aug.-Sept.
2013). Research has shown that 99% of survivors experience economic abuse during 
the relationship. Id. at 83. Economic abuse includes preventing resource acquisition 
(i.e., preventing a partner from working, acquiring asset ownership, interfering with 
employment opportunities), preventing resource use (i.e., denying access to money, 
disabling the person’s vehicle), and resource exploitation (i.e., taking out credit cards 
in partner’s name, deliberately failing to pay bills in partner’s name). Id. “Long after 
the occurrence of an incident of abuse, survivors experience significant obstacles” to 
obtaining economic security due to “the interpersonal, physical, and psychological ef-
fects of the violence.” Id.
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to gain contact or information about the non-offending 
parent, and litigation abuse.
2) Exposure includes, but is not limited to, directly observ-
ing the violence, hearing the parent being abused scream-
ing for help or crying; observing the aftermath of abuse 
such as injuries, torn clothing, broken or damaged items 
such as furniture and telephones; hearing the abusive 
parent degrade, belittle and/or threaten the other parent; 
and the abusive parent interrogating the child about the 
other parent.
3) Exposure to domestic violence may occur during the par-
ent’s relationship and/or after the parents have separated.
(b) Other considerations:
1) Termination of the parental relationship must be in the 
best interest of the child. There is a rebuttable presump-
tion that exposing a child to ongoing IPV is not in the 
child’s best interest. The court shall not presume that 
having only one remaining parent is contrary to the best 
interest of the child.
2) In determining whether TPR is in the best interest of the 
child, the court shall presume that continued contact 
with the person who is committing IPV may have psy-
chological effects on the non-abusing parent, negatively 
impacting the parent’s ability to raise the child.
3) The parent who is the victim of the IPV may file a peti-
tion for termination of parental rights. A victim of IPV 
may file the petition without an averment that there is an 
adoption; the filing parent need not relinquish their pa-
rental rights and need not have an adoptive parent for the 
child.
4) The parental rights of the parent who is being 
abused/victimized shall not be terminated under this sec-
tion.
5) Parents responding or reacting to violence of another 
parent in an effort to protect themselves or a child against 
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that violence does not constitute grounds to terminate 
parental rights under this section.
6) A petition to terminate parental rights under this section 
may be filed at any time.
7) Terminating the parental rights of a parent does not re-
lieve that parent of their support obligation. The parent 
whose parental rights are not being terminating has the 
right to waive said support. No state agency may require 
the parent whose rights are not being terminated to seek 
support as a condition of receiving public benefits.
The model legislation provides that a ground for TPR is ongoing expo-
sure to IPV because few states have explicitly included exposure to IPV 
as a statutory ground to terminate parental rights, leaving mothers with 
limited legal recourse. Given that many judges conclude that IPV does 
not harm children once the parties separate,375 the proposed statute also 
states that the exposure to IPV may occur during and after parties have 
separated. Absent from the model legislation is the requirement that 
there must be observable impairment in the child’s ability to function or 
that the child is exhibiting symptoms of emotional or psychological 
damage, such as anxiety, withdrawal, or aggressive behaviors. Though 
this might seem counterintuitive, while exposure to IPV does harm 
children, the impact IPV has on a child might not be apparent until 
months or years later.376 This language, then, is not included in the stat-
ute because the negative impact that exposure to IPV has on children 
may not be observable to the judge at the time of the hearing.377 This 
provision acknowledges that IPV harms children, helping to dismantle 
the nuclear family paradigm.
375. This is based on observations of judges’ decisions in custody cases involving IPV in 
Pennsylvania. See also DANIEL G. SAUNDERS, KATHLEEN C. FALLER & RICHARD M.
TOLLMAN, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATORS’ BELIEFS ABOUT
DOMESTIC ABUSE ALLEGATIONS: THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO EVALUATOR
DEMOGRAPHICS, BACKGROUND, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE KNOWLEDGE, AND
CUSTODY-VISITATION RECOMMENDATIONS (Oct. 31, 2011), https://www.ncjrs.gov
/pdffiles1/nij/grants/238891.pdf [https://perma.cc/KT2Y-AW6A] (finding that judg-
es had less knowledge about separation violence than other domestic violence topics).
376. See supra Part I.B.
377. See supra Part I.B.
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Provisions (2), (3), (4), (7), and (8) are the same as those found in 
the proposed legislation for cases involving rape when there is a relation-
ship with the child and are necessary here for the same reasons.378
There is always the fear that someone who is abusive and control-
ling may attempt to use any statute, no matter how carefully crafted, to 
further terrorize their victim by seeking to terminate her parental rights. 
As an example, it is not uncommon for a father who has engaged in a 
pattern of abuse to contact law enforcement about the non-offending 
mother as another form of abuse. Should law enforcement believe the 
father’s allegations that the mother assaulted him, the mother may be 
arrested, charged, and convicted of assault even when she was acting in 
self-defense. This, in turn, could provide the father with grounds to 
terminate the mother’s rights, alleging that she exposed the child to 
IPV. In an attempt to curtail this behavior, the model statute includes 
language stating that a victim’s parental rights shall not be terminated. 
Language was also incorporated to ensure that reacting or responding to 
the violence to protect oneself is not grounds for TPR because many 
women do react to the violence at some point in time.379
Mothers still encounter arduous battles in the legal system, even 
with statutory reform intended to correct judges’ presumptions that 
cause negative outcomes for mothers and children. This legal battle will 
continue until there is a shift away from the two-parent paradigm.
Conclusion
In a recent Pennsylvania case, a mother appealed a custody decision 
that awarded the father of her child primary custody.380 Prior to the fa-
ther obtaining primary custody, the mother had been the child’s prima-
ry caretaker since birth.381 The father, however, filed for primary custody 
after the mother’s new boyfriend assaulted the mother.382 Even though 
the mother testified at trial that she had separated from this boyfriend, 
the trial court determined that there was “uncertainty surrounding that 
status” because the mother was in contact with the boyfriend’s mother 
and used the boyfriend’s vehicle while he was incarcerated.383 The trial 
378. For discussion as to why these provisions are necessary, see supra Part IV.B.
379. Swan, supra note 173, at 1027-29.
380. B.S. v. D.M.S., No. 1340 WDA 2018, 2019 WL 2453865, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jun. 
11, 2019).
381. B.S., 2019 WL 2453865, at *1-2.
382. B.S., 2019 WL 2453865, at *2.
383. B.S., 2019 WL 2453865, at *3.
388 michigan  jo urn al  o f  g ender & la w [Vol. 27:311
court also referenced more than once that the “[f]ather’s home includes 
a positive female role model, while [m]other’s home currently does not 
include a positive male role model.”384 On appeal, the mother contend-
ed that the trial court awarded primary custody to the father because it 
incorrectly determined that the minor child needed a father figure.385
The Superior Court affirmed the trial court decision,386 finding that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the father primary 
custody based on the absence of a father figure in mother’s household.387
Gender bias and the court’s adherence to the two-parent paradigm 
influenced the decision in this case, heightening the father’s parental 
rights even though he had relocated out-of-state and the mother had
been the child’s primary caretaker since birth. The trial court discounted 
the mother’s testimony that she had separated from her abusive boy-
friend, even though there was an absence of testimony that she had been 
in contact with him.388 That the trial court discounted the testimony of 
the mother, a woman litigant, and the Superior Court affirmed the trial 
court’s holding suggests that the nuclear family paradigm influenced 
both courts deciding this case.
The above case highlights how entrenched the nuclear family para-
digm continues to be in the legal system. In cases where a child is con-
ceived as a result of a sexual offense or a child is exposed to ongoing 
IPV, a paradigm shift away from the nuclear family is necessary to pro-
tect both mothers and children from continued risk of harm. Until, 
however, a broader attitudinal transformation occurs in society—where 
women’s allegations of rape and IPV are believed, and gender bias in 
courts ends, resulting in judges recognizing that a “parental equality”
presumption is not in the best interest of the child in cases involving 
rape and IPV—courts will adhere to the nuclear family paradigm.
Enacting TPR statutes to address cases where a child is conceived 
as a result of a sexual offense or the child is exposed to ongoing IPV may 
lead to some unintended consequences. But not doing so preserves un-
acceptable barriers to justice and safety for mothers. Existing statutes are 
too limited in scope to address issues such as conviction requirements 
and judicial discretion. Statutes should be enacted and existing statutes 
should be amended to afford comprehensive and attainable protections 
for mothers and children.
384. B.S., 2019 WL 2453865, at *4, *16.
385. B.S., 2019 WL 2453865, at *1. The father was living with his girlfriend whereas the 
mother had recently separated from her boyfriend. Id. at *4.
386. B.S., 2019 WL 2453865, at *16.
387. B.S., 2019 WL 2453865, at *16-17.
388. B.S., 2019 WL 2453865, at *3.
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The law does not permit a person who has committed a criminal 
act to reap the benefits of his crime.389 A person who robs a bank forfeits 
his right to the money taken. And yet an offender who commits a vio-
lent crime and conceives a child or continues to commit violence against 
the mother of his children and his family is afforded protections by the 
legal system. Limited protections for mothers in the legal system persist
because the two-parent paradigm is entrenched in the legal system. This, 
in turn, creates the stability paradox as forced contact with the offending 
parent creates more instability in the family unit and results in harm to 
the child. Thus, the ramification of not trying to shift this entrenched 
paradigm is to perpetuate violence against women and children. In or-
der to ensure that children’s best interests are truly the driving force in 
the family court system, society and our legal system must address pre-
sumptions of parental equality, the discounting of violence against 
women, and gender bias. Only then can the stability paradox end.
389. See Peña v. Mattox, 84 F.3d 894, 901 (7th Cir. 1996).
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Table A
TPR: Statutes Requiring Conviction
STATE STATUTE(S) RELEVANT STATUTORY 
LANGUAGE
NOTES
Kansas KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-
2271(a)(12) (Supp. 2019).
“Presumption of unfitness 
when; burden of proof”
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-
2269(e) (Supp. 2019).
“Factors to be considered in 
termination of parental 
rights; appointment of 
permanent custodian”
Presumed that a parent is unfit 
when the parent is convicted of 
rape and the child was 
conceived as a result of the 
offense.
A finding of unfitness may be 
found when a person is 
convicted of a felony sexual 
offense and the child was 
conceived as a result of the 
offense.
The burden of proof is on the 
parent to rebut presumption of 
unfitness by a preponderance 
of the evidence. KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 38-2271(b) (Supp. 
2019).
Nebraska NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-
292.02(4) (2019).
“Termination of parental 
rights; state; duty to file; 
when”
TPR shall be granted if a person 
has been convicted, pled guilty 
or nolo contendere to a sexual 
assault and the child was 
conceived as a result of the 
offense.
TPR must be in best interest 
of child.
Nevada NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 128.105(1)(b)(8) (2018).




NEV. REV. STAT. § 125C.210 
(2018).
“Child conceived as a result 
of sexual assault”
A ground for TPR includes that 
the natural parent was convicted 
of a sexual assault and the child 
was conceived as a result of the 
offense.
Natural father has no rights to 
custody or visitation if he is 
convicted of sexual assault.
TPR must be in best interest 
of child.
Court may order custody or 
visitation if the natural mother 
consents and it is in the best 
interest of the child.
New 
Hampshire 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-
C:5-a (Supp. 2019).
“Ternination of the Parent-
Child Relationship in Cases 
of Sexual Assault”
Shall TPR when father has been 
convicted of or pled guilty or 
nolo contendere to sexual 
assault and the child was 
conceived as a result of the 
offense or “at a fact-finding 
hearing, is found beyond a 
reasonable doubt to have 
fathered the child through an act 
of non-consensual sexual 
penetration.”
TPR must be in best interest 
of child.
Rebuttable presumption that 
TPR is in the best interest of 
the child when there is a 
showing, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the child’s birth 
was a result of a sexual 
assault of the mother.
New Mexico N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-16-
1(A) (2020).
“Termination of parental 
rights; conception resulting 
from criminal sexual 
penetration”
TPR shall be granted if court 
“determines by clear and 
convincing evidence that the 
child was conceived as a result 
of a criminal sexual penetration 
for which the other biological 
parent was convicted.”
Biological parent may petition 
to TPR.
Presumption that TPR is in the 
best interest of the child.
2020] T H E  S T A B I L IT Y  P AR A D O X 391
STATE STATUTE(S) RELEVANT STATUTORY 
LANGUAGE
NOTES
North Carolina N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-
1111(a)(11) (2019).
“Grounds for terminating 
parental rights”
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.21-
.24 (2019), “First-degree 
forcible rape, Second-
degree forcible rape, 
Statutory rape of a child by 
an adult, First-degree 
statutory rape.”
May TPR when the parent is 
convicted of a sexually related 
offense and the child was 
conceived as a result of the 
offense.
Person convicted of 1st or 2nd
degree forcible rape, statutory 
rape of a child, or 1st degree 
rape “has no rights to 
custody . . . .”
Burden on the petitioner “to 
prove facts justifying the 
termination by clear and 
convincing evidence.”
Court shall determine whether 
termination is in best interest 
of child. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-
1110 (2019). (“Determination 
of best interests of the 
juvenile”).
North Dakota N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-
44(1)(e) (2016).
“Termination of parental 
rights”
May TPR if “[t]he parent has 
pled guilty or nolo contendere to, 
or has been found guilty of 
engaging in a sexual act” and 
the child was conceived as a 
result of the offense.
TPR must be in the best 
interest of the child.
Oregon OR. REV. STAT.
§ 419B.510(1) (2019).
“Termination upon finding 
child conceived as result of 
rape”
OR. REV. STAT. § 107.137(6) 
(2019).
“Factors considered in 
determining custody of 
child”
May TPR when the parent has 
been convicted of rape and the 
child was conceived as a result 
the of rape.
When determining custody, the 
court “shall not award sole or 
joint custody of child to a parent 
if” the parent has been convicted 
of rape and the child was 
conceived as a result of the 
rape.
TPR under this section is an 
independent ground for TPR.
South Carolina S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-
2570(11) (2010).
“Grounds.”
May TPR when the child was 
conceived as a result of criminal 
sexual conduct as “found by a 
court of competent jurisdiction.”
TPR must be in the best 
interest of the child.
Statute references “sentencing 
court” suggesting that a 
conviction is required.
Tennessee TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-
113(g)(10)(A) (2017 & 
Supp. 2020).
“Termination of parental 
rights”
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-
102 (2017).
“Rape; child conceived; 
custody or visitation rights; 
rights of inheritance.”
May TPR if the parent is 
convicted of aggravated rape, 
rape, or rape of a child and the 
child was conceived as a result 
of the rape.
Any person convicted of 
aggravated rape, rape, or rape 
of child shall not have custody or 
visitation rights when the child 
was conceived as a result of the 
offense.
TPR must be in the best 
interest of the child.
The other parent may request 
that the court grant reasonable 
visitation if paternity has been 
acknowledged.
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STATE STATUTE(S) RELEVANT STATUTORY 
LANGUAGE
NOTES
Wyoming WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-
309(a)(ix) (2019).
“Grounds for termination of 
parent-child relationship; 
clear and convincing 
evidence.”
May TPR when the parent is 
convicted of 1st or 2nd degree 
sexual assault or 1st, 2nd, or 3rd
degree sexual abuse of minor 
and the child was conceived as 
a result of the offense.
Facts must be established by 
clear and convincing evidence.
Table B
TPR: States Requiring Clear and Convincing Evidence






termination of parent and 
child relationships”
May TPR when the parent 
committed an act of sexual 
assault, sexual abuse of a minor, 
or incest and the child was 
conceived as a result of the 
offense.
TPR must be in best interest 
of child.
Case law suggests that TPR 
must be shown by clear and 
convincing evidence. See 
e.g. Casey K. v. State, 311 
P.3d 637, 643 (Alaska 
2013).
Colorado COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-
105.7 (2020).
“Termination of parent-
child legal relationship in 
a case of an allegation 
that a child was 
conceived as a result of 
sexual assault but in 
which no conviction 
occurred—legislative 
declaration—definitions”
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-
105.5(3) (2020).
“Termination of parent-
child legal relationship 
upon a finding that the 
child was conceived as a 
result of sexual assault –
legislative declaration –
definitions”
A victim may file to TPR when the 
“child was conceived as a result of 
a sexual offense in which a 
conviction did not occur.”
A victim may file to terminate the 
parent-child legal relationship 
when the “child was conceived as 
a result of an act that led to the 
parent’s conviction for sexual 
assault or for a conviction in which 
the underlying factual basis was 
sexual assault.”
Must show that TPR is in 
best interest of child.
Conviction must have 
occurred on or after July 1, 
2013.
TPR must be in best interest 
of child.
Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-
112(j)(3)(G) (2019).
“Termination of parental 
rights of child committed 
to commissioner.”
Court may grant a petition to TPR 
if it finds by clear and convincing 
evidence that “the parent 
committed an act that constitutes 
sexual assault” and child was 
conceived as a result of the 
offense.
TPR must be in the best 
interest of the child.
Statute applicable to any 
child in the custody of the 
Commissioner of Children 
and Families.
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“Grounds for termination 
of parental rights.”
Grounds for TPR include “when 
the court determines by clear and 
convincing evidence that the child 
was conceived as a result of an 
act of sexual battery . . . .”
Presumed that TPR is in the 
best interest of the child.
Petition to TPR may be filed 
at any time.
Hawaii HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-
61(5) (2018).
“Termination of parental 
rights; petition.”
HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-
46(a)(17) (2018).
“Criteria and procedure in 
awarding custody and 
visitation; best interest of 
the child.”
May TPR when clear and 
convincing evidence 
demonstrates that the parent 
committed a sexual assault and 
the child was conceived as a 
result of the sexual assault.
Natural parent shall not be 
granted custody or visitation with 
a child if the parent was convicted 
of rape or sexual assault and the 
child was conceived as a result of 
that offense.
Presumed that TPR is in the 
best interest of the child.
Idaho IDAHO CODE § 16-
2005(2)(a) (2019).
“Conditions under which 
termination may be 
granted.”
Court may grant an order 
terminating the relationship when 
“[t]he parent caused the child to 
be conceived as a result of rape, 
incest, lewd conduct with a minor 
child under the age of sixteen (16)
years, or sexual abuse of a child 
under age sixteen (16) . . . .”
Court may rebuttably 
presume that TPR is in the 
best interest of the child.
Case law states that grounds 
for TPR must be shown by 
clear and convincing 
evidence. See, e.g., Idaho 
Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. 
Doe, 260 P.3d 1169, 1171 
(Idaho 2011).
Indiana IND. CODE § 31-35-3.5-
7(a)(1) (2018).
“Court termination of 
parent-child relationship; 
findings.”
Shall TPR if court finds by clear 
and convincing evidence that the 
parent committed an act of rape 
and the child was conceived as a 
result of the rape.
TPR must be in the best 





May TPR if the court finds by 
“clear and convincing evidence 
that child was conceived as a 
result of sexual abuse” and the 
victim requests TPR.
Best interest of child “shall 
be the paramount 
consideration.” IOWA CODE
§ 600A.1 (2020).
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STATE STATUTE RELEVANT STATUTORY 
LANGUAGE
NOTES
Louisiana LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 
1004(I) (2014).
“Petition for termination of 
parental rights; 
authorization to file.”
LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 
1015(3), 1015(9) (2014).
“Grounds; Termination of 
parental rights.”
LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 
137 (2014).
“Denial of visitation; 
felony rape; death of a 
parent.”
Victim may file petition to TPR of 
the perpetrator of the sex offense 
when child was conceived as a 
result of a sex offense defined in 
R.S. 15:541.
Ground for TPR includes
“conviction of a sex offense as 
defined in R.S. 15:541 by the 
natural parent which resulted in 
the conception of the child.”
When the child “was conceived 
through the commission of a 
felony rape, the parent who 
committed the felony rape shall be 
denied visitation rights and 
contact with the child.”
“Termination shall result in 
the loss of custody, 
visitation, contact, and other 
parental rights of the 
perpetrator regarding the 
child.”
Sections 1015(3) and (9) 
suggest that TPR is 
permissible when there is 
either a conviction of a 
sexual offense or there is 
clear and convincing 
evidence.
Case law establishes that 
TPR must be proved by 
clear and convincing 
evidence and must be in the 
best interest of the child. 
See, e.g., In re J.A., 752 So. 
2d 806, 811 (La. 2000).
Maine ME. STAT. tit. 22, § 4055 
1-B (2019).
“Grounds for termination.”
ME. STAT. tit. 19-A, 
§ 1658 (West, Westlaw 
through 2019 Second 
Reg. Sess. of the 129th
Leg.).
“Termination of parental 
rights and responsibilities 
in cases involving sexual 
assault.”
May TPR if court finds by clear 
and convincing evidence that the 
child was conceived as a result of 
sexual assault.
Court shall TPR when petitioner 
proves by preponderance of 
evidence that a parent was 
convicted of a crime involving 
sexual assault, and the child was 
conceived as a result of the 
sexual offense.
Court may TPR when petitioner 
proves by clear and convincing 
evidence that child was conceived 
as a result of a sexual assault.
The court shall consider the 
best interest of the child.
Victim may file petition
Court is not required to TPR 
if a parent is convicted of 
gross sexual assault, the 
other parent states that the 
sexual act was consensual, 
and the other parent 
opposes the TPR.
Maryland MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW
§ 5-1402(a) (LexisNexis 
2019).
“Termination of parental 
rights after conviction of
nonconsensual sexual
conduct that resulted in 
conception of child.”
May TPR when the court finds 
that the person “has been 
convicted of an act of 
nonconsensual sexual conduct” or 
finds by clear and convincing 
evidence that the person 
committed an act of 
nonconsensual sexual conduct 
resulting in the conception of the 
child.
Must find by clear and 
convincing evidence that 
TPR is in the best interest of 
the child.
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Mississippi MISS. CODE § 93-15-
119(1)(b) (2018).
“Grounds for involuntary 
termination of parental 
rights; standard
of proof; rebuttal of 
allegations of desertion; 
inquiry as to military 
status.”
May TPR when the court finds by 
clear and convincing evidence 
that a parent committed a sexual 
act and that the child was 
conceived as a result of the 
unlawful sexual act.
Court may exercise its 
discretion not to TPR “if the 
child’s safety and welfare will 
not be compromised or 
endangered and terminating 
the parent’s parental right is 
not in the child’s best 
interests.” MISS. CODE. § 93-
15-123 (2017), “Court 
discretion not to terminate.”
Missouri MO. REV. STAT.





terminate parental rights 
filed, when—juvenile 
court may terminate 
parental rights, when—
investigation to be 
made—grounds for 
termination.”
May TPR if “the court finds that by 
clear, cogent, and convincing 
evidence that the biological father 
committed the act of forcible rape 
or rape in first degree against the 
biological mother” and the child 
was conceived as a result of the 
act.
Victim of rape may file 
petition to TPR of the 
biological father.
Court must find by 
preponderance of evidence 
that TPR is in the best 
interest of child.
Montana MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 41-
3-609, -801(2) (2019).
“Termination of parental 
rights where a child was 
conceived without 
consent;” “Criteria for 
termination.”




May TPR when the parent “is 
convicted of a felony in which 
sexual intercourse occurred” or “at 
a fact-finding hearing is found by 
clear and convincing 
evidence . . . to have committed 
an act of sexual intercourse 
without consent, sexual assault, or 
incest that caused the child to be 
conceived.”
Person convicted of 45-5-503 
(“Sexual intercourse without 
consent”) forfeits all parental and 
custodial rights to the child.
Victim may file.
Provision contained within 
Criminal Code.
Provisions of Penalty 
Enhancement (Section 41-1-
401) must be followed for 
section to apply.
Oklahoma OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A, § 1-
4-904(B)(11) (2011).
“Termination of parental 
rights in certain 
situations.”
May TPR upon “a finding that the 
child was conceived as a result of 
rape perpetrated by the parent 
whose rights are sought to be 
terminated.”
Court shall not TPR unless it 
is in the best interest of the 
child.
Case law suggests that TPR 
must be established by clear 
and convincing evidence. 
See, e.g., In re E.H., 429 
P.3d 1003, 1007 (Okla. Civ. 
App. 2018).
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Pennsylvania 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 2511(a)(7) (2010).
“Grounds for involuntary 
termination.”
23 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 5329(b.1) (2018).
“Consideration of criminal 
conviction.”
May TPR if “the parent is the 
father of a child conceived as a 
result of rape or incest.”
If the parent who is the victim 
objects, the court shall not award 
any type of custody to a parent 
convicted of a sexual offense 
when the child was conceived as 
a result of the sexual offense.
TPR must be in the best 
interest of the child.
Pursuant to case law 
grounds for TPR must be 
established by clear and 
convincing evidence. See,
e.g., In re Y.A., No. 1059 
EDA 2018, 2018 WL 
4270291, at *3-4 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. Sept. 7, 2018).
Provision contained in 
Adoption Act Victim need not 
have a contemplated 
adoption. H.B. 1984, 2019-
20 Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (Pa. 2019). Prior to 
H.B. 1984 passing, the PA 
Superior Court held that 
victim need not have a 
contemplated adoption if for
cause shown. See In re Z.E., 
Nos. 3577 EDA 2018 & 3624 
EDA 2018, 2019 WL 
3779711 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
Aug. 12, 2019).
A court may award any type 
of custody if the victim has 
opportunity to be heard; child 
consents; and court finds it is 
in the best interest of the 
child.
Texas TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 161.007(a) (West 
2014).
“Termination When 
Pregnancy Results From 
Criminal Act.”
The court shall TPR if the court 
finds by clear and convincing 
evidence that the parent 
committed sexual assault and the 
child was conceived as a result of 
the offense.
TPR must be in the best 
interest of the child.
Wisconsin WIS. STAT. § 48.415(9) 
(2018).
“Grounds for involuntary 
termination of parental 
rights.”
Ground for TPR includes 
“[p]arenthood as a result of sexual 
assault . . . Conception as a result 
of sexual assault as specified in 
this paragraph may be proved by 
a final judgement of conviction or 
other evidence produced at a fact-
finding hearing.”
Burden of proof is not 
specified for “other evidence 
produced at a fact- finding
hearing.” Case law suggests 
it would be a clear and 
convincing standard. See,
e.g., In re Kyle S.-G, 533 
N.W.2d 794, 799 (Wis. 
1995).
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Arizona ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-416 (2017). “Sexual 
assault conviction; effects 
on rights.”
Person convicted of sexual 
assault does not have legal 
decision-making or parenting-
time rights with regard to the 
child if the child was conceived 
as a result of the assault.
Arkansas ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-
121 (2015).
“Termination of certain 
parental rights for 
putative fathers convicted 
of rape.”
“All rights of a putative father to 
custody, visitation, or contact 
with a child conceived as a 
result of a rape shall be 
terminated immediately upon 
conviction of the rape in which 
the child was conceived . . .”
The biological mother may 
petition the court to reinstate 
the parental rights.
California CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 3030(b) (West 2020).
“Sex offenders; 
murderers; custody and 
visitation; child
support; disclosure of 
information relating to 
custodial parent.”
“No person shall be granted 
custody of, or visitation with, a 
child if the person has been
convicted under Section 261 of 
the Penal code (rape) and the 
child was conceived as a result 
of that violation.”




visitation, custody or 
residence of a child to a 
sex offender.”
When the biological father of a 
child is convicted, pleads guilty 
or nolo contendere to any 
degree of rape or unlawful 
sexual intercourse in the 1st or 
2nd degree and the child was 
conceived as a result of the 
offense, he “shall not be 
permitted visitation privileges.”
Illinois 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 46
/622 (2018).
“Allocation of parental 
responsibilities or 
parenting time prohibited 
to men who father 
through sexual assault or 
sexual abuse.”
A father, who was convicted, 
pled guilty or nolo contendere to 
a sexual offense or,
at a fact-finding hearing, “is 
found by clear and convincing 
evidence to have committed an 
act of non-consensual sexual 
penetration” and the child was 
conceived as a result of the 
offense, is “not entitled to”
parenting time with the child 
without the mother’s consent.
Petition may be filed by the 
mother or the child’s
guardian as an affirmative 
petition or an affirmative 
defense.
Kentucky KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 403.322, 405.028 
(West 2018).
“Custody, visitation, and 
inheritance rights denied 
parent convicted of felony 
sexual offense from 
which victim delivered a 
child; waiver; child 
support obligation.”
“[A]ny person who has been 
convicted of a felony offense 
under KRS Chapter 510, in 
which the victim of that offense 
has conceived and delivered a 
child, shall not have custody or 
visitation rights . . . . “
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Massachusetts MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
209C, § 3 (2018).
“Paternity and support 
actions; jurisdiction; 
enforcement of prior 
orders or judgments; 
juvenile court 
commitment proceedings; 
parents convicted of first 
degree murder.”
The court shall not award 
visitation rights to a parent who 
is convicted of rape, and the 
child was conceived as a result 
of the offense, “unless the judge 
determines that such child is of 
suitable age to signify the child’s
assent and the child assents to
such order and that assent is in 
the best interest of the child.”
The court may award 
visitation to a parent 
convicted of rape under 
MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 265, 
§ 23 (2018), if visitation is in 
the best interest of the child 
and the other parent of the 
child has turned 18 and 
consents to visitation or the 
judge determines that 
visitation is in the best 
interest of the child.
New Jersey N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4.1 
(West 2013).
“Custody and visitation 
denied to person 
fathering a
child through rape; 
obligation to support 
minor child unaffected.”
“A person convicted of sexual 
assault under N.J.S. 2C:14-2
shall not be awarded custody or 
visitation rights to any minor 
child, including a minor child 
who was born as a result of or 
was the victim of the sexual 
assault, except upon a showing 
by clear and convincing 
evidence that it is in the best 
interest of the child for custody 
or visitation rights to be 
awarded.”
A denial of custody or 
visitation shall not by itself 
TPR of the person denied 
visitation or custody.
An order awarding custody 
or visitation must be stayed 
for 10 days to allow appeal.
New York N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 240 (McKinney 2010).
“Custody and child 
support; orders of 
protection.”
“[R]ebuttable presumption that it 
is not in the best interest of the 
child to be placed in the custody 
of or to visit with a person who 
has been convicted of” rape and 
child was conceived as a result 
of the offense.
The court may order 
visitation or custody if the 
child is of suitable age and 
consents to an order or, if 
the child is not of suitable 
age, the child’s parent of 
custodian consents to an 
order.
Ohio OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3109.504 (LexisNexis 
2015).
“Prohibition against order 
granting parental rights to 
offender; termination of 
order upon notice.”
The court shall not “issue an 
order granting parental rights to 
a person who has been 
convicted of or plead guilty to 
rape or sexual battery and has 
been declared . . . to be the 
parent of the child conceived as 
a result of rape or sexual battery 
committed by the person.”
If the court issued an order 
granting parental rights, the 
court shall terminate the 
order upon receipt of a 
notice under OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3109.503 
(LexisNexis 2015).
Rhode Island 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-
16(d)(4) (2003).
“Alimony and counsel 
fees—Custody of 
children.”
“No person shall be granted 
custody of or visitation with a 
child if that person has been 
convicted” or pled nolo 
contendere to a sexual assault 
and child was conceived as a 
result of the that act.
Court may order supervised 
visitation and counseling if 
the biological mother 
consents and the court 
determines that visitation is 
in the best interest of the 
child.
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South Dakota S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-
4A-20 (2013).
“Presumption that 
granting custody or 
visitation rights to person 
causing conception by 
rape or incest not in best 
interest of child.”
Rebuttable presumption that “it 
is not in the best interest of the 
child” to have visitation with a 
person that the court has found 
by clear and convincing 
evidence to have committed an 
act of rape or incest that 
resulted in the conception of the 
child.
The court may revoke 
visitation rights if it finds by 
clear and convincing 
evidence that the person 
committed an act of rape or 
incest that resulted in the 
conception of the child.
Utah UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-
414 (LexisNexis 2017).
“Child conceived as result 
of a sexual offense—
Custody and parent-
time.”
A person convicted of a sexual 
offense that results in 
conception of a child may not be 
granted custody or parent-time 
rights.
The court may award 
custody or parenting time if 
the non-offending parent 
consents and the court finds 
it is in the best interest of the 
child.
Virginia VA. CODE ANN. § 20-
124.1 (2019).
“Definitions.”
A person with a legitimate 
interest (in a custody 
proceeding) does not include a 
person convicted of rape when 
the child was conceived as a 
result of the rape.
West Virginia W. VA. CODE § 48-9-209a 
(2015).
“Child conceived as result 
of sexual assault or 
sexual abuse by a parent; 
rights of a biological 
parent convicted of 





The court shall not allocate 
custodial rights or time with the 
child to the biological parent 
convicted of sexual assault
when the child was conceived 
as a result of the rape.
Court may order custodial 
rights or time with the child if 
it finds by “clear and 
convincing evidence that it is
in the best interest of the 
child, adequately protects 
the child and the victim,” and
that the person(s) with 
custody consent.
A denial of custodial 
responsibility or parenting 
time does not by itself TPR.
Table D:
Parentage
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Georgia GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-
22(d)(2) (2018).
“Petition to legitimatize 
child.”
There is a presumption against 
legitimation when the court 
“determines by clear or 
convincing evidence that the 
father caused his child to be 
conceived as a result of having 
nonconsensual intercourse with 
the mother of his child.”
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Michigan MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 722.1445(2) (2019).
“Determinations and 




“Child custody disputes; 
controlling interests, 
presumption; award of 
custody to parent 
convicted of criminal 
sexual conduct or acts of 
nonconsensual sexual 
penetration”
When the mother “proves by 
clear and convincing evidence 
that the child was conceived as 
result of nonconsensual sexual 
penetration the court shall do 
one of the following:
(a) Revoke an 
acknowledgement of parentage 
for an acknowledged father.
(b) Determine that the genetic 
father is not the child’s father.
(c) Set aside an order of filiation 
for an affiliated father.
(d) Make a determination of 
paternity regarding an alleged 
father and enter an order of 
revocation of paternity of that 
alleged father.”
The court shall not award 
custody when a parent is 
convicted of criminal sexual 
conduct or if found by clear and 
convincing evidence in a fact-
finding hearing to have 
committed acts of 
nonconsensual sexual 
penetration and the child is 
conceived as a result of the 
acts.
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Vermont VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, 
§ 616 (2019).
“Precluding establishment 
of parentage by 
perpetrator of sexual 
assault.”
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, 
§ 665(f)(1)-(2) (2019).
“Rights and 
responsibilities order; best 
interests of the child.”
“In a proceeding in which a 
person is alleged to have 
committed a sexual assault that 
resulted in the birth of a child, 
the person giving birth may seek 
to preclude the establishment of 
the other person’s parentage.”
“The court may enter an order 
awarding sole parental rights 
and responsibilities to parent 
and denying all parent-child 
contact with the other parent if 
the court finds . . . that the 
nonmoving parent was 
convicted of sexually assaulting 
the moving parent and the child 
was conceived as a result of the 
sexual assault” or the court 
“finds by clear and convincing 
evidence that the child was 
conceived as a result of the 
nonmoving parent sexually 
assaulting or sexually exploiting 
the moving parent.”
Section does not apply if the 
person has already been 
adjudicated to be the parent of 
the child.
Must show by clear and 
convincing evidence that the 
person was convicted of a 
sexual assault and the child 
was conceived as a result of 
the conduct or clear and 
convincing evidence that the 
person committed the sexual 
assault and the child was 
conceived as a result of the 
sexual assault.
If court finds that the burden 
has been met, it “shall enter 
an order (1) adjudicating that 
the person alleged to have 
committed a sexual assault is 
not the parent of the child; 2) 
requiring that the Department 
of Health amend the birth 
certificate to delete the name 
of the person precluded as a
parent; and 3) requiring that 
the person alleged to have 
committed a sexual offense to 
pay child support or birth-
related costs, or both, unless 
the person giving birth 
requests otherwise.”
The court may also award 
sole parental rights to the 
moving party when the moving 
party was trafficked by the 
nonmoving party.
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Washington WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 26.26A.465 (2020).
“Precluding establishment 
of parentage by 
perpetrator of sexual 
assault.”
Parent may seek to preclude the 
person who committed a sexual 
assault that resulted in 
conception of the child from 
establishing or maintaining 
parentage of the child.
An allegation that child was 
conceived as a result of sexual 
assault may be proved by a 
conviction or guilty plea or by 
clear, cogent, and convincing 
evidence that the person 
committed the sexual assault.
Section does not apply if the 
person who committed the 
sexual assault “has previously 
been adjudicated in a 
proceeding . . . to be a parent 
of the child.”
If the court determines 
allegations have been proved 
“the court shall: (a) Adjudicate 
that the person . . . is not the 
parent of the child . . .
(b) Require the state registrar 
of vital statistics to amend the 
birth record if requested by the 
parent and the court 
determines that the 
amendment is in the best 
interest of the child . . . .”
More detailed versions of Tables A-D may be found at 
jclewisesq.wordpress.com. Click the Resources Tab then select “The 
Stability Paradox.”
